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ABSTRACT 
 
While the discourse of great power politics is an intellectual commonplace of International 
Relations theory, its roots in nineteenth-century conceptions of imperialism have rarely been 
the subject of any sustained historical analysis. Rather, the prevailing literature on great power 
competition relies on transhistorical theoretical claims about the permanence of geopolitical 
rivalry under anarchy, in conjunction with a common imaginary of early modern Europe as 
the birthplace of modern international politics. In contrast, this thesis locates the origins of a 
specifically modern condition of global power politics in the strategic and ideological conflicts 
which drove the New Imperialism, c.1870-1914. With a particular focus on the evolution of 
the American Empire, it traces the international, societal, and geopolitical transformations 
which made possible the flourishing of imperial ambitions for world power in the century after 
the first Industrial Revolution (1780-1815). 
 
On this basis, the thesis makes three overarching contributions to the study of International 
Relations. First, to the debate over the origins of modern international politics, it contributes a 
sociohistorical account of the novel conceptions of grand strategy, empire, and geopolitics 
associated with the nineteenth-century transition to modernity. Moving beyond the so-called 
‘Westphalian narrative’ of international modernity, it locates the production of a distinctively 
modern conception of national-imperial expansionism and civilizational hierarchy in the lived 
unevenness of industrialization and colonialism. Second, to the literature in historical sociology 
and international security, it contributes an intersocietal approach which challenges the 
conventional ‘states-under-anarchy’ framework and links power-political competition to the 
unevenly experienced constraints of global social structures. In so doing, it explains how the 
international pattern of the industrial revolution — the uneven and combined development of 
an empire-centered world economy and international order — interacted with emergent 
ideologies of social progress to shape and legitimize imperial projects of political order building.  
More generally, the thesis recovers the nineteenth century experience of a globalized struggle 
among empires as a critical counterpoint to apolitical accounts of globalization.     
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1.  INTRODUCTION   
POWER POLITICS IN THE GLOBAL CONDITION, 1870-1914 
 
 
 
World history has not always existed. History as world history [is] a result.1 
— Karl Marx (1858) 
 
Among a plurality of co-existing polities, some, the Great Powers, usually ascribe to themselves and 
usurp an interest in political and economic processes over a wide orbit. Today such orbits encompass 
the whole surface of the planet.2  
— Max Weber (1910) 
 
I. Historicizing Power Politics 
 
According to conventional wisdom, the modern geopolitical order is marked by a recurrent 
pattern of great power politics.3 In a formally anarchic universe of multiple sovereign states, 
the struggle for power and position among independent actors is widely viewed as an inexorable 
force of history, rooted in the “essentially conflictual” nature of political life.4 Given the 
fragmentary character of the modern political field, where human existence is divided into a 
plurality of sovereign polities, power and security constitute the primary motivations of 
collective action, generating a repetitive dynamic of inter-group conflicts mediated by force. In 
this bleak perspective, the external field of statecraft remains defined by the timeless imperatives 
of Realpolitik.5 For according to the realist tradition of International Relations (IR) theory, surely 
the twentieth century’s most influential body of international thought, a competitive system of 
strategic rivalry is the inevitable consequence of geopolitical anarchy — the absence of 
overarching authority at the interstate level.6 To the degree that the international system 
comprises a plurality of independent states, the practice of power politics — strategic action 
                                                
1 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 
1993), 109. 
2 Max Weber, “Structures of Power,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. C. Wright Mills and H.H Gerth 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 161. 
3 Classic statements of this theme include: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
4th ed. (1948; repr., New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf, 1967), 5, 8, 211–15; Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: 
A Theoretical Analysis (1959; repr., New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 160; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 128, 186; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order 
in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), 111–12, 256; Martin Wight, “Why Is There No International 
Theory?,” International Relations 2, no. 1 (1960): 44, 48; Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1977), 131–33, 151–52; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 7, 228. 
4 Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” International Organization 38, no. 2 (1984): 
290. For two more recent accounts along these lines, see, John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 
(New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2001), 5, 31–37; Nuno P Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 31–36. 
5 Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” 304. 
6 For the seminal statement of this view in contemporary IR, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, esp. 88, 91, 
105. 
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oriented to the pursuit of power and influence rather than the realization of ethical or other 
nonpolitical goals — will remain the ultima ratio of international relations.7 While the modern 
connotations of this schema actually stem from the late-nineteenth century — when the notion 
of “Machtpolitik” first emerged from a wider discourse on the newly conceived problems of 
“world politics” and “national statecraft”8 — the realist tradition has elevated the power-
political interpretation of international affairs to the status of a perennial law of politics. From 
this perspective, the “timeless wisdom” of Realpolitik has unfolded continuously since the era of 
the Peloponnesian War (c. 431 BC – 404 BC), when Thucydides purportedly described the 
balance of power between states as the essence of international politics.9 This transhistorical 
outlook has perhaps found its most famous expression in Kenneth Waltz’s dictum that: “The 
enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the 
quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide 
assent.”10 Anarchy, violence, and self-interest: the realist tradition depicts world politics as a 
ceaseless struggle for survival, where political communities appear as oppositional conflict-
groups, and universal values give way to the tragic conflict between particularistic identities.11 
 
While the formal theoretic foundations of this states-under-anarchy framework are, properly 
speaking, non-historical,12 its intellectual force and prevalence owe much to IR’s own 
circumscribed historical imaginary.13 For the argument that international relations is defined 
by a perennial system of anarchy finds broad support in the idea of the “Westphalian states 
                                                
7 This definition of power politics is consistent with the way the term power politics is used by most authors in the 
realist tradition and related fields. For an overview, see, Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel Nexon, “The Dynamics of 
Global Power Politics: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of Global Security Studies 1, no. 1 (2016): 5; Murielle 
Cozette, “Realistic Realism? American Political Realism, Clausewitz and Raymond Aron on the Problem of 
Means and Ends in International Politics,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 438–43; Michael 
C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 6–7. 
8 The clearest historical account of the nineteenth-century origins of these institutional spheres and conceptual 
categories, the nation-state model and the image of “the world” as a single geopolitical system, is provided by 
Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2014), xv, 83–88, 394–95.  On the nineteenth-century origins of the idea of “world politics” and 
other indices of global political consciousness, see, Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and The Future of 
World Order, 1860-1900 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 261–66; Barry Buzan and George 
Lawson, The Global Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 52–53, 67–78; Mathias Albert, 
A Theory of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 81–131. On the origins of the ideas of 
“Realpolitik” and “Machtpolitik” during the same historical period, see, Keya Ganguly, “Machtpolitik,” in The 
Encyclopedia of Political Thought (Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 2224–25; John Bew, Realpolitik: A History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 7–8, 68-76 85-87.  
9 Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism,” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, 
Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 60; Richard Ned Lebow, The 
Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 357. 
10 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 66. 
11 On this ethical dimension of realist theorizing, see, Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1946; 
repr., London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), esp. 195-196, 199, 220-223. 
12 For a good overview of the structural-functionalist assumptions of Waltzian neorealism, see, Stacie Goddard 
and Daniel Nexon, “Paradigm Lost? Reassessing Theory of International Politics,” European Journal of International 
Relations 11, no. 1 (2005): 9–61. 
13 On the (a)historical dimensions of realist theorizing, see, George Lawson, “The Eternal Divide? History and 
International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 2 (June 1, 2012): 206–8; also, B. de 
Carvalho, H. Leira, and J. M. Hobson, “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You 
about 1648 and 1919,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3 (May 1, 2011): 735–58. 
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system” that has traditionally shaped the discipline’s understanding of modernity.14 In this 
orthodox perspective, it is the rise of the “balance of power” principle in the period between 
the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of Utrecht (1713) which marks the onset of 
modern geopolitical relations. After the Protestant Reformation, the break-up of European 
Christendom is said to have generated an increasingly multipolar interstate system, defined by 
the structural dualism of political hierarchy and geopolitical anarchy. As the means of 
legitimate violence were gradually monopolized by a plurality of independent sovereign 
powers, the interstate order emerged as anarchical realm populated by autonomous war-
states.15 On this basis, the putative foundations of modern geopolitics — state sovereignty, 
territorial independence, impersonal raison d’état, the balance of power, interstate war, sovereign 
equality, and formal anarchy — were institutionalized across the emergent European states 
system during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.16  
 
This historical narrative has been foundational for IR’s prevailing conceptions of the modern 
geopolitical order. Its overall thrust — the evolution of an autonomous sovereign war-state 
from the competitive pluriverse of European geopolitics — casts the rise of an anarchical 
balance-of-power order as the defining hallmark of modern international relations. Although 
the treaties of Westphalia recognized neither the absolute sovereignty nor the independence of 
their signatories, who remained patrimonial-dynastic polities rather than modern-bureaucratic 
nation-states, a highly selective understanding of early modern Europe has been allowed to 
dominate IR-theoretic models of modern international systems and power politics.17 This 
conception of modern international relations not only obscures the historical continuity of the 
ancien régime post-1648.18 It has also served to naturalize and justify the core themes of the realist 
international theory — the primacy and autonomy of an anarchical interstate system 
comprising independent sovereign actors.19 
 
                                                
14 For this conception of Westphalia, see, for example: Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,” The 
American Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (1948): 28; Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 264; Bull, The Anarchical 
Society, 101–7.  
15 For an early statement of this view, which sees interstate power politics as both the causal driver and essential 
condition of the modern geopolitical order, see Otto Hintze, “Military Organization and the Organization of the 
State,” in The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. Otto Hintze and Felix Gilbert (1906; repr., New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), here at 199. For the contemporary version of the argument, see, Charles Tilly, 
“Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. 
Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
16 Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power,” in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. 
Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966); Martin Wight, Power Politics, 
ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (1946; repr., New York, NY: Leicester University Press, 1978). 
17 For the most systematic critique to date of the idea of Westphalia as the origins of the modern states system, see, 
Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the  Making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 
2003).   
18 On the variety of feudal, religious, and aristocratic forms of ancien régime political organization which survived 
and sustained the Westphalian settlement, see, Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the 
Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251–87; Andreas Osiander, “Before Sovereignty: 
Society and Politics in Ancien Régime Europe,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 5 (December 2001): 119–45. 
19 On the historical limitations of this view, which effectively obscures the reality of imperial hierarchies in world 
politics, see also Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31, no. 1 (2002): 109–127. 
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Yet it was not before the nineteenth century that the state and international system as we know 
it today emerged. Contrary to the expectations of the Westphalian narrative — and against the 
transhistorical thrust of the neorealist schema — it was only in the period after the first 
industrial revolution (1780-1815) that the ideologies, practices, and structures of interstate 
politics began to converge around a recognizably modernist nation-state model of institutional 
and political organization.20  Now, for the first, time, it became possible to define the state as 
an impersonal corporate entity, rather than the personal patrimony of an absolutist monarch. 
Quite unlike the world of European feudalism, international politics could now operate as a 
clash of separate “national interests,” structured by the parliamentary, civic, and socioeconomic 
institutions of the first nation-states.21 Far from being timeless, the first formal theories of 
Realpolitik and power politics began to emerge in this context. Centered on the problem of how 
to manage the affairs of state in a rapidly changing international order, they announced the 
emergent sense of global interdependence and volatile military and economic competition 
generated by the new industrial age.22 In the final decades of the nineteenth century, these 
power-political conceptions of the modern geopolitical order began to coalesce around a 
distinctly imperialist form of “high nationalism,” which gave expression to the increasingly 
rivalrous international conditions being generated by the spread of industrial capitalism to new 
power-centers in  the United States, Germany, Russia, and Japan.23 Neither the states-under-
anarchy framework, nor the Westphalian modernization narrative, have much purchase on 
this process of historical development: the highly uneven nineteenth-century transition to an 
international order dominated by industrializing capitalist states, and organized along national-
imperial lines. This long-term dynamic of social and geopolitical transformation can hardly be 
explained as an outgrowth of the European states system. Westphalia c.1648 or Utrecht c.1713 
were separated from the imperial capitals of London, Berlin and Tokyo c.1880 not just by the 
passage of time, but by an industrial revolution which had transformed the social sources of 
state power itself. Even if the existence of an anarchic geopolitical structure can be traced far 
back into the timelines of human history, coming to terms with the implications of power 
transformation on this scale — the rise of a recognizably modern epoch of industrial societies 
enmeshed within the single global space of the world market — requires something more than 
a general theorem of balance-of-power-politics. 
 
The genesis of this thesis derives from a desire to break free from such ahistorical models of 
analysis, to transcend the Westphalian narrative of modern international politics, and to 
reexamine our understanding of modern geopolitical behavior in light of the historical 
conditions which engendered the first sustained ideologies and practices of imperialism on a 
global scale. I conceived its title, The Emergence of Global Power Politics, in part as a description of 
the new form of international competition that marked the evolution of New Imperialism, and 
                                                
20 Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, 1–4, 24–38, 147ff. 
21 Osterhammel, Transformation, 394–98; cf. Osiander, “Before Sovereignty,” 144. 
22 For the general point, see, Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), 214ff; Bew, Realpolitik, 32; George Steinmetz, “Geopolitics,” in The Wiley-Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Globalization (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2012).  
23 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “The Varieties of the Nation State in Modern History: Liberal, Imperialist, Fascist, and 
Contemporary Notions of Nation and Nationality,” in The Rise and Decline of the Nation-State, ed. Michael Mann 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 210–26. I elaborate on this point in detail below.  
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in part as an allusion to the historically emergent character of different possible forms of 
geopolitical behavior and rivalry. As this emphasis on history and emergence implies, my 
intention is to analyze such foundational theoretic categories as “power” and “world politics” 
in explicitly historical terms: examining their evolving social character, and providing evidence 
for the belief that the transformations in political life which marked the New Imperialism 
constitute a transitional phase in the historical unfolding of modernity. On this basis, I shall 
evaluate the relative adequacy of various theories of power politics in international relations 
through an extensive historical analysis of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century era 
imperial rivalries. Given the historical oversights and theoretical indeterminacy of the states-
under-anarchy model,24 there are good reasons to re-examine the conceptions of power politics 
that dominate existing IR theory, and to try to formulate an alternative method of analysis that 
is more attuned to the empirical diversity of modern international power struggles. My core 
argument is directed at a question which remains implicit in the legacy of political realism: 
What does rejecting the conventional interpretation of the modern geopolitical order — 
understood as an anarchical interstate system, organized around the balance of power, and 
defined by the competitive national security strategies of independent sovereign states — imply 
for our understanding of the nature and evolution of power politics in modernity?  
 
My overarching answer is that it implies that a turn toward historical sociology is essential for 
reconceptualizing and reconstructing the nature of power politics as a modern category of 
international thought and practice. My position is that the phenomena usually studied under 
the title of power-political competition — state power, foreign policy, grand strategy, 
international systems, geopolitical competition, and interstate war — need to be properly 
historicized in order to identify and theorize their conditions of possibility, modes of operation, 
and unfolding international dynamics. As such, I seek to develop a historical sociology of 
international relations focused on the unfolding pathways for strategic action generated by the 
variable relations between economic, coercive, and ideological structures. This analytical 
perspective aims to induce broader theoretic and conceptual explanations for the nature and 
dynamic of global power politics by focusing on the sociopolitical conflicts, socioeconomic 
transformations, and ideological frameworks which motivated the architects of late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century imperial foreign policies. This inductive method of analysis is 
guided by a historicist conception of social science that seeks to embed broader theoretical 
                                                
24 The logic of anarchy is causally indeterminate since its fundamental criterion — absence of governmental 
authority at an interstate level —  specifies permissive conditions rather than causal mechanisms. This is perhaps 
why Waltz, in a strange aside, could argue that even the process of European integration post-1945 — not typically 
an example of Realpolitik — could exemplify the nature of state-behaviour under anarchy. Theory of International 
Politics, 71. Given the indeterminacy of anarchy, many international relations scholars now emphasize the variety 
of forms and causes of geopolitical behaviour within multi-state systems, undermining the core realist premise of 
international politics as an invariant, anarchy-generated, system of power-balancing and security-maximization. 
For an overview see, Daniel Nexon, “The Balance of Power in the Balance,” World Politics 61, no. 2 (April 2009): 
330–59. On the limits of realist balance-of-power theory see also Victoria Tin-bor Hui, “Toward a Dynamic 
Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe,” International 
Organization 58, no. 1 (2004): 175–205; Møller Jørgen, “Why Europe Avoided Hegemony: A Historical Perspective 
on the Balance of Power,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (December 11, 2014): 660–70. 
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abstractions in the concrete practices of international relations, understood as a lived field of 
social multiplicity.25  
 
My emphasis on historicism in this context is not just intended to invoke the contextual 
specificity of particular forms and relations of “international power.” More fundamentally, it is 
an attempt to comprehend the international character and geopolitical implications of the 
transition to modernity which IR has conventionally associated with the era of the Westphalian 
settlement. Specifically, I seek to better understand the changes which the conduct, structure, 
and dynamics of international relations underwent during the onset of the global industrial era 
in the nineteenth century. In what follows, I therefore develop a sustained dialogue between 
international theory and international history by consistently tracking between the practices of 
conceptual elaboration, historical analysis, and theoretical explanation, in order to build a 
coherent understanding of the nineteenth-century emergence of global power politics. The 
underlying ethos of this account can be described as a form of global historical sociology — an 
approach which combines the principles of historicism with an attempt to grasp the operations 
of social power on multiple scales of social and intersocietal interaction.26    
 
Towards this end, I focus on the era of the New Imperialism (c.1870-1914) as a transitional 
phase in the emergence of a fully globalized international order and world economy — a new 
arena for the exercise of state power and strategic force. This focus is motivated by my 
conviction that the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperial era was grounded in a 
distinctively modern geopolitical configuration of national-imperial states bound together 
within the emergent global sphere of a single yet highly uneven world market. This evolving 
condition of intersocietal conflict and interdependence constituted a world-historical departure 
from the balance-of-power order associated with early modern Europe: rather than the 
dynastic-absolutist states of the late-feudal period, its constitutive actors were capitalist societies 
organized as national-imperial states; in contrast to the essentially agrarian world of the pre-
nineteenth century, its power hierarchies of industrial growth, colonial rule, and naval 
supremacy reflected the socially uneven and regionally differentiated development of the 
industrial revolution; centered on the political authority of a secular-rational sovereign states, 
its constituting ideologies, of “high nationalism” and “civilizational imperialism,” were modern 
forms of cultural universalism, radically opposed to the personalized and religious authority 
structures of European absolutism.  
 
As such, the late-nineteenth century age of empire needs to be recognized as a key phase in the 
so-called medieval-to-modern shift:27 the transition from feudalism toward a modern geopolitical 
system defined by politically and militarily centralized states, capitalist socioeconomic relations, 
                                                
25 On multiplicity, the signifiance of which I return to below, see Justin Rosenberg, “International Relations in 
the Prison of Political Science,” International Relations 30, no. 2 (2016): 127–53. 
26 For an overview, see, Julian Go and George Lawson, eds., Global Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017).  
27 John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” 
World Politics 35, no. 2 (1983): 273, 279, 282. 
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and the universalization of secular-rational standards of political authority.28 As I will illustrate, 
the imperial power struggles which spawned the first ideas of Machtpolitik and world politics 
were anchored in a security problematic which only became possible in modernity. Far from 
being timeless, the political and ideological underpinnings of the New Imperialism reflected a 
widely-felt need to manage the pressures of a universalizing yet highly uneven and crisis-prone 
capitalist world market, and to stabilize the pressures of societal and cultural difference that 
were being brought into a single global orbit. This emergent sense of world-scale geopolitical 
and security imperatives was marked and made by the transformation of the international order 
into an arena of intersocietal conflict between the first industrial societies and national-imperial 
states, the emergence of global power politics. 
 
The central claim of this thesis thus takes the form of a characterization and periodization of 
global power politics as a modern form of geopolitical behavior. This interpretation rests on a 
conception of the contradictory pattern of the industrial revolution — that is, the uneven and 
combined development of industrial capitalism within the empire-centered interstate system 
and world economy of the long-nineteenth century.29 In this historical process, I suggest, the 
regionally differentiated pattern of industrial capitalism, together with the global structures of 
social interaction it helped generate, engendered hierarchies of wealth, status, and coercive 
capacity that encouraged expansive strategies of imperial competition. On the one hand, the 
steep unevenness of the long-nineteenth century industrial revolution fostered a highly 
competitive international dynamic. The specific power hierarchies generated by the uneven 
spread of industrial growth — the development of a sustained military and economic “power 
gap” between “early” and “late” industrializers30 — made the evolving world economy into an 
arena of competitive coexistence, rooted in the tensions between societies undergoing the 
transition to industrialization at very different speeds. On the other hand, the distinctive pattern 
of intersocietal interdependencies forged by this nineteenth century conjunction of social 
processes — including the experience of spatio-temporal restructuring enabled by new forms 
of transportation and communications technology, the deepening of socioeconomic ties and 
regional interactions brought about by industrialization and colonialism, the generalization of 
a world market in trade and financial transactions, and the proliferation of novel ideologies of 
inter-cultural comparison (e.g. civilizationism, developmentalism, and nationalism) — 
promoted what can be best described as the globalization of modern political horizons.  
 
As a consequence, late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century conceptions of imperial 
competition revolved around various national idioms of world politics that figured the conflict 
                                                
28 This understanding of the transition to modernity is an amalgam of various approaches in the literature. See, 
Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations (London: Verso, 
1994), 126; Ayşe Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 38–56; Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, 3ff. 
29 The resurgence of the theory of uneven and combined development in contemporary international theory has 
been pioneered by Justin Rosenberg. For the early development of the idea, see, Justin Rosenberg, “Isaac 
Deutscher and the Lost History of International Relations,” New Left Review 215 (1996): 3–15; Justin Rosenberg, 
“Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 
307–40.  
30 This follows Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, 9. 
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dynamics and external environment as a single global arena. It was in this specific context, as 
this thesis illustrates, that the making of a national-imperial state with expansive spheres of 
external influence overseas came to be viewed as a legitimate and necessary political response 
to the intersocietal pressures produced by the historical unevenness of the industrial transition. 
In this sense, the emergence of global power politics was anchored in a process of societal and 
geopolitical transformation that was only possible in modernity. The pursuit of world power 
envisioned by the architects of the New Imperialism announced the advent of a novel security 
problematic rooted in the industrial-era experience of capitalist unevenness.  
 
Before introducing the empirical material and theoretic principles which underpin this 
argument, my emphasis on the modernity of global power politics requires some further 
clarification. While parts of this thesis illustrate the qualitative differences between the inter-
imperial system of the late-nineteenth century and the pre-industrial geopolitical orders of the 
Utrecht balance-of-power and the Concert of Europe (c.1713-1815/1848),31 the following 
work is not designed as a systematically comparative study. Rather, it is primarily intended as 
a sustained analytic narrative of the political, strategic, and ideological projects that sustained 
the New Imperialism. With a particular focus on the American Empire, I seek to provide an 
interpretation of the international contexts that produced imperial ambitions for world power, 
to illustrate the structural and historical forces that produced the emergent geopolitical order, 
and to explain how American grand strategy was shaped by the United States’ competitive 
coexistence with rival empires. This research design does not lend itself to a full analysis of the 
differentia specifica of modern international systems and practices; for it lacks the kind of 
systematic historical comparison that such a procedure would require. Consequently, while I 
can claim to specify the distinctively modern characteristics of late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century global power politics — by illustrating that the historical emergence, 
ideological foundations, and geopolitical trajectory of nineteenth century imperialisms were 
inseparably tied to the conjunction between uneven capitalist development and national-
imperial state-formation — it would be an exaggeration to describe my argument as an account 
of the origins of power politics per se. In other words, though I will emphasize that the core idea 
of great power politics as we know it today — where the very idea of a “great power” is tied to 
the ability of the state to manage the global pressures of socioeconomic and political unevenness  
— is very much rooted in the historical conditions of nineteenth century modernity, I do not 
seek to rule out the possibility of some pre-modern forms of power-political behavior, perhaps 
with a meaningful family resemblance relationship to modern geopolitical conditions. This 
qualification has two main sources.  
 
Firstly, this study is not organized around a systematic comparison of modern and pre-modern   
geopolitical systems (ancient, feudal, dynastic, monarchical-imperial, absolutist, etc.). As a 
result, while there are likely aspects of power-political thought and practice — for example, the 
idea that sovereignty is primarily a reflection of power-capacities rather than natural or political 
rights — which are exclusive to the modern era of impersonal statehood and capitalist political 
economy, the design of this thesis is not intended to specify the distinguishing characteristics of 
                                                
31 See especially, Chapter 1, section III and Chapter 3 sections III-IV.  
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modern geopolitical systems in general.32 Instead, its purpose is to identify and theorize the new 
pathways and orientations for international rivalry and geopolitical projection generated over 
the course of the nineteenth century. On this basis, it is possible to make generalizations about 
the qualitative modernity of global power politics, and to historicize the conflict dynamics of 
the New Imperialism, but it is not possible define the generative grammar of modern 
geopolitical relations as a whole.  The kind of macro-historical comparison of geopolitical 
systems which this analysis would require is a project I hope to pursue in future work, but it is 
not the main objective of this thesis.33 Secondly, there are a number of good theoretical reasons 
to treat a minimal understanding of power-political behavior as a general abstraction that needs 
to historicized in relation to a particular societal and geopolitical context. While I adopt a 
critical attitude toward the transhistorical outlook of much classical and neorealism, this is 
because realist thought has generally failed to analyze the historical production of specific forms 
of state power and geopolitical competition, not because it is wrong to identify power struggles 
(of some kind) as a general feature of international affairs. Unlike other traditions of social and 
political theory, such as Marxism and liberalism, realist thought has long-emphasized how the 
fragmentary character of the geopolitical domain exercises competitive and developmental 
pressures on all human societies, whose insertion into a decentralized international field has 
profound consequences for the ensuing character of politics itself.34 My position in this thesis is 
not that realists are wrong to think that power and domination are likely pervasive features of 
this fragmentary international-political condition, but rather that a meaningful analysis of its 
implications needs to abandon the supra-historical framework of states-under-anarchy, in order 
to better establish the diverse ways in which the geopolitical domain is produced and 
encountered as a field of human practice. This explains why the following chapters place such 
a great emphasis on historical analysis as a method and foundation for theory-building: to better 
understand what power politics and geopolitical fragmentation actually mean in modernity, we 
need to begin from a detailed conception of how the international field has been mediated — 
politically, strategically, and culturally — by living historical actors.  
 
In particular, I suggest that a focus on the emergent “global condition” which shaped the late-
nineteenth century experience of modernization — such as uneven expansion of industrial 
capitalism, the increased centralization and territorialization of national-imperial states, and 
the symbolic ties between empire and civilization — is crucial for overcoming anarchy-centric 
understandings of power politics as a timeless geopolitical form.35 In rejecting this broadly 
realist view, this study draws attention to the constitutive impact of intersocietal 
                                                
32 In this sense, the argument does not operate on the scale of Rosenberg, Empire of Civil Society, chapter 5. 
33 For a leading example of this type of work, see, Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World 
History: Remaking the Study of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
34 For a discussion of the importance of realism’s emphasis on anarchy and power politics from outside the realist 
tradition itself, see especially Justin Rosenberg’s comments on the status of realism in Alex Callinicos and Justin 
Rosenberg, “Uneven and Combined Development: The Social-Relational Substratum of ‘The International’? An 
Exchange of Letters,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 1 (2008): 90–98; and, Andrew Davenport, 
“Marxism in IR: Condemned to a Realist Fate?,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 
27–48.  
35 Defined more fully below, the idea of the global condition is from Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, 
“Benchmarks of Globalization,” in A Companion to World History, ed. Douglas Northrop (Chichester: John Wiley & 
Sons, Ltd, 2012), 285–300. 
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interdependence on the character of interstate conflict and the power dynamics underpinning 
it. In this regard, it places strong historical and analytic emphasis on the unevenly experienced 
dynamics of societal and geopolitical transformation engendered by the late-nineteenth century 
development of a single international hierarchy. Leon Trotsky summarized this feature of the 
modern imperial era in the following way: “imperialism links up incomparably more rapidly 
and more deeply the individual national and continental units into a single entity, bringing 
them into the closest and most vital dependence upon each other and rendering their economic 
methods, social forms, and levels of development more identical.”36 As a result, it is not only 
“impossible to approach the fate of one country” without locating it within a wider conception 
of “world development.”37 It is also crucial to examine the ways in which the intersocietal 
character of the emergent international order produced mechanisms of conflict and 
domination that were rooted in the deep unevenness of industrial development. Drawing on 
this conception of uneven and combined develop, the argument of this thesis depends on what 
can best be described as an intersocietal perspective on international relations which traces the 
causal mechanisms and drivers of global power politics to the interactional constitution of the 
modern international order. By extension, such an approach presents a significant challenge to 
the ahistorical dichotomy between “anarchy” (competitive power politics) and 
“interdependence” (cooperative globalization) that informs much contemporary IR theory.38 
 
Rather than seeking to identify a single mechanism or driver of international competition, this 
thesis develops a historical sociology of international power transformations that focuses on the 
unfolding pathways of, and orientations for, strategic action generated by the variable relations 
between economic, coercive, and ideological structures. 39 Where anarchy-centric approaches 
tend to see power politics as a product of the military rivalries generated by the absence of state-
like authority at a geopolitical level, the historical sociological approach I elaborate in this thesis 
rests on deeper conception of the forms of power and competition generated by the 
international coexistence of societies.40 In particular, I identity three main intersocietal structures 
or dynamics that contributed to the strategic and ideological power struggles unleashed with 
the evolving New Imperialism: (1) the tensions between “advanced” industrial powers (Britain, 
                                                
36 See, Leon Trotsky, The Third International After Lenin, trans. John G. Wright (1928; repr., New York, NY: 
Pathfinder, 1996), 20; also, Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, trans. Max Eastman (1932; repr., London: 
Penguin, 2017), 4–6. 
37 Trotsky, The Third International After Lenin, 42. 
38 The primary context for such intellectual dichotomies — “anarchy” vs. “interdependence,” “power politics” vs. 
“globalization” — was the seminal divide between realist and liberal IR theories. Walter Russell Mead, “The 
Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014): 69–79; G. John 
Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014). The authors and positions associated with 
these debates are examined in the next chapter. 
39 It seems necessary to emphasize that recognition of the analytical power of Trotsky’s conception of uneven and 
combined development does not equate to an endorsement of the political-strategic conclusions he drew from it, 
especially with regard the so-called “permanent revolution” thesis associated with twentieth century Trotskyism. 
For the argument that this strategy might, in fact, have been in contradiction with an analysis of the Russian 
Revolution’s trajectory based on the premise of uneven and combined development, see, Justin Rosenberg, 
“Trotsky’s Error: Multiplicity and the Secret Origins of Revolutionary Marxism,” Globalizations, September 30, 
2019, 15, 18. 
40 As discussed below, this insight is central to Rosenberg’s conception of “the international” such as a product of 
societal multiplicity. See, Rosenberg, “International Relations in the Prison of Political Science.” 
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USA) and “catch-up” empires (Germany, Japan, Russia); (2) the progressive nationalization of 
political-economic and sociocultural relations in response to the processes of global 
interdependence; (3) symbolic competition among national-imperial elites for recognition of 
their civilized status. This combination of dynamics took various historical forms, but the 
crucial point is this: the interrelations between unevenly industrializing empires, in the context 
of a growing nationalization of the societal and political orders, engendered the strategic and 
symbolic conflicts that articulated into the wider dynamics of imperial expansionism and 
rivalry. 
 
In order to develop a sustained analytical narrative of the contribution of this causal 
configuration to the development of specific imperial strategies, ideologies, and projects, I focus 
on the logics of external power-projection developed by American elites in the decades of 
escalating international rivalry that unfolded after 1870. During the final quarter of the 
nineteenth century, American capitalism, its industrial productivity now surpassing that of its 
major economic rivals, emerged as a key factor in the unstable international power hierarchies 
from which imperial rivalries grew. By placing the strategic drives and ideological vocabulary 
of US expansionism in this inter-imperial setting, I aim to make visible the sociohistorical forces 
that shaped the logics of “world power” and “world politics” through which American political-
military elites confronted the challenge of increased global interdependence. I thus seek to shed 
light on the ways in which the strategic and ideological coordinates of American expansion 
were reconstituted in relation to the societal and geopolitical transformations which marked 
the onset modernity.41  
 
The dates I have chosen for the thesis — 1870-1914 — act as a rough indication of its 
chronological range rather than a precise definition of the materials covered in each chapter. 
In some chapters, it is necessary to reach back into the long-nineteenth century pattern of 
industrial development and territorial restructuring in order to capture the developmental 
trajectories of American capitalism and its imperial rivals. In others, it is necessary to look 
forwards in time to grasp the longer-term rationales of US global power projection, which 
crystallized as a project of international-ordering building during the unfolding crisis of the First 
World War. While the United States’ entry into the war in 1917 serves as a kind of coda to the 
argument developed here, the much-debated origins of World War One are not its object.42 
Instead, it aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the transformations of international 
order and imperial competition that shaped the development of a global form of power politics 
on the eve of US world hegemony. Far from being a chronological history of foreign-policy 
                                                
41 My understanding of “modernity” and the “modern international order” as a nineteenth-century constellation 
of growing intersocietal interdependence Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation. On this view, modernity 
refers to a constellation of social structures and international power dynamics wrought by such nineteenth-century 
processes as the industrialization of the capitalist economy, the growth of nationally-constituted states and society, 
the rationalization and bureaucratization of state institutions, and the increasing prevalence of secular, progressive 
forms of ideological power like nationalism and liberalism. On the forms of cultural and socio-symbolic hierarchy 
that accompanied the nineteenth-century expansion of Western dominance see Zarakol, After Defeat.  
42 For a recent interpretation, based on the idea of uneven and combined development, see Alexander Anievas, 
Capital, the State, and War: Class Conflict and Geopolitics in the Thirty Years’ Crisis 1914-1945 (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2014). I discuss Anievas’ important work in the following chapter.  
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decisions, the purpose of this account is to provide an analytical reconstruction of the generative 
historical conditions which enabled the development of global power politics, defined the 
motivations of some its central actors, and engendered the repertoire of cultural forms that 
legitimized the use of force on a world scale.  
 
This chapter establishes the foundations of the thesis by defining its key analytical terms 
(Section II), outlining a historical-sociological understanding of the power transformations that 
shaped the modern global condition (Section III), and describing the structure of its overall 
argument (IV). It uses insights from IR theory, historical sociology, and global history to 
conceptualize some of the key transformations in coercive, ideological, and socioeconomic 
power structures which enabled the globally-oriented ideologies and strategies of external 
expansionism characteristic of the 1870-1914 imperial era.  
 
 
II. Foundations of the Argument 
 
Unlike other major academic disciplines, International Relations (IR) theory has not produced 
much sustained analysis of the historical character of its core analytic categories.43 In this 
respect, a wider objective of this thesis is to historicize the idea of the “struggle for power” that 
stands at the heart of much IR scholarship.44 Given that the terms “power” and “conflict” so 
often seem invoke near-timeless features of the international system, this interest in the practice 
of historicization might appear misplaced. After all, the core relations figured by the concept 
of power politics — of conflict and domination among political communities — have often 
been considered eternal forces of political life as such. Whether it is couched in terms of an 
enduring struggle for human survival,45 as a functional requirement of an anarchical states-
system,46 or as a reflection of the essential nature of military strategy,47 the domain of power 
politics has often been situated outside any meaningful sense of historical time. Influenced by 
the realist tradition of IR theory, such analyses effectively reduce the international “struggle for 
power” to a series of timeless conceptual abstractions — human nature, systemic anarchy, 
strategic violence.48 This thesis elaborates several critiques of such broadly a-historical 
                                                
43 This is now changing. See, for example, Nicholas Guilhot, ed., The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, 
the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011); Patricia 
Owens, Economy of Force : Counterinsurgency and the Historical Rise of the Social (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015); Tarak Barkawi, Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II (Cambridge, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
44 For a classic discussion, much broader in its conceptions of “political economy” and “political order” than many 
contemporary treatments, see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, ed. Michael Cox (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016), 94–100, 108. 
45 Wight, “Why Is There No International Theory?,” 60; Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5ff. 
46 For an especially clear statement of this view, see, Kenneth Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International 
Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), 329; see also, Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism.” 
47 This Clausewitzian argument is prominent in the Strategic Studies literature: Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ix; Charles Hill, Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 5–7; Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2009), 409. 
48 For a seminal critique of this a-historical form of realist IR theory, see, Rosenberg, Empire of Civil Society. 
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perspectives. For now, I highlight two broad analytical principles which inform the argument 
of the entire work. These relate to the form of the international as an object of inquiry and the 
content of global power politics as a historical formation.  
 
AN INTERSOCIETAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
First, in what has become the traditional realist interpretation of power politics, the 
international, the overarching domain of conflict among political communities, is defined by 
the absence of sovereign authority at an interstate level. Lacking the overarching security of a 
state-like authority, states exist within an anarchical environment that produces security 
rivalries — power-political struggles driven by the imperative of survival  — as its single timeless 
dynamic.49 Yet such a negative definition of the form of the international is both unnecessary 
and misleading.50 Rather, international orders, despite the lack of any so-called world state, are 
constituted by the interactions between the different societies which comprise and constitute 
them.51 While the scale, density, and structure of intersocietal interaction is historically variable, 
the interactive multiplicity of human communities is likely a general feature of world history, 
expressed in the forms of exchange, communication, and conflict that have long-operated 
between separate social formations.52  
 
This constitutive feature of social life, the fact that human social organization is comprised of 
multiple interacting societies, indicates that the textures of international relations are not 
adequately conceived by metaphors of “anarchy” that portray the absence of centralized rule 
as the generative principle of international relations.53 For this condition of political 
fragmentation exists together with positive mechanisms of historical development produced 
and reproduced through the processes of intersocietal interaction associated with such core 
features of historical development as trade, warfare, and cultural exchange.54  Whether in the 
form of the substantial power gaps generated by the uneven spread of the Industrial Revolution, 
in the patterns of cross-cultural comparison figured by colonial ideologies of civilizational 
hierarchy, or in the geopolitical pressures engendered by the pursuit of imperialism, the 
distinctively empire-centered international order of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries brought the dynamics of intersocietal multiplicity to a new scale and intensity.55 The 
proliferation of such highly competitive forms of intersocietal interaction — economic, 
ideological, and coercive — brought into being the perceived imperatives for global penetration 
and sustained self-strengthening which were articulated in imperial ideologies of external 
                                                
49 The key statement of this view in the neorealist tradition is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 66. 
50 Rosenberg, “International Relations in the Prison of Political Science,” 136. 
51 Rosenberg, 135–41. For an account of the modern international order that emphasizes the centrality of 
intersocietal interaction, see, Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, 19, 32, 325. 
52 Justin Rosenberg, “Basic Problems in the Theory of Uneven and Combined Development. Part II: Unevenness 
and Political Multiplicity,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23, no. 1 (2010): 185. 
53 Pace Waltz, Theory of International Politics, here at 93. 
54 My definition of the international as a product of societal multiplicity follows Rosenberg, “Why Is There No 
International Historical Sociology?,” 308.  
55 This tallies with Barkawi and Laffey’s argument about “the imperial” as “a space within which processes of 
mutual constitution are productive of the entities which populate the international system.” Barkawi and Laffey, 
“Retrieving the Imperial,” 111; see also, Barkawi, Soldiers of Empire, 256. 
 19 
expansionism. This is the meaningful sense of historical development elided by many existing 
accounts of power politics: the interplay between structural transformation and political action 
shaped by the interaction between multiple societies. The study of power politics in this context 
is centrally about examining the novel pathways and orientation for international competition 
generated by the competitive coexistence of societies within a single world hierarchy of 
economic, coercive, and ideological power. 
 
Secondly, therefore, taking seriously the intersocietal form of the modern international order 
leads directly toward a more historically specific approach to the content of power-political 
competition: for it demands the identification of the particular conjunction of social processes 
and interactions which drive intersocietal conflicts, define the capacities and proclivities of 
political actors, and determine their cognitive conceptualizations of international 
competition.56 In this respect,  it is telling that the language of “world politics” is a distinctly 
nineteenth century invention. For although terms denoting “world” and “globe” featured as 
articles of political discourse in earlier historical periods, it was not until nineteenth century that 
concepts like “world politics” or “Weltpolitik” — “world power,” “Weltreich” or “la politique 
mondiale” — became used widely and systematically to conceptualize the purposes and 
environment of modern statecraft.57 A fully intersocietal understanding of the international 
demands attention to social processes which produced and enabled such a basic transformation 
of epistemological categories. Rather than treating the international as an already constituted 
geopolitical structure —  like “anarchy” or the “balance of power” — this requires an analysis 
of the generative historical developments which made “world politics” into a widely-felt social 
reality. Towards this end, it is to necessary visualize the range of sociohistorical transformations 
contained in the nineteenth century conversion of “the world” into a “single system.”58   
 
DIMENSIONS OF THE GLOBAL CONDITION 
 
Throughout this thesis, I refer to this process of growing intersocietal interdependence as the 
global condition. Taken from the work of the historians Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, this 
term encapsulates a historical periodization and developmental process that is crucial for 
understanding for the trajectory of international power relations during the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century era 59 The core idea is that, over the course of the nineteenth century, 
the growing scale and density of intersocietal interconnection meant that previously semi-
independent regions and societies could no longer produce “discrete or autonomous 
                                                
56 This echoes Justin Rosenberg’s argument about the greater historical specificity derived from an internationally-
oriented historical sociology, as a opposed to an “internalist” understanding of historical development: “Uneven 
and Combined Development: ‘The International’ in Theory and History,” in Historical Sociology and World History: 
Uneven and Combined Development over the Longue Durée, ed. Alexander Anievas and Kamran Matin (London: Rowman 
& Littlefield International Ltd, 2016), 29. 
57 See, Albert, A Theory of World Politics, chapter 3. 
58 Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, 2. 
59 Bright and Geyer, “Benchmarks of Globalization”; cf. Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, “For a Unified 
History of the World in the Twentieth Century,” Radical History Review 1987, no. 39 (September 21, 1987): 69–91; 
Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, “Regimes of World Order: Global Integration and the Production of 
Difference in Twentieth Century World History,” in Interactions: Transregional Perspectives on World History, ed. J.H. 
Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, and Anand A Yang (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005).  
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histories.”60 From the mid-nineteenth century on, neither physical distance nor the time costs 
of long-distance travel served to divide societies as they once had; the breakdown of the land-
based, Old Regime empires of Eurasia, together with the rapid proliferation of new means 
industrial growth and global mobility eroded physical barriers of intersocietal interaction on a 
world scale.  
 
It was in this historical transition that the global condition crystalized as a multidimensional 
struggle for power and autonomy with the interior spaces of the world; now, “all were forced, 
with a new immediacy, to secure and maintain control over their futures by means of a greater, 
more sustained engagement with all others.”61 By drawing social orders into a single 
international hierarchy, the deepening of intersocietal interdependence through the expansion 
of capitalist and colonial social systems engendered a range of interlocking efforts to reconstitute 
the bases of political order in relation to increasingly systemic forms of global competition. As 
result, while the phenomenon of uneven and combined development is an intrinsic feature of 
capitalist development — indeed, perhaps, an inherent tendency of multi-society historical 
processes in general62 — the constitutive unevenness of industrial expansion assumed a highly 
particular ideological and political form in the newly-compressed global condition of late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century modernity. Indeed, this thesis emphasizes how the 
power gaps generated by the staggered pattern of the industrial revolution were articulated 
with, and even activated by, the highly ideological expectations of civilizational advancement 
and social progress that were invested in the national-imperial state. This articulation of 
coercive, ideological and economic power structures was central to the emergence of external 
expansionism as the core purpose of national-imperial state projects. This process unfolded as 
part of the development of wider efforts to construct internationally competitive social and 
political orders in the rapidly industrializing societies of North America, Europe, and Japan. 
These emergent linkages between societal and geopolitical conflict were intrinsic to the form of 
competitive coexistence engendered by the modern global condition, which produced a whip 
like burden of external pressures expressed in the form of a struggle to acquire the most 
advanced forms of military and economic power capacity.63  
 
As a consequence, political elites on both sides of the Atlantic confronted the increasingly visible 
interdependence of industrial societies as a profound restructuring of modern social life. The 
advent of the Second Industrial Revolution (1870-1914) brought a highly-integrated world 
market into existence, its trade and capital flows supercharged by the connective force of the 
first global telegraph networks, inter-oceanic canals, and trans-continental railways.64 These 
economic and technological transformations were accompanied by a simultaneous integration 
of regional political systems, wrought by the violent intensification of European colonialism 
                                                
60 Bright and Geyer, “Benchmarks of Globalization,” 290. 
61 Bright and Geyer, 290. 
62 Rosenberg, “Unevenness and Political Multiplicity,” 169. 
63 This echoes Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, 5. 
64 This periodization mainly follows Osterhammel’s conception of an “1880 threshold” — a kind of “hinge period” 
that links a “long nineteenth century” (1780-1914) to a more tightly compressed “fin-de-siècle” (1880-1914).  
Osterhammel, Transformation, 63–67. I return to this periodization in more detail below.  
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during the 1880s, and molded by the interstate conflicts which made up the evolving New 
Imperialism.65 Now, for the first time, it was possible to envisage the spaces of the world as a 
single global whole.66 This was how Rear Admiral George W. Melville, a leading figure in the 
ongoing process of US naval expansion, described the character of American interests in an 
evolving global age:    
 
Either by reason of our material wealth, force of circumstances, or manifest destiny, we have become a 
World Power. The Navy is the best instrument that can be used for the extension of trade, protection 
of commerce, securing justice to those weaker nations of this continent who are helpless to resist stronger 
Powers, and even for the preservation of that honor and self-respect which are essential to keep alive 
the spirit of liberty.67 
 
Like many of his contemporaries, Melville saw the pursuit of world power through maritime 
force as a necessary adjunct to the strategic and ideological priorities of American statecraft; he 
joined numerous American military strategists and political elites in advocating a project of 
global expansionism backed by the full the weight of US state power.68 Across the Atlantic 
Ocean, Kaiser Wilhelm II, offered a similarly globalist depiction of German foreign policy 
aims. In a speech at Bremen in 1905, he announced that: 
 
The World-Empire of which I have dreamed is that of the newly-created German Empire enjoying on 
all sides the most absolute confidence as a tranquil, honourable, peaceful neighbor. If peradventure 
history should ever speak of a German world-empire, or a Hohenzollern world-dominion, it shall not 
be based on conquests won by the sword, but on the reciprocal confidence of nations possessing the 
same aims — briefly expressed, as a great poet says, “limited externally, unlimited internally.”69 
 
Such direct engagements with the reality of global interdependence index the shifting horizons 
of geopolitical aspiration that accompanied the novel systems of military and economic power 
generated over the course of the nineteenth century. In societies like the United States and 
Germany, where rapidly industrializing socioeconomic systems were combined with the 
development of modern battleship navies and powerful political-military elites, a new language 
of “World Empire” and “World Power” expressed the new landscape of modern statecraft in 
a discourse of heroic expansion into far-flung world arenas.70 Revolving around rival systems 
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of national imperium, such conceptions of world conflict cast the globe as a single geopolitical 
system, structured by the relationships between powerful industrial states, and driven by the 
intensely competitive projects of global influence figured by nineteenth-century ideologies of 
manifest destiny and imperial prestige.71  In a distinctively fin-de-siècle language of civilizational 
power struggles, American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan expressed the combination 
of threat and possibility felt by many who confronted this developing global condition. In a 
time when the dynamics of “imperialism” seemed to make the “conditions of world politics” 
an increasingly inescapable reality,72 Mahan argued that: 
 
No state lives to itself alone, in a political seclusion resembling the physical isolation which so long was 
the ideal of China and Japan. All, whether they will or no, are members of a community, larger or 
smaller; and more and more those of the European family to which we racially belong are touching 
each other throughout the world, with consequent friction of varying degree…The field of external 
action for the great European states is now the world, and it is hardly doubtful that their struggles, 
unaccompanied as yet by actual clash of arms, are even under that condition drawing nearer to 
ourselves. Coincidently with our own extension to the Pacific Ocean, which for so long had a good 
international claim to its name, that sea has become more and more the scene of political development, 
of commercial activities and rivalries, in which all the great powers, our selves included, have a share. 
Through these causes Central and Caribbean America, now intrinsically unimportant, are brought in 
turn into great prominence, as constituting the gateway between the Atlantic and Pacific when the 
Isthmian canal shall have been made, and as guarding the approaches to it. The appearance of Japan 
as a strong ambitious state, resting on solid political and military foundations, but which scarcely has 
reached yet a condition of equilibrium in international standing, has fairly startled the world; and it is a 
striking illustration of the somewhat sudden nearness and unforeseen relations into which modern states 
are brought, that the Hawaiian Islands, so interesting from the international point of view to the 
countries of European civilization, are occupied largely by Japanese and Chinese.73 
 
The range of international power struggles figured in this passage illustrate the highly 
competitive world economy and international order that emerged during the era of the New 
Imperialism. Mahan’s world-imperial frame of reference sheds light on a variety of geopolitical 
transitions engendered by increased global interdependence: the formation of a universal field 
of worldwide imperial competition, the contestation of military and industrial hierarchies by 
“late-developing” societies like Japan or China, the designation of “domestic” and “foreign” 
actors according to normative categories of race, nationality and civilization. In this context, a 
miscellany of commercial opportunity, strategic imperative, and the perceived escalation of 
international antagonisms along both civilizational and racial lines called political elites to 
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pursue world power in the form of extensive spheres external influence.74 Operating at a more 
extensive, global scale than older land-based systems of regional power-balancing and 
diplomacy, these ideologies and practices of international competition helped fashion such 
archetypally modern political forms as: the dichotomy between a national social-territorial 
order and a boundless world economy; the sense of the external environment as an interlocking 
system with specific structural and material imperatives; and the discourse of cultural difference 
and hierarchy so central to the idea of “the West.” They figured the novel arena of intersocietal 
conflicts that defined the emergent dynamic of global power politics.  
 
 
III. Power Transformation in the Age of Empire: Theory and History 
 
In this work, I develop this conception of the global condition in an attempt to historicize the 
novel pathways of international power-projection and intersocietal interaction which marked 
the development of the New Imperialism from 1880 on. This entails a sociohistorical 
conception of international change and power transformation that differs from several 
prominent approaches to IR theory and historical sociology. At this stage of the argument, 
three are worth highlighting. 
 
First,  in contrast to approaches which focus exclusively on changes in the distribution of power, 
I emphasize the relationship between changes in intersocietal interaction and the reconstitution 
of the ideological, coercive, and economic power sources that defined the ways in which states 
competed with one another at a global level.75 On this view, the nature of power-political 
conflict depends on the kinds of societies, international orders, and social structures through 
which relations of conflict and domination are mediated and constructed; it ceases to be a 
timeless struggle for survival. Second, I seek to move beyond unproductive dichotomies 
between “material” and “cultural” conceptions of power. While the IR-theory problematic of 
moving beyond the reified conception of state power inherited from realism has been enriched 
by the development of constructivist perspectives, an exclusive emphasis on the identity 
dynamics and sociocultural constituents of interstate rivalry risks replacing realist materialism 
with an equally one-sided culturalism.76 Rather, a sociohistorical perspective demands an 
analytical approach that is attentive to the simultaneously strategic and symbolic character of 
power politics, the intersocietal dynamics that shaped modern ideologies of imperialism, and 
the historical processes that make such dominant cultural forms as “the nation” or “the West” 
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into authoritative forms of social power. Finally, the intersocietal analytic that underpins this 
work also challenges conceptions of state power as a highly autonomous military infrastructure. 
For historical sociologists like Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann, and Theda Skocpol, states 
and other power constellations tend to represent fixed or autonomous institutional spheres.77 
An emphasis on the dynamics of uneven and combined development introduces an 
intersocietal logic of global interactivity that is missing from such frameworks of analysis. As 
will become clear, this intersocietal analytic entails a strong emphasis on the dialectical 
entwinement of strategic, ideological, and economic logics of international competition — a 
sense of contingent yet systemic interconnection that is missing from such broadly neo-
Weberian accounts of state autonomy.78 
 
POWER TRANSFORMATION IN A GLOBAL AGE 
 
The core conception of international power transformations analyzed in this thesis traces the 
historical and structural linkages between a range of co-evolving and co-constitutive social 
processes. It rests on a broadly dialectical, internationally-oriented understanding of historical 
development, rather than any particular micro-foundational assumption about the essence or 
agents of power per se. This argument can be encapsulated by defining five distinctive yet deeply 
interlinked features of the global condition.  
 
1. GLOBALITY. The global dimensions of the modern international order can be understood as 
a product of the multisided, highly uneven, and regionally differentiated condition of 
intersocietal interactivity engendered by the intensification of capitalist development and 
colonial expansion during the mid to late-nineteenth century.79 Together with the rapid 
redivision of world territory wrought by European colonialism, the formation of a world 
market brought all societies into ever increasing contact. Long-distance trade and financial 
transaction now began to displace domestic producers at an increasing rate, from European 
farmers to Indian textile merchants. Industrialization and its associated revolutions in 
communications, transport, and military technology helped produce an imperially-
organized international order that was at once highly interdependent and deeply unequal.80 
 
2. UNEVENNESS. The political consequences of intersocietal interdependence were centrally 
shaped by the uneven historical geography of the industrial revolution. The fact that 
national industrialization processes took place in a staggered historical sequence produced 
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a series of military and economic power gaps: between an industrially preponderant Anglo-
American industrial core and such later-developing states as Germany, Russia, and Japan, 
on the side, and between the imperialist powers of Europe and North America and those 
societies subject to colonial rule, on the other.81 Unevenness was a fluctuating historical 
process rather than a fixed state of affairs: its dynamic revolved around the relational 
construction of societies through forms of competitive coexistence and interaction. 
Industrial power hierarchies were continually subject to contestation in the form of 
national-developmental strategies that involved the emulation and restructuring of the most 
advanced economic forms. These forms of combined development entailed a range of 
institutions, practices, and cultural schema that radically impacted political life. Examples 
include the regimes of national economy formation associated with protective 
industrialization strategies; the preparation of societies for military competition; and the 
pursuit of national efficiency as central ideological principle of industrial states.  
 
3. THE NATIONAL-IMPERIAL STATE. This deeply uneven global condition was a medium of 
strategic and symbolic conflicts revolving around the transformation of states into 
consolidated centers of strategic power-projection and political authority. A remarkably 
general feature of this  advancing process was the reconstitution of modern states along 
national-territorial lines.82 The restructuring of intersocietal relations proceeded in tandem 
with a number of top-down efforts to transform regionally and sectionally fragmented state 
forms into centralized national-imperial states; the nationalization of previously aristocratic 
or semi-feudal authority structures; and the transformation of imperialism into a colonialist 
nation-building project defined by the developmental or civilizational ambitions of national 
empires. In different forms and with uneven success, this combination of processes 
impacted political development in all the major industrializing states of the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the USA. 
Like other forms of modern state, the national-imperial state had a strong symbolic 
foundation in its claim to hold authority in a legitimate rational form. While these claims 
were structured by local political conflicts and cultural traditions, the legitimization of 
national-imperial rule had general characteristics that resonated with the pressures of the 
global condition. These included claims to civilizational greatness and national cultural 
distinction; modernist conceptions of political authority as the progressive transformation 
of society; and the proliferation of hierarchical systems of symbolic classification defined in 
terms of race, ethnicity, and cultural development.  
 
4. EXPANSIONISM. This combination of economic, coercive, and ideological developments 
shaped the convergence of many late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century elites on the 
desirability of external expansionism. Territorial expansion in the form of overseas 
                                                
81 For particulars, see the tables and analysis presented in chapters 3-4, which demonstrate the distribution of these 
power hierarchies in detail.  
82 For the general point see, Manu Goswami, “Rethinking the Modular Nation Form: Toward a Sociohistorical 
Conception of Nationalism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 44, no. 4 (2002): 770–99; Charles S. Maier, 
“Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” The American Historical 
Review 105, no. 3 (June 2000): 807–31. 
 26 
conquest, settler colonialism, and forcible annexation was one of the most general forms of 
this process, from the United States’ turn from westward expansion to territorial empire in 
the Philippines, to Germany’s struggle for Lebensraum in the form of a greater-German 
sphere of transcontinental settlements.83 Expansionism also took a number of 
deterritorialized forms, such as the expansive system of American-dominated but formally 
independent world markets envisaged by the architects of the Open Door policy (1899), 
and the kinds of gun boat diplomacy pursued by the USA in Japan (1854-1855), Japan in 
Korea (1876-1877), and Germany in Venezuala (1902-1903). What united these practices 
was their common effort to expand the global influence of the national-imperial state via 
coercive policies of territorial, military, and economic penetration.  
 
5. THE STRUGGLE FOR ORDER.  Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperialisms 
involved a contest for influence within the interior spaces of a common international order 
and world economy. This emergent field of interaction was both a systemic form of 
geopolitical and economic power structure — defined by the regular imposition of 
competitive pressures on all actors — and an open arena of political and ideological 
struggles — marked by a proliferation of attempts to redefine the terms of worldwide 
interdependence. In this respect, the conduct of power politics and the development of the 
global condition were deeply linked in the form of a struggle for order on multiple spatial 
scales and through a diversity of strategies and techniques. These involved efforts to reshape 
internal social orders through highly nativist projects of political reform (such as the Pan-
German and Russification movements of the late-nineteenth century, or the 
Americanization Movement of the 1910s) in conjunction with the aggressive strategies of 
external expansionism unleashed during the escalating tariff wars and naval-arms races 
unleashed by the breakdown of the Pax Britannica in the 1880s.84 
 
For the purposes of my argument, the precise origins of these economic, coercive, and 
ideological power transformations are less important than their conjunctural intersection 
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries imperial era. What bears emphasis 
here is the distinctive clustering of such transformations within a particular historical moment 
and intersocietal context. In political-economic, sociocultural, and geopolitical terms, the era 
of the New Imperialism defines a transformative historical conjuncture in the co-development 
of capitalist society and the modern states-system. As Jürgen Osterhammel has argued, “in 
1880s and 1890s such a jolt passed through the world that it is appropriate to describe those 
decades as the beginning of a further subperiod.”85 This was the fin-de-siècle age of empire, not 
the first age of global imperialism, but a highly distinctive moment in the unfolding of 
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modernity on a world scale.86  To flesh out this periodization, I now elaborate the basic 
dynamic of international change with the above sketched conception of the global condition 
implies. 
 
THE ORIGINS OF WORLD POLITICS 
 
In the winter of 1814, the leading ministers of Russia, Austria, Prussia and Britain prepared an 
international concert of European powers to negotiate the conclusion of the war against the 
French Emperor, Napoleon I. After the protracted warfare of the eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries, the restoration of European order was a widely-felt priority, impelled by 
the rising demands for the extension of popular sovereignty associated with the advent of 
Jacobinism.87 For Prince Metternich of Austria, the “general reorganization of Europe” was 
now a “subject of domestic policy,” demanding the forcible reassertion of absolutism and 
aristocratic supremacy as the central pillars of the ancien régime.88 For Castlereagh, architect of 
British diplomacy, European “security” required a more limited process of alliance-building, 
so as to reconstitute the traditional “union against France,” a conception of European 
diplomacy which looked back to the paradigm of the “balance of power” inaugurated in the 
1713 Treaty of Utrecht.89 With the Treaty of Paris, in March 1814, the coalition agreed the 
terms for the restoration of Bourbon Monarchy in France, confirming themselves as the 
principal regulators of an exclusive hierarchy of great powers.90 By the signing of the Final Act 
of the Vienna Congress on June 9th 1815, the formalization of this interstate system was 
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confirmed, establishing a comprehensive framework of European public order backed by 
military force.91 The Concert of Europe thereby enshrined a shared commitment to “political 
equilibrium” — a balancing of mutual interests, independent spheres of influence, and 
diplomatic status — among recognized great powers.92 With the formation of the Holy 
Alliance, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia expanded these commitments into a full-blown 
defence of the old regime, arrogating to themselves the right of intervention into the internal 
affairs of states where revolution threatened the principles of absolute monarchy. By 1820, this 
struggle to freeze the existing composition of European states saw the crushing of uprisings in 
Naples, Piedmont, Spain and Portugal, all under the name of the Congress system.93  
 
The Vienna Order thus crystallized a paradigm of European statecraft with deep roots in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By design, it upheld a prevailing hierarchy of aristocracy 
and rural land-ownership in order to buttress the social foundations of dynastic rule.94 In 
conception, it derived from a series of archetypes of interstate ordering — ideals of political 
equilibrium, the balance of power, and European public law95 — originally forged in the 
context of an earlier struggle against the threat of “universal monarchy” — the domination of 
Europe by a single dynastic imperium, typically associated with the House of Bourbon, now 
revived by the rise of Napoleon.96 In effect, it replayed an opposition between the ideals of the 
early-eighteenth century “Utrecht Enlightenment,” which saw the first sustained efforts to 
reconstitute European politics on the basis of secular diplomatic norms,97 and the older 
framework of continental absolutism embodied by the Holy Alliance. Conceived in a world 
still lacking the global spread of industrialization — where economic and political systems 
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continued to be locally organized and almost entirely agrarian — the Concert of Europe 
upheld an early modern framework of land-based competition among absolutist or aristocratic 
states; one in which the external purposes of state power tended to be articulated through 
juridical frameworks of territorial distribution or regional power-balancing. In these respects, 
the Vienna Order was locked into a world still basically suspended between the yoke of the 
“semi-feudal…absolute monarchy” and the advance of “modern bourgeois society,” as Marx 
and Engels highlighted in their famous assault on the foundations of the post-Napoleonic states-
system.98 
 
By the era of the New Imperialism, however, great power politics could no longer be contained 
within the framework of the Vienna Order. Central to the new climate of imperial competition 
that took shape during the 1880s and 1890s was the evolving reality of global interdependence 
forged by the advent the world market.  Between 1875 and 1913, the total volume of visible 
trade trebled against the background of an unparalleled global export and investment boom 
while the commodity market integration — now a favored measure of economic globalization 
— became worldwide in extent by 1900.99 After 1870, the mileage of the railway system 
expanded by some 1053 percent worldwide, rising from 130,000 miles of track to half a million 
miles globally by 1900. Sustained by a new system of ports, canals, and telegraph networks, 
inter-oceanic connections rose precipitously, linking the continental economy of the United 
States to commodity chains in Europe and East Asia, the financial markets of New York to 
those of Paris and London.100 Organized under the international gold standard, between 1870 
and 1914 financial capital achieved levels of mobility and transnational integration not seen 
again until the late 1970s, with net foreign liabilities rising from 7 to 20 percent of global output, 
and expenditures on foreign direct investment reaching some 9 percent of world GDP (1870-
1914).101  
 
In the words of the early-twentieth century British Geographer Halford Mackinder “for the 
first time we can perceive something of the real proportion of features and events on the stage 
of the whole world.”102 In this way, “whether we think of the physical, economic, military, or 
political interconnection of things on the surface of the globe, we are now for the first time 
presented with a closed system.”103  In Germany, Friedrich Ratzel developed a similarly 
systemic conception of the “spatial unity of life,” insisting that the power of states followed from 
the mastery of space.104 On the other side of the Atlantic, meanwhile, the historian and lecturer 
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at the US Naval War College, Brooks Adams, formulated a prophetic account of US 
expansionism, which cast the American Empire as the center of an encompassing imperial 
system and world economy: 
 
With the completion of the Panama Canal all Central America will become a part of our system. We 
have expanded into Asia, we have attracted the fragments of the Spanish dominions, and reaching out 
into China we have checked the advance of Russia and Germany, in territory which, until yesterday, 
had been supposed to be beyond our sphere. We are penetrating into Europe, and Great Britain 
especially is gradually assuming the position of a dependency, which must rely on us as the base from 
which she draws her food in peace, and without which she could not stand in war. Supposing the 
movement of the next fifty years only to equal that of the last, instead of undergoing a prodigious 
acceleration, the United States will outweigh any single empire, if not all empires combined. The whole 
world will pay her tribute. Commerce will flow to her both from east and west, and the order which has 
existed from the dawn of time will be reversed.105 
 
This sense of collapsing distances and systemic interconnectedness — the dynamics of spatio-
temporal restructuring associated with emergence of industrial-capitalist societies106 — became 
central to the ideologies of geopolitical conflict and expansion which emerged with the coming 
of the New Imperialism. The vast expansion of colonialism and imperial competition which 
ensued after Britain’s occupation of Egypt in 1882 not only established a new form of 
international hierarchy centerd on the leading industrial states of the time. It also entailed new 
ideologies of international power struggle which recast the imperatives of international 
competition in distinctively global terms.107 In his late-nineteenth century lectures on German 
politics, the National Liberal historian Heinrich von Treitschke summarized this struggle for 
world primacy as follows: 
 
The domination of Transatlantic territory is becoming the first task of the Navies of modern Europe, 
for since the goal of human civilization will be the establishment of the aristocracy of the white races 
over the whole globe, the importance of each nation will ultimately depend upon its share in that 
Transatlantic domination. This is the reason why the Navy has grown in importance in our own 
times.108 
 
One of the central figures of the modern Realpolitik tradition, Treitschke served as an influential 
advocate of German expansion and colonialism, promoting a militaristic strategy of global 
power politics and state-centerd nationalism which resonated with the high command of the 
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Imperial Navy.109 His advocacy of Machtpolitik (force-based power politics) bore the imprint of 
a world transformed by the rise of naval power and the consolidation of an imperial 
international hierarchy, conceived here under the sign of the “aristocracy of the white races.”110 
In this context, Treitschke viewed the “colonizing impulse” as a fundamental basis of great 
power status,111 insisting that: “The rational task of a legally constituted people, conscious of a 
destiny is to assert its rank in the world’s hierarchy and in its measure to participate in the 
civilising mission of mankind.”112 Epitomized by the expansion of the British Empire and its 
North American extension, this struggle to assert control over “barbarian lands” was a 
necessary stage in the cultural and economic development of a national Machtstaat within the 
encompassing spaces of “the globe.”113 For Germany, it offered a solution to the problems of 
“overproduction” and mass-emigration thought to be hindering the development of German 
national industry.114 At the end of the nineteenth century, such problems had been thrown into 
sharp relief by the “economic energy” of “North America”, now the home of “giant” cross-
continental “railways,” and the destination for many German migrants — “a present given to 
a foreign country without any equivalent compensation.”115  
 
While this dimension of the Machtpolitik thesis centred around the disjuncture between national 
development and global economic rivalry, Treitschke’s conception of German strategy also 
opened out onto a broader conception of nation-building colonialism in the emerging spaces 
of the globe. “With the crossing of Africa begins the last epoch of great discoveries. When once 
the center of the Dark Continent lies open, the whole globe, with the exception of a few regions 
which will be always inaccessible to civilisation is also opened before European eyes.”116 On 
the eve of the Congo Conference of 1884-85, the pursuit of Machtpolitik signified an imperial 
nation-building project, an attempt to fashion a kind of Greater Germany as an outlet for 
socioeconomic problems seen in the mirror of British and North American prosperity.117 “The 
great German seaport towns, at present imbued with a half-mutinous spirit toward the 
Government, have the prospect of a new period of revival; it is from the Hansa towns that the 
bold pioneers of our nation in Africa come.”118 
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The vision of imperial rivalry and colonial expansion crystallized in this seminal conception of 
Machtpolitik provides a portal into the larger condition of global power politics forged at the turn 
of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Fin-de-siècle figures like Mahan, Treitschke, Adams, 
Ratzel and Mackinder, were deeply embroiled in a struggle to grasp the evolving conditions of 
a rapidly changing international system and world economy. They offered a consciously 
progressive image of international politics wherein a globally-organized system of states and 
political economies figured as the medium of rival political futures. Consider, in these terms, 
the following quotations:  
 
Every country must look to its “sea power,” not only to defend its coasts, but also to protect all its interest 
beyond its coast; and every civilized, and many uncivilized, countries have extended and varied interests 
all over the world… We must begin to seek our share in the new parts of China that are now about to 
be thrown open to the world, as is foreshadowed by the opening of the West River in the south and the 
calling for bids for many tons of steel rails in the north. We must strengthen our trade with Japan, we 
must seek for a market in all portions of the globe; but above all we must develop our commerce with 
Mexico, Central and South America… Let us have a military power, both sea and land, such as will 
command respect and will insure the safety of our citizens in life, liberty and property in any and every 
portion globe.119  
— Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright, US Navy (1898) 
 
The primary object of the call for the First Conference — the accomplishment of the great design which 
Henry IV of France conceived three centuries ago for the limitation of armaments in Europe — failed 
for the time; yet the Conference accomplished other things of the highest value to humanity, and it 
demonstrated for the first time in the world’s history the potent and epoch-making fact that a congress 
of the world’s powers convened, not to deal with some concrete question demanding immediate 
solution, but convened to consider and discuss the application of the general and fundamental principles 
of justice and humanity under all circumstances and to all international questions, can be made a 
practical and effective agency in the government of the world; it developed a new method and a new 
power for the betterment of international conduct, far superior to the ordinary rules of diplomatic 
intercourse, far broader in its scope, far nobler in its purpose.120 
— Elihu Root, US Secretary of State (1907) 
 
It is worth reproducing these statements at length because they help to illustrate the emergence 
of the world as a distinct cognitive reality and political horizon. For Richard Wainwright, the 
world was similarly highly competitive and interconnected social space, where economic power 
                                                
119 Richard Wainwright, “Our Naval Power,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, no. 24 (1898): 40, 43, 46. A future 
Rear-Admiral, Wainwright was an important advocate of US naval expansion and imperialism. For extensive 
documentation of American fixations on the widely vaunted “China Market” see David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy 
of Involvement: American Economic Expansion Across the Pacific, 1784-1900 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 
2001) chapter 9.  
120 Elihu Root, “Address in Opening the National Arbitration and Peace Congress,” in Addresses on International 
Subjects, ed. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916), 136. In 
preparation for the Hague Conventions of October 1907, Root spoke extensively on the subject of expanding the 
scope of arbitration to resolve international disputes in to the National Arbitration and Peace Congress in New 
York, April 15, 1907. Occasioned by the increasing risk of naval warfare among the major industrial states, 
National Arbitration and Hague conferences were linked attempts to organize the emerging conditions of world 
politics on a systematic legal basis, efforts that would later materialize in the creation of the League of Nations. 
For an account of Root’s influence on the growing legalism of American foreign policy during the early-twentieth 
century see Benjamin Allen Coates, Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 116ff.  
 33 
rested on military capacity, and the expansion of “uncivilized” countries demanded a global 
conception of American geopolitical strategy. Likewise, the notion of a nascent world 
government elaborated by US Secretary of State Elihu Root registers a keenly felt need to assert 
control on a truly global scale. In its emphasis on the advent of international law as a “new 
method” for the constitution of a global political order, it indicates the conscious novelty and 
modernizing ethos of fin-de-siècle world politics. Despite their differences in emphasis, such 
statements illustrate the concrete interplay between American grand strategy and an evolving 
world economy. At the turn of the twentieth century, political and military elites in the United 
States, as elsewhere, confronted the global as lived horizon of political action. 
 
 
IV. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
In the twenty-first century, this sense of systemic global connectedness is perhaps one of the 
most basic features of social existence. It is embedded as a structural reality within the present 
historical condition of national-states existing inside a capitalist world economy; and it is called 
into being through the prevalent discursive oppositions between locality and globality, native 
and foreign, inside and outside.121 During the 1990s and early 2000s, the highpoint of the 
“globalization theory” debates prompted by the end of the Cold War, the notion of a systemic 
global condition was conceptualized mainly in the form of evolutionary narratives of 
technological development and spatio-temporal change. From this perspective, the process of 
globalization signified an almost inevitable pathway of human social development.122 In these 
terms, globalization was often conceived as engendering a permanent decline in the military 
and geopolitical rivalries associated with great power politics as such.123 Today, by contrast, 
such assessments of globalization fail to convince.124 Against the background of escalating great 
power antagonisms, it seems necessary to recover an understanding of the global that makes 
room for the existence of power politics as a central international dynamic. As this thesis 
suggests, viewed from a historical perspective the emergence of the international as a worldwide 
political-economic space and competitive global whole can be better understood in terms of a 
series of active political projects and distinctively modern socio-historical transformations. The 
global condition of fin-de-siècle world politics is best understood neither as the natural evolution 
of the globalization process, nor as the repetition of an eternal geopolitical dynamic. The 
political and ideological dynamics associated with the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century globe need to be specified in relation to the socio-historical conditions which mediated 
and constructed them.  
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The argument of this thesis is developed over the course of five chapters. In the next chapter, I 
seek to clear the ground for an internationally-oriented historical sociology by addressing some 
of the theoretical problems and explanatory pitfalls that characterize prominent IR attempts to 
understand the development of international power relations over time. This discussion 
highlights the advantages of explanatory power and historical specificity that are to be gained 
by conceiving international relations in terms of changing structures of intersocietal interaction. 
On this basis, Chapter 3 develops a historical-sociological approach to international change that 
is grounded in a dynamic, historical understanding of modern forms of social structure. Against 
the background of the United States’ entry in Spanish-American War (1898), I provide a 
theoretical conception of the interplay between structural change and political agency that 
highlights key features of the global condition as a medium and object of international relations. 
In these terms, the chapter illustrates some of the key nineteenth century sources of global 
power politics: how state power came to operate through the long-distance interconnections of 
an imperial world economy; the uneven transformation of societies generated amid this process; 
and the emergence of the national-imperial state as a key political locus of industrial societies 
and competitive ideologies of social modernization.  
 
Chapter 4 demonstrates how the dynamics of uneven and combined development triggered by 
the take-off of American industrial capitalism in the 1870s shaped the escalating geopolitical 
rivalries of the New Imperialism. Specifically, this chapter describes the socioeconomic 
transformations and geopolitical pressures that pulled industrial societies into an encompassing 
dynamic of imperial competition; shows how imperial elites in the United States confronted 
the reality of increasing interdependence both politically and ideologically; and explains the 
foregoing consequences of these structural transformations for the development of imperialist 
geopolitical strategies in both Meiji Japan and Wilhelmine Germany. To continue this analysis 
of American expansionism, Chapter 5 examines the development of “the West” as a key 
ideological framework of US grand strategy and political culture. This illustrates the ways in 
which the uneven and hierarchical character of the modern global condition developed in 
tandem with forms of symbolic competition over the right to claim civilized, modern status. 
Together, these two chapters provide an internationally-oriented interpretation of the logics of 
strategic power-projection and ideological calculus that informed American global expansion 
in the age of imperialism before 1914. They demonstrate the forms of competitive coexistence 
generated by the power hierarchies of an Anglo-American dominated world economy, and 
interpret the implications of this international setting for the visions of “world power” and 
“western civilization” that shaped US attempts to reconstruct the prevailing international 
order. In conclusion, Chapter 6 discusses some implications of the argument for understanding 
the development of American hegemony after World War One, and for intervening in debates 
about the return of great power politics to the contemporary world scene.  
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2. POWER AND MODERNITY IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the sociohistorical transformations and political and 
ideological shifts which shaped the nineteenth-century emergence of the global condition. This 
historical-theoretical framing — figuring the international as a historically evolving sphere of 
societal multiplicity organized around emergent power sources — represents a significant 
challenge to the universal political-science theories conventionally associated with the study of 
power politics. For the transhistorical character of many IR-theoretical vocabularies — 
whether the language of norms and identity-formation we find in much constructivist 
theorizing or the notions of anarchy, Realpolitik, and national security conventionally employed 
by realists — tends to bracket rather than confront the reality of qualitative structural change. 
These over-generalized abstractions lack purchase on the possibility of meaningful 
transformations of political life that is associated with the concept of modernity as a 
developmental process and historical condition.1  
 
This chapter takes up this critique in more detail by examining prominent IR-theoretic 
attempts to analyze the development and character of “international power” over time. In 
particular, I address the limits of prominent IR attempts to map the development of interstate 
power politics on to narratives of “Westphalia” and “globalization;”(Section II); the 
explanatory pitfalls internal to neorealist efforts to theorize international power in nomothetic 
and transhistorical terms (Section III); the possibility of a post-realist agenda for the study of 
power politics grounded in constructivist premises (Section IV); and finally, the promise of a 
global historical sociology of international relations (Section V).  
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HISTORY AND THEORY 
 
The guiding theme of the following discussion of IR theory mirrors classical historical 
sociology’s interest in the genesis of modernity’s constituting social forms: specifically, its focus 
is the sociohistorical problematic of how to conceptualize the sources and character of 
“international power” in relation to the qualitative transfigurations of social life which 
constitute different periods and formations of modernity.2 In addition to its critical component, 
the chapter thus establishes the conceptual and analytic foundations for an approach to the 
study of power politics based on the emergence and dynamic of modern social structures, their 
global or intersocietal dimensions, and the kinds of pathways for strategic and symbolic action 
which they constitute. Centrally, it highlights the variety of analytical problems and 
explanatory pitfalls that arise when international-security theories adopt ahistorical models of 
interstate competition; models which elide the long-term transformations of societal 
organization, cultural expression, and political economy which have shaped the texture of 
international politics since the nineteenth-century development of the modern global 
condition. 
 
As an initial point of orientation, it is worth considering the ongoing debate over the range of 
crises and disorders afflicting the contemporary world scene.3 In a body of work divided 
between competing theoretical traditions, one of the main axes of recent IR debates remains 
that between those who conceive international politics as a near-timeless struggle for wealth 
and power and those who emphasize the reality of international change by casting the 
geopolitical-military concerns of classical Realpolitik as fundamentally outmoded.4 While the 
representatives of the contemporary neorealist tradition insist on the enduring primacy of 
conventional power politics, a trans-historical system of strategic rivalries revolving around the 
universal imperatives of interstate anarchy, a vast body of scholarship now views this image of 
interstate relations as outdated and analytically unsustainable.5  
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4 For a particularly clear illustration of this opposition see the debate between Walter Russell Mead, “The Return 
of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014): 69–79; and G. John 
Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014). 
5 In part, the increasingly widespread view of power politics as a purely atavistic feature of international affairs 
was a product of the intellectual decline of realism which set in after the end of Cold War, an event it had famously 
failed to account for. In a widely-read article of the time, Friedrich Kratochwil argued that the collapse of the 
USSR, by failing to conform to neorealist assumptions about the primacy of military power distributions and 
hegemonic wars in processes of geopolitical change, had revealed the limits of the putatively “scientific method” 
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For many advocates of this second outlook, the old power-political logic of security has been 
displaced by the forms of global economic integration, multilateral governance, and legal-
normative principles of cooperative-cum-pacific international organization associated with the 
post-war liberal order.6 On this view, the rising levels of economic and political 
interdependence generated by advanced capitalism entail the decline of power-political models 
of international statecraft as such.7 Globalization under the aegis of a world-wide “empire of 
capitalist democracy” has generated a structural transformation in the basic rules of 
international conduct, modifying the underlying purposes of state-power, and promoting a 
long-term pacification of interstate relations that makes categories like power politics and 
Realpolitik largely irrelevant as descriptors for an emergent liberal order.8 Outside the formal 
context of IR theory proper, Jürgen Habermas has given one of the most expansive versions of 
this argument. Within the “post-national constellation” of the contemporary world order, the 
trend lines of political modernity are marked by a turn away from “classical power politics” 
toward “a politics that can catch up with global markets.”9 This telos, together with the 
emphasis on the pacifying impact of global marketization which underpins it, is paradigmatic 
of much of what counts as liberal internationalism today. 
 
Increasing evidence of new great-power antagonisms, especially in the triangle of geopolitical 
relations between the USA, China, and Russia, provides a direct counterpoint to such 
cosmopolitan forecasts. Now the seeming crisis of Western liberalism, as an either legitimate or 
effective mode of international-ordering, makes it possible to re-assert the predominance of 
power-political competition as the modal condition of world politics. The forms of systemic 
crisis emanating from the decline of American hegemony and the rise of revisionist powers are 
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thus upheld by contemporary realists as the “return of geopolitics.”10 As with the developent of 
Anglo-American realism in the early decades of the Cold War, such developments are thought 
to represent something more than a resurgence of strategic rivalries. They also serve to 
undermine the kind of progressive conception of modernity which realists associate with the 
failed project of liberal statecraft.11 
 
Beneath its surface, this pattern of theoretical polarizations seems to attest less to the difficulties 
of establishing the core dynamics of contemporary international change than to the narrow set 
of categorical oppositions through which many international theorists address the power 
dynamics of modern interstate politics. Indeed, the tension between these two views — 
essentially between a static and a-historical geopolitical analysis and a dynamic but 
depoliticized conception of globalization — exemplifies the extent to which issues of power 
politics are still conceived in narrowly binary terms: either as a more-or-less timeless feature of 
international affairs, or otherwise as a form of “old-fashioned domination” incompatible with the 
“forces of modernity.”12 The persistent appearance of such dichotomies points to the lack of a 
sustained analysis of the relations between power politics and the global social forms which 
characterize modernity as a dynamic historical condition.  
 
Despite the progress that has been made toward heterodox “post-realist” conceptions of 
international-security theory, this literature is yet to really examine the place of power politics 
within the evolution of modern international order.13 For all its achievements, such scholarship 
has tended to re-value the realist vocabulary in order to expand its objects of analysis — to 
encompass, for example, the power-political dynamics of status-seeking or international 
institutions — rather than assessing the wider historical formations which actually produce and 
mediate such international power dynamics. So conceived, the study of power politics lacks 
historical depth. It is as though the classical status of the term — denoting, generically, the 
realm of struggle among political communities — has shielded it from close historical 
                                                
10 Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics”; see also, John J. Mearsheimer, “The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful 
At All,” The Australian, November 18, 2005; Christopher Layne, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity 
and the Pax Americana,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2012): 203–13. 
11 More generally, this is emphasized by Robert Gilpin’s outline of the realist tradition: “realism is founded on a 
pessimism regarding moral progress and human possibilities” in contrast to the tradition of “idealism” associated 
with liberal theory. Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” International Organization 
38, no. 2 (1984): 290. On this theme, see also, Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism,” in International 
Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 47–65.  
12 In the words of John Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics.”  
13 On post-realism see J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review 5, no. 3 (2003): 325–
42; J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Stacie E. Goddard 
and Daniel Nexon, “The Dynamics of Global Power Politics: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of Global Security 
Studies 1, no. 1 (2016): 4–18; Stacie E Goddard, Paul K MacDonald, and Daniel H Nexon, “Repertoires of 
Statecraft: Instruments and Logics of Power Politics,” International Relations, March 17, 2019; Dani K. Nedal and 
Daniel H. Nexon, “Anarchy and Authority: International Structure, the Balance of Power, and Hierarchy,” 
Journal of Global Security Studies 4, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 169–89; Alexander Cooley, Daniel Nexon, and Steven 
Ward, “Revising Order or Challenging the Balance of Military Power? An Alternative Typology of Revisionist 
and Status-Quo States,” Review of International Studies, 2019, 1–20. 
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examination.14  Identified with a taken-for-granted constellation of international concepts and 
practices, discussions of power politics can easily resolve into generic statements to the effect 
that “the struggle for power constitutes an immutable feature of international relations.”15  
 
In perhaps the most concentrated version of this argument, Martin Wight famously claimed 
that, in contrast to domestic political theory, international thought was the theory of “survival” 
and therefore properly focused on “the system of the balance of power” rather than “man’s 
control of his social life.”16 Lacking any overarching system of government or social order, the 
interstate domain was necessarily characterized by a highly-limited range of political 
experience. For its central dynamic of the struggle between “national existence and national 
extinction” imposed imperatives which made the realm of international politics fundamentally 
autonomous from the progressive dimension of historical change associated with modern 
society.17 Essentially, Wight concluded, “so long as the absence of international government 
means that Powers are primarily preoccupied with their survival, so long will they seek to 
maintain some kind of balance between them.”18 For this “even distribution of power” was, 
ultimately, the “only principle of order” which international politics could produce in the face 
of a choice between “universal anarchy” and “universal dominion.”19 On this view, machtpolitik 
— “the conduct of international relations by force or the threat of force, without consideration 
of right of justice”20 — is reduced to the imperatives of an immutable system of interstate 
competition, removing the study of power politics from any meaningful sense of human history 
— understood not as a repetitive law of power-balancing, but as the active making of the social 
world.21 While many scholars of IR would now view Wight’s conception of machtpolitik as a 
purely atavistic vision of modern international relations, realists and non-realists are united in 
adopting such formally a-historical categories as the benchmark for assessing changes to the 
contemporary structure of international-security relations.22 
                                                
14 Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 3.  
15 Goddard and Nexon, “The Dynamics of Global Power Politics,” 15. 
16 Martin Wight, “Why Is There No International Theory?,” International Relations 2, no. 1 (1960): 48, 38 
respectively. 
17 Wight, 48. 
18 Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power,” in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. 
Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966), 174. 
19 Wight, 174–75. 
20 Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (1946; repr., New York, NY: Leicester 
University Press, 1978), 29. 
21 For this critique of Wight see Justin Rosenberg, “Isaac Deutscher and the Lost History of International 
Relations,” New Left Review 215 (1996): 5ff. Notably, Wight’s theoretical commitment to the idea of the balance of 
power as a perpetual law of international life is sometimes at odds with his own statements about changing 
character of idea of “balancing.” After the Second World War, he suggests at one point, the idea of  a balance of 
power ceases to be about “equilibrium” and becomes invested with a sense of “perpetual change,” in line with the 
prevailing experience of global chaos. Wight, “The Balance of Power,” 155. Among the wider English School, 
Herbert Butterfield offered a deeper kind of scepticism about the universality of the balance of power concept, 
arguing that “the international order is not a thing bestowed upon by nature, but is a matter of refined thought, 
careful contrivance and elaborate artifice.” Herbert Butterfield, “The Balance of Power,” in Diplomatic 
Investigations: Essays in The Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1966), 147. 
22 Goddard and Nexon also argue that IR scholars tend to conflate power politics per se with the theoretical 
architecture of neorealism: “The Dynamics of Global Power Politics,” here 5. 
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The theoretical perspective elaborated in this chapter, by contrast, seeks to historicize power 
politics as a concept and practice of the modern international order. It does so by examining 
the IR-theory debate about the development and nature of modern international-security 
relations in light of what might be described as an alternative, sociohistorical problematic: that 
is, the task of identifying the constituting social forms of the modern international order and of 
integrating the conflictual constitution of international life with an analysis of the multiple 
structural transformations — such as  forging of a universal nation-state order and the uneven 
and combined development of a global intersocietal political-economic hierarchy — that 
characterize modernity as an emergent world-historical condition.23 To elaborate this 
analytical framework it will first be necessary to assess the limits and insights of existing IR-
theory traditions.  
More fundamentally, however, running through the following discussion is a rising claim about 
the late-nineteenth century emergence of global power politics itself. As will emerge, the 
generalized vocabulary of “security” and “power,” “states” and “norms” that characterizes 
much IR-theory lacks purchase on the transformations in the sources and orientation of 
interstate rivalry which marked the advent of global power politics during the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century imperial era. As argued in the previous chapter, the emergent 
global condition of societal and international relations brought into being toward the end of 
the nineteenth century carried with it a number of distinctive power transformations — such 
as the uneven spread of industrial capitalism and the constitution of the national-imperial state 
— that can only be fully grasped in terms of the intersocietal context of their emergence. By 
using this argument as vantage point from which to assess contemporary IR theory traditions, 
I seek to underscore the co-constitution of “history” and “theory” and emphasize the 
sociohistorical specificities of global power politics as such.24    
II. The Historical Assumptions of International Theory  
 
The theory-history relationship elaborated in this thesis implies that theoretical categories 
implicate broader processes of historical change. This section therefore considers two macro-
historical contexts in relation to which prominent international-security theories have 
developed: the “Westphalian states-system” identified with the development of early modern 
Europe; and the “globalization” narrative associated with the making of the so-called liberal 
international order of modernity. These narratives of international politics not only suggest 
radically different historical trajectories, but also ground the opposing theoretical discourses of 
                                                
23 This emphasis on the “problematic of modernity” echoes, Rosenberg, Empire of Civil Society, 46 although in this 
early attempt to reformulate the international in sociohistorical terms Rosenberg did not thematize “societal 
multiplicity” as a core feature of the modern international system. 
24 On “history” and “theory” as mutually constitutive areas of IR theory, see George Lawson, “The Eternal 
Divide? History and International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 2 (June 1, 2012): 203–
26; Tarak Barkawi and George Lawson, “The International Origins of Social and Political Theory,” in International 
Origins of Social and Political Theory, vol. 32, Political Power and Social Theory (Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017), 
1–7. 
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realism and liberalism. Examining their limits illuminates the wider pitfalls of universal 
political-science theories.  
 
WESTPHALIAN ANARCHY? 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1,  the historical development of power politics has conventionally been 
associated with such early modern, “Westphalian” institutions as the balance of power, great 
power diplomacy, and sovereign independence.25 In consequence, the nineteenth-century age 
of “industry and empire”26 has played relatively little role in the construction of IR’s core 
theoretic vocabulary. Indeed, within the English School, traditionally the most historically 
sensitive of IR traditions, an emphasis on the Westphalian origins of political modernity has 
tended to obscure the centrality of the New Imperialism to making of modern world politics. 
The originating age of a conscious discourse of global power politics — the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century era of worldwide imperialisms — has been elided as an object of 
theoretical reflection.27 Where it figures at all, the nineteenth-century dynamic of world power 
rivalries appears as an era of “duels and triangles” resembling the balance-of-power-politics of 
both ancient and early modern states-systems,28 or otherwise as the culmination of a Western 
international society originating in the sixteenth century.29 These readings of the modern 
interstate system downplay the forms of imperialism and economic interdependence which 
bound the putatively Westphalian order to the “extra-European” world.30  
 
By privileging the diplomatic institutions of early-modern Europe, the pattern of interstate 
norms forged in the context of dynastic struggles over the leadership of Christendom, they also 
elide the impact of such archetypally modern  institutions as global capitalism and the national 
state form upon the actual textures of great power politics.31 They leave the relation between 
the structural transformations of modernity and the character of interstate politics 
                                                
25 For such an interpretation of the Westphalian origins of balance-of-power-politics see, Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), 101–7; for a related account of the 
evolution the modern great power system between Council of Constance (1414-18) and the Treaty of Utrecht 
(1713) see Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), 114, 129, 151. Both accounts 
emphasize the centrality of early modern European developments to the origins a modern states-system. 
26 Eric Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day, Revised Edition (1968; repr., Penguin Books, 
1999). 
27 For a convincing argument that the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, a diplomatic arrangement among dynastic 
empires, represents the continuation feudal property and authority relations, rather than the advance of 
modernity, see Benno Teschke, “Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from 
Absolutism to Capitalism,” European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 (January 3, 2002): 5–48. 
28 Wight, Systems of States, 180–91. 
29 Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. 
Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 122–24.  
30 On the Eurocentrism of the English School see, Sanjay Seth, “Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of 
International Relations,” Millennium 40, no. 1 (September 1, 2011): 169–73; John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric 
Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
222ff. 
31 For a critique of the early English School along these lines see Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, 
2015, 58. The third section of the following chapter provides a more substantive critique of the idea of the balance 
of power as modern.  
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undertheorized.32 As a consequence, even historically-grounded IR scholarship says relatively 
little about the historical transitions and political imaginaries that galvanized the emergence of 
global power politics. For while the literature on Westphalia and its alleged legacies is vast, that 
on the world-power imaginings of the New Imperialism, and the strategies of great power 
coercion they elaborated, is comparatively underdeveloped.33   
 
This tacit historical framing — conceptualizing modern power politics as an enduring feature 
of Westphalian international relations — encodes several analytic problems. The first and most 
general of these is the persistent continuity bias which characterizes realist conceptions of 
interstate politics. Figuring power politics in relation to the received image of Westphalian 
anarchy tends to naturalize realist assumptions about the enduring character of international 
politics over time. In an almost exact echo of Wight’s earlier claim, Kenneth Waltz formalized 
this sense of transhistorical stasis with a structural-functionalist model of systemic anarchy as 
the supreme ordering principle of international life.34 Viewing self-help and power-balancing 
as the necessary features of an anarchical states-system — an international structure comprising 
functionally undifferentiated actors in the absence of any state-like authority — Waltz 
concluded that continuity rather than change was the dominant condition of international 
politics as such: “Balance-of-power politics in much the form that we know it has been practiced 
over the millennia by many different types of political units, from ancient China and India, to 
the Greek and Italian city states, and unto our own day.”35  
 
This emphasis on transhistorical similarities reflects a broader struggle to meaningfully analyze 
international change itself. For while Waltz’s blunt conception of structural continuity under 
anarchy can be said to make the issue of historical change into a “nonproblem,”36 it is not clear 
that the numerous attempts to incorporate developments in violence capacity, state-institutions, 
                                                
32 Against the conception of Westphalia as a watershed to modernity, several more recent works have emphasized 
the extent to which the sixteenth-eighteenth century European order remained bound to conflicts over universal 
monarchy, monarchical imperialism, and patrimonial role specific to European absolutism. See especially, 
Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 90–91; Andreas Osiander, 
“Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 271–
74; Teschke, The Myth of 1648, 242–43; Daniel Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, 
Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 278–80.  
33 For a notable exception see Daniel Deudney, “Greater Britain or Greater Synthesis? Seeley, Mackinder, and 
Wells on Britain in the Global Industrial Era,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 2 (2001): 187–208; Daniel 
Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2007). 
34 For Waltz’s account of the enduring nature, self-help dynamics, and systemic structure of anarchy consult 
especially Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 70–71, 93 114-116. 
35 Kenneth Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and 
Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 341. For a similar claim about the 
priority of continuity see Gilpin’s argument about the consistency of “international anarchy” from the time of 
Thucydides Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 211–
13, 229–30. From a different philosophical standpoint, an equally seminal statement of the realist theme of 
timeless conflict is Morgenthau’s argument about the “aggressive instincts” of human nature: Scientific Man vs. 
Power Politics, Fifth Edition (1946; repr., London: Phoenix Books: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 216; 
similarly see the third, human-motivation assumption of Gilpin’s composite formulation of the realist tradition 
“The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” 290. 
36 According to Benno Teschke, “Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory,” 
International Organization 52, no. 02 (March 1998): 329. 
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and material contexts into the theoretical architecture of neorealism actually succeed in 
recognizing the reality of qualitative structural change. Although Robert Gilpin’s hegemonic 
stability theory acknowledges the systems-transforming impact of the rise of the nation-state 
and world market economy, this development is analyzed almost exclusively in terms of 
quantitative changes in the distribution of power within an enduring Westphalian system, 
rather than as transforming the prevailing “rules of the game” of national security politics.37 
Alternatively, where the Westphalian starting-point is explicitly rejected, the assumption of 
continuity-within-anarchy means that even accounts of ostensible macro-political change 
struggle to confront the qualitative character of international politics. For example: while 
Daniel Deudney emphasizes the distinction between Westphalian Europe and the 
“Philadelphian System” pioneered by the early American Republic, it is not clear how the 
theoretical context in which such developments are conceptualized — changes in “violence 
interaction capacity” and the geopolitical scale of “anarchy” — can actually visualize 
historically distinct modalities of international power.38 Linking security strategies to the 
variable “material contexts” (technological change and geography) of an enduring “anarchy-
independence problematique” might gesture toward a historical analysis; but it elides the socio-
structural transformations — global capitalism, uneven development, cultural modernism, 
rationalization and so on — which make world-scale revolutions in technical capacity a feature 
of modernity rather than other historical periods.39  
 
The perennial focus of much IR theory on the enduring character of anarchical systems and 
Westphalian-type institutions therefore encourages a reified form of geopolitical analysis; one 
in which the problematic of qualitative historical change is reduced to an analysis of changes 
in the material distribution of power. As a result, analyses of power politics have rarely been 
formulated in relation to the problem of analyzing qualitative international change: how the 
pathways and opportunities for external power-projection, conflict, and competition are 
constituted at particular historical junctures by a specific patterning of historically constituted 
symbolic and material resources linked to a particular configuration of social structures.40 If we 
abandon the strictures of neorealist theorizing, however, examples of the structured ties 
between systemic transformation and international-political change are commonplace. In the 
late-nineteenth century, for example, the staggered spread of nation-centred industrial-
capitalist societies generated a novel international hierarchy, of Western colonialism, and a 
                                                
37 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 62–66, 111, 116ff; Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International 
Relations (New Jersey, NJ: Princeton University, 1987), 10–11; Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding 
the International Economic Order (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 16, 19. For a critique of Gilpin along 
these lines see Barry Buzan, “Brilliant But Now Wrong: A Sociological and Historical Assessment of Giplin’s War 
and Change in World Politics,” in Power, Order, and Change in World Politics, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 233–362. 
38 Daniel H. Deudney, “Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and Changing Material Contexts,” Security 
Studies 10, no. 1 (September 1, 2000): 16, 37; Deudney, Bounding Power, chapter 6. 
39 Pace Deudney, Bounding Power, 267. 
40 On the importance of the relationship between power politics, international change, and structural 
transformation see especially, Nedal and Nexon, “Anarchy and Authority,” 170–73; Daniel Nexon, “The Balance 
of Power in the Balance,” World Politics 61, no. 2 (April 2009): 355; Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern 
Europe, chapter 2. Although liberal and constructivist scholarship does draw attention to evolving security 
dynamics of particular international orders, such scholarship regularly downplays the significance of power politics 
by positing the cooperative dynamic of economic and normative change under globalization, as we shall see below. 
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distinct “security dynamic,” of transnational inter-imperial rivalries over access to informal 
spheres of global influence, which differed markedly from the kinds inter-dynastic struggles 
over land and titles seen in early modern Europe.41 Likewise, it might be said that the late-
twentieth German state, by pursuing a foreign economic policy strategy of institutionalizing 
regional hegemony within multilateral institutions has transformed the relationship between 
state power and political economy with far reaching implications for the manner in which 
international competition operates among European states. Contrary to the expectations of 
historical continuity built in to realist theorizing, such forms of meaningful international change 
cannot be captured by a generic conception of international military competition among 
homogenous like units. 
 
This serves to highlight the limits of the Westphalian narrative which has conventionally 
structured realist conceptions of power politics. The kind of continuous balance-of-power order 
authorized by the notion of a Westphalian states-system  is too static to address the possibility 
and reality of qualitative change, still less the global condition of intersocietal conflict forged 
during the nineteenth century.  In contrast, liberal and constructivist accounts of international 
order make room for considering the changing security dynamics of differing interstate 
systems.42 For this reason, it is worth exploring the tensions that arise when these various 
approaches are situated in the context of the globalization dynamics associated with much 
twentieth-century international change. 
 
GLOBALIZATION — FROM REALPOLITIK TO THE LIBERAL PEACE? 
 
Central to the IR discourse of Realpolitik and power politics is the early-twentieth opposition 
between liberal-progressive narratives of peaceful change and pessimistic depictions of 
permanent political violence. Against the tendency to imagine an unbroken realist tradition 
43directly rooted in the thought of Thucydides,  recent accounts of IR’s disciplinary formation 
situate this binary in the early Cold War era, when Morgenthau’s Scientific Man versus Power 
Politics (1948) 44provided the leading statement of the new political realism.  As Guilhot has 
shown, such conceptions of power politics carried quite specific connotations, firmly opposed 
to the empiricist and rationalist presuppositions which underpinned the coeval discourse of 
                                                
41 For a further elaboration of this point, see Chapter 3, Section IV. 
42 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Little, Brown Boston, 
1977); John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 379–415; Daniel Deudney and G. John 
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43 For example, Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 357. 
44 Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1998); Duncan Bell, “Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond,” 
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2011); Michael C. Williams, “In the Beginning: The International Relations Enlightenment and the Ends of 
International Relations Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 647–65.  
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45“policy science.”  Whereas this latter project, an early forerunner of the “behavioural 
revolution” in the social sciences, assumed the conformity of political action to rational, 
scientifically observable rules and mechanisms, the first postwar realists believed, in the words 
of a 1947 report by the Rockefeller Foundation, “the study of power politics to be premised on 
46‘the possibility that force and not social science will be employed to solve disputes.’’   
 
In these terms, the opposition between Realpolitik and liberal modernity was made basic to the 
concept of power politics itself: early postwar realists conceived the study of interstate conflict 
as a necessary corrective to the emergence of liberal policy science, which had sought to reduce 
political analysis to a value-free empiricism that was not capable of grasping the conflict 
tendencies of political life. Indeed, while thinkers such as Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Herz 
believed this intellectual project vital for the defense of liberal democracy during  the Cold 
47War,  the internal make-up of Western society played no role in their attempts to model the 
state system on the image of a bellum omnium contra omnes. Adopting the anomic view of 
48modernity that Morgenthau derived from Weber and Carl Schmitt,  they saw the arena of 
power politics as one of virtually pre-rational struggles over prestige and material resources, 
structurally divorced from the rationalized social system of democratic capitalism. As 
Morgenthau describes in Politics Among Nations  
 
The tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations, from the family 
through fraternal and professional associations and local political organizations, to the state. On the 
family level, the typical conflict between the mother-in-law and her child’s spouse is in its essence a 
struggle for power, the defence of an established power position against an attempt to establish a new 
one. As such it foreshadows the conflict on the international scene between the policies of the status quo 
49and the policies of imperialism.   
  
By the 1970s, this crude conception of Realpolitik appeared increasingly outmoded. Invoking 
the authority of Kissinger, Keohane and Nye signaled the direction of this shift in 1977: “the 
traditional agenda of international affairs — the balance among powers, the security of nations 
50— no longer defines our perils or our possibilities.”  This followed the agenda for international 
theory outlined by Stanley Hoffman, who argued that the terrain of world politics was now a 
post-realist transnational society, comprising economic integration and international 
                                                
45 Nicolas Guilhot, “The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory,” 
International Political Sociology 2, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 282–83. 
46 Guilhot, 282, 292. 
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48 Hans-Karl Pichler, “The Godfathers of ‘Truth’: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau’s Theory of 
Power Politics,” Review of International Studies 24, no. 2 (April 1998): 185–200; Michael C. Williams, “Why Ideas 
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Politics,” International Organization 58, no. 4 (2004): 633–665. 
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50 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 4; Henry Kissinger, “A New National 
Partnership,” Department of State Bulletin, 1975. 
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51institutions.  The result was a new order of complex interdependency, producing systemic 
forms of cooperation and institutionalization that “circumscribe and dampen the “‘state of 
52war’” envisaged by traditional realists.  The “classical” age of Realpolitik” was fading into 
history as a “modernist” horizon of global economic exchange and global bureaucratic 
53governance gradually emerged.  Force, then, would no longer be the primary mediator of 
interstate relations. International politics had acquired an increasingly economic set of 
54characteristics and meanings.  On reflection, Keohane attempted to recast Kissinger’s 
response to the OPEC crisis of 1973 — the creation of the International Energy Agency — as 
a turning point, inaugurating a new era of international co-operation — “to enable Western 
55countries to deal cooperatively with the threat of future oil embargoes.”   
 
The centrality of American military power, later illustrated by the First Gulf War (1990-1991), 
to the maintenance of the oil economy was elided in this formulation. Here, the basic 
presuppositions of neoclassical economics were at work. For this tradition has conventionally 
viewed market and society as a kind of natural equilibrium, where conflict and crises are 
56externally produced deviations from an otherwise functional system.  Unsurprisingly, then, 
neoliberal institutionalism fostered a wider skepticism about the analytical significance of power 
57for explaining the dynamics of international systems.  For Keohane, on the contrary, the more 
neutral language of leadership could better describe the hegemony of the United States, defined 
58in terms of its “willingness” and “ability” to provide international public goods.  In this 
trajectory, the proponents of regime theory and rational choice liberalism came to argue that 
the economic and institutional organization of the US world order now precluded the workings 
of Realpolitik as the “national interest” diminished in the context of globalization and 
international governance.59  
 
Also citing the influence of neoclassical economics, Kenneth Waltz provided the major 
60counterpoint to this formulation.  This recast Morgenthau’s emphasis on the international 
struggle for survival in terms of a microeconomic theory of rational-choice calculations oriented 
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61to the permanent imperatives of anarchy.  Waltz’s neorealism thereby fostered an increasingly 
narrow understanding of international-political ends — survival — which excluded any 
meaningful sense of politics as a contested space of competing strategic projects and rival value-
62orientations.  The price of theoretical parsimony was a corresponding decline in explanatory 
purchase. As John Ruggie recognized, Waltz’s systems theory lacked the ability to analyze the 
process and determinants of change at the international (i.e. interstate) level. It therefore failed 
to provide any substantive specification of the emergence of anarchy as a property of 
63international orders, generating a flat, trans-historical reading of the states-system.  Expanded 
into a general covering law, the logic of anarchy was reduced to a taxonomy of geopolitical 
dynamics, only capable of identifying the most general, permissive dimension of international 
causality.  
 
Waltz’s attempt to systematize realism was thus recognized as increasingly unsustainable: 
neorealists addressed a series of empirical anomalies through the more-or-less ad hoc adoption 
of auxiliary assumptions and causal factors that were formally unconnected to the functional 
64logic of systemic anarchy.  This pattern of intellectual drift is still in evidence today. Neorealists 
acknowledge that “states usually do not fight wars for security reasons alone”, while 
65maintaining the analytic primacy of anarchy at the systemic level.  The conflict between these 
two views is obvious. In the work of Christopher Layne , for example, an insightful realist-
inspired critique of contemporary liberal internationalism rests fundamentally on the analysis 
of secular tendencies within US and Chinese economies, rather than any distinctive conception 
of interstate anarchy. While such arguments can convince readers of the continuing 
significance of power politics, especially in the context of a declining Pax Americana, their 
66explanatory force lies outside the formal remit of Waltzian systems theory.    
 
Given this intellectual background, it is not surprising that power politics has become an 
increasingly marginal element of IR theorizing. Whether couched in terms of a shift to a 
67multilateralist security system with inbuilt incentives for cooperation,  or as the transition from 
68a Hobbesian to a Kantian “culture of anarchy,”  late-twentieth century American IR theory 
came to downplay the centrality of Realpolitik to the developmental trajectories of modern world 
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69politics.  While such accounts point to the systems-transforming impact of economic 
globalization, they rest on a deeply one-sided reading of the relation between power politics 
and global interdependence. Against the thesis of a structural and continuous relation between 
“liberal modernity” and interstate peace, the historical record suggests that the advent of an 
international order oriented to capitalism and national sovereignty has been characterized by 
a series of geopolitical conflagrations and deeply contested episodes of power politics: from the 
late-nineteenth century dynamics of inter-capitalist and inter-imperial rivalry, via the era of 
total-mobilization warfare, down to the onset of the Cold War and the rise of a new great power 
hierarchy, dominated by an American hegemon that oscillates between liberal order-building 
and unilateralist power-projection.70 Throughout this history, capitalist development and great 
power coercion have evolved together in a dynamic which Alexander Anievas  describes as a 
“contradictory unity of universalizing and differentiated imperatives driven by the exigencies 
of competitive accumulation.”71 Viewed in a long-term perspective, liberal projects of 
economic development and international order-building likely depend on strategies of 
hegemonic coercion and national-security competition, as numerous accounts of American-
72style liberal internationalism demonstrate.  
 
In fact, the emergence of a new era of financial globalization during the 1970s — the material 
base of Hoffman’s transnational society — arose not from any natural or inexorable logic of 
market development, but rather from the clashing force of national capitalisms and the 
unilateral intervention of the United States. After German state-managers had sought to 
constrain the monetary leverage of the US and prevent European social democrats from 
pursuing Keynesian responses to the emerging crisis of the world economy, successive 
American administrations elected to break with the financial strictures of the Bretton Woods 
system, Reagan forcing German and Japanese governments to accept substantial increases in 
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the value of the mark and the yen to restore the competitiveness of US manufacturing.73 
American grand strategy was thus to wreck all those “institutionalized arrangements which 
limited US dominance in international monetary politics in order to establish a new regime 
which would give it monocratic power over international monetary affairs.”74 Pace Keohane 
and Nye, rather than a neutral exercise of economic leadership this was a strategic attempt to 
increase the geo-economic power of the United States at the expense of organized labor and 
rival capitalist states.  
 
The background to these transitions was the wrenching experience of military failure in 
Vietnam. In this context, the Nixon Doctrine announced a reduced role for American 
hegemony in the provision of collective military and economic security.75 Only on a very 
narrow conception of Realpolitik can these dynamics be excluded from the analysis of power 
politics. Seen in a wider perspective, the transition from embedded liberalism to a new era of 
neoliberal capitalism indicates the extent to which the uneven and combined character of the 
modern international order serves to interrupt the universalizing claims of liberal 
internationalism.76 From the Cold War to the “Long 1970s,”  the recurrent dynamic of great 
power competition emerging in the context of a highly interdependent world economy 
highlights the antagonistic constitution of an international system where the persistence of 
nation-centred strategies of political and economic development continually undermines 
projects of global governance.77 
  
 
III. International Systems: Realist Versus Sociohistorical Approaches 
 
Contextualizing the twentieth-century discourse of Anglo-American IR against the background 
of these global power shifts indicates the extent to which the modern international order 
contains, as part of its inner developmental dynamics, a tendency to destabilize prevailing 
institutional arrangements and intellectual paradigms. Stated in somewhat different terms, this 
emphasis on the contested fragmentation of international life is, perhaps ironically, the core 
premise of political realism.78 It therefore becomes necessary to address the problematic of 
internationality, the multiplicity of social life, head on.79 What, ultimately, is the problem with 
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the realist conception of geopolitical anarchy, and what alternative theoretical resources are 
available for analyzing international politics on this scale?  
 
THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 
 
Realist theory rests on a strong claim about the enduring character of geopolitics throughout 
the ages.80 The international system is a sphere of perpetual geopolitical rivalries arising from 
the structural necessity of “self-help” strategies of state survival in an anarchical system.81 Given 
their anarchic character, the struggle for survival (through power maximizing or security 
seeking behavior) constitutes the structuring logic of geopolitical systems as such, compelling 
states to socialize as functionally equivalent political-military power containers.82 While Waltz 
never subjected these claims to any sustained historical analysis, the work of John Mearsheimer 
situates neorealism’s security problematic  within a long-term account of great power politics.83 
In this “offensive-realist” version of the theory, “anarchy and uncertainty about other states’ 
intentions create an irreducible level of fear among states that leads to power-maximizing 
behavior.”84 Given the security dilemmas generated by the overarching condition of anarchy, 
power-maximizing strategies of geopolitical-military expansionism — hard power politics — 
can be expected to define an interstate system dominated by major powers: “A great power 
that has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to behave more aggressively, because 
it has the capability as well as the incentive to do so.”85 Great power politics is thus centrally 
driven by an existential struggle for state-survival among the dominant actors of the 
international system.86 As Mearsheimer claims, “states seek to maintain their territorial 
integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. Survival dominates other motives 
because, once a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims.”87  
However, that survival is, in fact, the main goal of modern states, is a historical claim that can 
be opened up to empirical scrutiny. Is it in fact the case that at stake in modern great power 
politics is the existential struggle for territorial integrity and outright survival?88  
 
Surveying the epoch of modern interstate politics from the French Revolutionary Wars to the 
end of the Cold War, Mearsheimer concludes that the rationality of self-preservation underlies 
the entire dynamics of great power politics. As Peter Gowan highlights in an incisive critique, 
however, the historical record provides little evidence to support the idea that the strategic 
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stakes of such conflicts actually entail a zero-sum game of security competition.89 In the period 
after c.1792, great power war has never resulted in the complete destruction of any state — 
with the sole exception of Nazi Germany whose territorial dismemberment resulted not from 
any systemic logic of interstate rivalry, but rather from the social and ideological cleavages of 
the emerging Cold War, which left the German state divided between communism to the East 
and capitalism to the West. After 1815, the British State under the leadership of Castlereagh 
sought to reincorporate France into a European order of trade and diplomacy, failing to 
observe the realist priorities of territorial aggrandizement. Likewise, while Bismarck did annex 
Alsace-Lorraine, he left the wider structures of the French and Austro-Hungarian empires 
intact. Following victory in the First World War, the Entente then left German territory largely 
untouched, restoring sovereignty to Poland, while imposing crippling reparations payments 
which undermined the effective sovereignty of the Weimar Republic without abolishing its 
formal statehood. After 1945, subsequently, the United States sought to re-establish the 
sovereign states-system by refashioning the policy agendas and international allegiances of 
European and East Asian states through the Marshall Plan, the San Francisco System, and the 
NATO alliance.90 Indeed, the pre-eminent form of international-ordering projected by the 
American State for much of the twentieth century consisted not in the elimination of great-
power rivals, but the construction of liberal-capitalist zones of interstate peace, the 
incorporation of potential rivals into this orbit, and the exercise of military intervention within 
an exterior politico-economic field associated with the “non-Western” world.91 This was what 
Theodore Roosevelt, in the late-nineteenth century, described as the strategy of international 
“police power.”92 
 
In contrast to neorealist expectations, what stands out from this history is the increasingly 
deterritorialized character of great-power antagonisms and rivalries during the nineteenth and 
twentieth century era of modernity.93 This longue durée transformation of geostrategic priorities 
serves to seriously question Mearsheimer’s judgement that the tragedy of great power politics 
can be adequately represented in terms of balance-of-power conflicts driven by the existential-
survival imperatives of an anarchical states-system.94 For while the age of industrial capitalism 
and national sovereignty that emerged after c.1780 was marked by an increasingly bellicose 
interstate politics, there is little evidence that major players of these conflicts ever envisaged the 
territorial destruction of rival great powers as a realistic possibility. In fact, the historical 
evidence provides greater support for the argument that the underlying cause of state collapse 
in this period was less great power politics per se, than the threat of social revolution and national 
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separatism which broke apart the dynastic empires of Ottoman Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and 
Tsarist Russia in the period 1917-1923.95  
 
What these cases have in common, pace Mearsheimer, is not the mere fact of great power 
warfare. More specifically, what unites them is the fact that such dynastic monarchies — 
originally forged in an era of composite feudal states centuries prior to the advent of nationalist 
sovereignty regimes — were unable to maintain a legitimate monopoly on the institutions of 
public rule once military conflict against stronger capitalist empires weakened the domestic 
apparatus of internal repression. Indeed, for much of the nineteenth-century such polities 
experienced a long period of destabilization triggered by the dual crisis of a rising nationalist 
opposition to dynasticism and an increasingly self-evident process of decline vis-à-vis the 
industrial powerhouses of Western Europe and North America. Over the same period, while 
great-power strategies of external expansionism increasingly withdrew from a policy of direct 
territorial annexation against European rivals — defeated powers were not incorporated as 
colonies after WWI — the dominant European states increased their control of world territory 
from 37 to some 84 per cent of the global total (1880-1914).96 This was the real tragedy of 
global power politics: the differential strategies of geopolitical expansion and domination which 
accompanied the rise of Western imperialism on a world-scale. A reading of nineteenth and 
twentieth century geostrategic rivalries as generic survival struggles between identical state-
forms runs counter to the weight of historical evidence.  
 
For the inter-imperial international order forged over the course of the nineteenth century was 
marked by struggles over informal spheres of influence and the control of strategic enclaves 
rather than any systematic contest for survival between territorial states. To the extent that 
states like the British Empire or Imperial Germany sought territorial expansion, their 
geopolitical orientations were toward the forging of greater spaces of national-colonial 
economic and political control rather than the outright dissolution of rival powers. As capitalist 
states socialized into the logic of market competition, it was not territorial sovereignty per se but 
the potential sources of commercial profit housed by foreign lands which gave these struggles 
for expansion an effective rationality. The structural separation of public-political coercion 
from the private sphere of economic exchange, which characterizes capitalism as a mode of 
production, entails exactly this restructuring of geopolitical priorities: no longer forced to 
accumulate wealth by means of direct physical coercion — exploitation of serfs or physical 
appropriation of lands and titles — the ideal-typical capitalist states operates with a much more 
flexible strategic horizon than its feudal or absolutist predecessors. Rather than establish a 
uniform geopolitical logic, this structural transformation might be best described as generating 
a fluctuating pattern of conflict and co-operation whose complexity requires case-specific 
reconstruction rather than generic concepts of “security competition.”97 While a kind of 
survival imperative was built-in to the structure of the typical feudal state, where the 
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accumulation of serf labor and landed property made the destruction of rival houses a standard 
strategy of wealth accumulation, the capitalist social order contains no such systematic 
incentive toward state-destruction.98 Dependent on a neorealist framework of geopolitical 
analysis, Mearsheimer is unable to access this historical sociology of modern-era international 
transformation. His entire account depends on a presupposition about the survival-needs of 
modern states which lacks purchase on the nineteenth-to-twentieth century dynamic of 
imperial rivalries culminating in great power conflicts. These were power struggles within the 
evolving world space of the capitalist global economy — rivalries which seem to push power 
politics beyond its conventional realist meaning.  
 
FROM ANARCHY TO THE INTERSOCIETAL: ANALYTICAL PREMISES 
 
This critique of Mearsheimer highlights the necessity of an alternative conception of the 
international.99 The assumption of permanent state-goals (security/survival) around which 
realist conceptions of power politics revolve derives from the broader presuppositions of the 
states-under-anarchy framework formalized by Waltz. Its starting point is an account of 
internationality — or, more precisely, geopolitical fragmentation — defined in purely negative 
terms: through the absence of any sovereign-like authority above the political multiplicity of 
states.100 The effect of this negative starting point, it has now been seen, is to promote a 
strangely thin and ahistorical understanding of interstate politics  reduced, under the sign of 
anarchy, to a timeless security struggle between states defined as homogenous conflict units. 
The basis of an alternative perspective begins to emerge if the negative image of anarchy is 
substituted for a positive sociohistorical premise: the co-presence of a generative multiplicity of 
interacting societies.101 This move, as Justin Rosenberg has argued in a series of agenda-setting 
articles, represents the critical first step toward a conception of international theory capable of 
moving beyond the realist problematic of universal anarchy.102  It thereby implies a number of 
critical revisions to the realist conception of power politics discussed so far. At this stage of the 
argument, three of these require especial emphasis. 
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First, a conception of societal multiplicity as the “deepest code of the international” implies a 
reformulation of international relations as an object of social analysis.103 Conceived as an 
emergent domain of intersocietal interactions,104 the problem of internationality undergoes a 
conceptual transformation. Rather than the universal political-science problematic envisaged 
by realists, it becomes subject to the sociohistorical problematic of identifying the structural and 
conjunctural transformations which constitute the modern international order as a distinctive 
historical formation. The turn away from a negative conception of geopolitical fragmentation, 
and toward a positive understanding of societal multiplicity introduces a principle of “historical 
specificity” that is excluded from the realist definition of the international.105 On the one hand, 
the premise of societal multiplicity historicizes the subject matter of IR by foregrounding the 
developmental dynamics of modern social forms: how a particular conjunction of 
sociohistorical structures, such as the late-nineteenth century configuration of national-imperial 
states, liberal imperialism, and industrial capitalism, combines to produce mechanisms of an 
international change. On the other, it draws attention to the consequences of intersocietal 
interaction as a shaping and controlling influence on the development of modern political, 
economic, and cultural structures: how the coexistence of societies may generate mechanisms 
of social mutation and cultural creativity, like the anxieties about historical backwardness which 
shaped the nineteenth-century pursuit of colonial expansion, which subtend on the fact of 
multiplicity as such. The premise of societal multiplicity thus grounds IR theory on a 
sociohistorical basis. It reintegrates the reality of the international, the existence of multiple 
social formations, with the basic task of the historical social sciences: the study of the 
development of socially and relationally embedded human practices.  
 
Second, from this reframing of the international follows a distinct conception of power politics. 
Located within an understanding of the international as of societal multiplicity, the phenomena 
conventionally studied under the title of power politics — war, interstate competition, 
geopolitical rivalries and so on — cannot be adequately conceived as a brute political force or 
reduced to a function of the security/survival needs of so-called “conflict groups.”106 Instead, 
they open out on to broader terrain of societal interactions forged by multiplicity of social, 
cultural, political forces co-existing at an international level. From this perspective, the conflict 
relations figured by the notion of power politics are grounded socially in a historical 
configuration of dynamics that generate specific modes, pathways, and orientations of 
intersocietal conflict. What realism conceives as an external geopolitical force thus becomes an 
internal feature of the social processes and cultural lifeworlds which constitute societies as 
meaningful historical formations. What the idea of Realpolitik frames as an unmediated 
expression of “national security” concerns instead represents a historically specific 
configuration of resources and orientations that shape the expression of power at an 
international level. This intersocietal conception of power politics, by departing from the 
survival/security analytics of the anarchy problematique, suggests a broader understanding of 
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international power-projection as the medium and object of creative attempts to restructure 
both “internal” social orders and “external” geopolitical systems. This dynamic of socially-
transformative yet strategic-coercive historical praxis entails the strategic mediation and symbolic 
restructuring of intersocietal conditions — the reconstitution of international orders through 
specific conjunctions of political action. For much of the nineteenth-century geopolitical era 
analyzed by Mearsheimer, for example, the existence of great-power antagonisms was 
inseparable from the political attempts by prevailing social elites to constitute fragmentary 
industrial societies as cohesive national states with legitimate claims to world power status.107 
The strategies of social order-building and legitimization entailed by such processes indicate 
the extent to which power politics is a “thick” social process, and not an isolated outcome of 
Realpolitik calculations.   
 
Finally, this intersocietal perspective yields a distinct historical sociology of the development of 
modern international power relations. Where neorealist approaches privilege changes in the 
distribution of power-capacities, a focus on the intersocietal illuminates the multi-scalar forms of 
social structure and historical process which generate both the agents and orientations of 
interstate power politics.108 Such an approach resituates the classical IR study of interstate 
politics within a broader analysis of the ways in which particular intersocietal contexts endow 
agents with specific goals, capacities, opportunities for international power-projection. More 
particularly, it draws attention to the uneven and combined character of the modern 
international orders within and against which the national-security states visualized by realists 
emerge and operate. Where Mearsheimer’s understanding of great power politics rests on a 
conception of states-systems as homogenous political structures, this emphasis on the uneven 
and combined construction of modern international orders foregrounds the structured 
dynamics between intersocietal unevenness and international power.  
 
The specific long-nineteenth-century manifestation of interstate-cum-inter-imperial rivalries 
traced above can be parsed, in these terms, as a distinct sociohistorical phenomenon structured 
by the logics of intersocietal unevenness that accompanied the formation of global social 
hierarchy of capitalist states and colonial empires. The hierarchical structure of the inter-
imperial international system closely resembles what Trotsky conceptualized as an evolving 
“whip of external necessity,” transforming the sociological differences between an 
industrializing “West” and a late-developing “East” into a unique conjunction of geopolitical 
pressures and social crises. This processs was powerfully manifested within societies, such as 
Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire, where the dominant character of the putative security 
problematic emerged from perceptions of historical backwardness that were internal to the 
making of a Western-imperial international order, together with the deeply uneven regional 
distribution of the industrial revolution. Equally, the United States’ long-term preference for 
“informal empire” emerged within a late-nineteenth century international order where the 
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emergence of a British-American centered hierarchy of industrial prosperity was generating 
rival bids for world power which threatened to destabilize the political organization of the world 
market. In this context, the meaning of US grand strategy was shaped less by any isolated 
calculus of Realpolitik, than the struggle to manage the patterns of uneven and combined 
development being generated by the expansionist aims of continental European states seeking 
to mediate the pressures of Anglo-American industrial supremacy through their own territorial 
imperialisms. This clashing dynamic of strategic mediations will be analyzed in detail in chapter 
four.   
 
The critique of realist international theory developed above demonstrates some of the key 
differences between universal political-science science theories and sociohistorical approaches. 
In contrast to the assumption of transhistorical stasis intrinsic to a theorization of international 
systems as anarchic, a sociohistorical conception of international orders as emergent 
intersocietal formations would emphasize the possibility of geopolitical transformation as a 
result of historically constituted conjunctions of social structures, strategic mediations, and the 
uneven and combined dynamics to which they give rise.  At the same time, rather than seeing 
the forms of transnational economic interdependence associated with globalization as 
inherently pacifying, a sociohistorical emphasis on the constitutive unevenness and historically 
constituted power politics  of the global condition order roots the possibility of interstate conflict 
in the contradictory tendencies of the modern international order itself, thereby challenging 
the persistent representation of power politics as a kind of pre-modern atavism.   In the next 
section, I expand this sociohistorical perspective in dialogue with the idea for a post-realist 
understanding of power politics developed in the context of IR constructivism.   
 
 
IV. The Post-Realist Agenda and the Constructivist Challenge   
 
An intersocietal conception of international relations, as this thesis elaborates, should not be 
taken as a kind of unmediated materialism. The existence of historically constituted ideological-
cultural schema is essential to very possibility of global power politics, shaping the forms of 
societal mobilization which enabled the formation of national-imperial states, and conditioning 
the orientations to world power that made up its strategic horizons. To position this claim 
within a sociohistorical conception of international theory, it is necessary to address some basic 
features of the constructivist tradition. For it is here that the role of “ideas” in international 
politics has been conceived with greatest theoretical force. Far from attempting a full discussion 
of constructivist insights, I focus on two central claims: first, the argument that power-political 
trajectories — patterns of international conflicts and domination — depend on intersubjective 
normative structures; and second, the argument that strategies of great-power coercion can be 
explained with reference to status-seeking behavior. The bottom-line argument which follows 
is that constructivist accounts of the sociocultural construction of international politics can be 
usefully reframed in intersocietal terms, in order to provide a stronger historical basis for 
arguments about the status-oriented character of much great power politics. Although there is 
a wealth of historical evidence to support the descriptive form of this claim, explaining why 
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status anxieties sometimes emerge as coercive geopolitical strategies demands an account of the 
production of the actual intersocietal hierarchies from which socio-normative conflicts arise 
historically.  
 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF POWER POLITICS 
 
While the first formulations of IR constructivism tended to be couched in the liberal-
cosmopolitan terms, more recent constructivist scholarship provides what might be described 
as a post-realist theoretical agenda.109 This agenda departs from Wendt’s 1992 claim about 
“constructivism’s potential contribution to a strong liberalism”110 by foregrounding the 
relations of power politics, conflict and domination, said to be generated by particular 
intersubjective social structures. It goes beyond the accounts of interstate pacification and 
normative socialization offered by earlier constructivist work, and highlights the cultural-
discursive construction of force, hierarchy, and dominance as a central constituent of modern 
world politics.111 
 
Many such works have contributed to an enhanced understanding of the range of legitimation 
strategies involved in contemporary power-political relations; the sociocultural hierarchies 
which refract modern conflicts over the organization of international order, especially the 
fraught divisions between “East” and “West” as an ongoing object of normative conflict; and 
the variety of identity-constructions — nation, race, civilization, and gender — that shape the 
texture of world politics, and the condition mobilization strategies of international actors. 
Critical of the “asociality” and “ahistoricity” of neorealism,112 a key strand of this scholarship 
seeks to reconceptualize power politics as a social phenomenon by recovering classical realism’s 
ostensibly broader understanding of Realpolitik as a complex set of normatively-structured 
calculations about foreign-policy strategy in a competitive international environment.113 In this 
view, power politics tends be viewed as a foreign-policy sensibility linked to decisions about 
when power-maximization represents an optimal or justified strategy of external statecraft — 
rather than as a functional requirement of interstate structure per se.114 More broadly, recent 
constructivist engagements with competitive interstate politics tend to stress the impact of 
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identity crises and conflicts on the militarization of foreign-policy strategies.115 For such works 
international politics is not structured by any predictable logic of geopolitical outcomes. Rather, 
interstate relations are “socially and historically contingent” on the patterns of identities, 
norms, and institutions which shape the collective mobilization of political actors.116 Anarchy 
remains “what states make of it.”117  On this basis, recent work on geopolitics and great-power 
competition indicate a shift away from the neorealist emphasis on material power-capacities 
toward a sometimes almost exclusive privileging of the kinds of identity dilemmas, discourses, 
and ideologies associated with aggressive power-political strategies. The ideological pathologies 
of putatively illiberal forms of geopolitics and imperialism, notably those associated with the 
Axis powers of the early-twentieth century, figure prominently in this scholarship.118  
 
Contained in this shift from an ahistorical and asocial realism to the view of power-political 
strategies as inter-subjective, ideational constructions is a problematic elision of the historically 
constituted intersocietal conditions that mediate specific power-political conflicts. Subjectivist 
frameworks of analysis threaten to obscure the broader structural and historical forces — such 
as the long-term transformation of aristocratic sociopolitical orders into legal-bureaucratic state 
forms — which shape the proclivities of modern statecraft and interpolate political elites as 
normative national-security managers. At issue  here is not the descriptive emphasis on the 
centrality of status or ideology to conduct of international politics, but rather the failure to fully 
interrogate the conditions in which specific status hierarchies or ideological systems acquire 
their collective social force. Indeed, while recent accounts of great-power status competition 
pay attention to the proliferation of expansionist world-power agendas during the late-
nineteenth century, they do not offer a historically grounded explanation for the development 
of this distinctive politico-ideological pattern, which emerged within the highly specific 
historical conjuncture and international field of the New Imperialism, and not just from the 
generic requirements of identity recognition.119 The counterpoint to this broadly a-historical 
version of constructivism is offered by the work of Ayşe Zarakol.120 By illustrating the 
sociocultural dynamics which ensued from core features of modernity — especially the desires 
for progress, positive freedom, and social equality built into modern norms of state sovereignty 
— Zarakol demonstrates the patterning of sociohistorical transformations which, in 
conjunction with the differential outcomes of industrialization and national state-building after 
c.1780, laid the foundations for the “standard of civilization” hierarchy established during the 
nineteenth century.121 This analysis seems to indicate a shift away from ideational models of 
constructivism toward a more substantive historical-sociological agenda focused on the 
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historically constituted modes of symbolic power-projection underlying specific international 
orders. An exclusive focus on the dynamics of identity-formation and discourse cannot capture 
these structured linkages between symbolic forms and social power structures.  
 
Thus, while I concur with the spirit of recent efforts to pluralize the study of power-political 
dynamics in “post-realist” terms, an emphasis on the sociohistorical formation of international 
relations goes beyond conceptions of power politics as “an essential feature of international 
security” or an “object of analysis in its own right.”122 A stress on the inherent historicity of 
international power demands a deeper conception of the ways in which the pathways and 
orientations of interstate competition are produced at particular spatio-temporal junctures: one 
that pays simultaneous attention to the lived meanings and structuring historical dynamics of 
particular international orders, and locates practices of statecraft and geopolitical strategy 
within the historically constituted pathways for collective political action which constitute them. 
This analysis cannot be confined to the development of “social technologies” and mobilization 
strategies. 123 More fundamentally, it demands a sustained analysis of the ways in which 
modern socio-structural transformations — such as the universalizing dynamic of global 
capitalism, the enduring socio-symbolic ties between nationhood and statehood, and the 
competitive dynamic of the political-economic and cultural hierarchies generated by colonial 
expansion and industrialization — shape the texture of international relations and constitute 
novel opportunities for power-projection at a global level. 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR STATUS 
 
The pattern of analytical problems associated with contemporary constructivism is manifest in 
the substantive accounts of great-power status competition elaborated in recent work on status 
competition. For Steven Ward, perceptions of “status immobility” are a central factor in the 
kinds of aggressively revisionist geopolitical strategies adopted by states like Wilhelmine and 
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during the late-nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth 
century era of world power rivalries.124 When such “rising powers” seek to transform the 
institutional-normative foundations of the international status quo, rather than merely seeking 
to alter the distribution of power among states, the opposition they face from established powers 
can engender the perception of an international status “glass ceiling” which in turn fosters 
increasingly aggressive, nationalist foreign policies, with the aiming of overturning an 
international order deemed incompatible with great-power ambitions.125 Underlying this 
process is a struggle for the social recognition of great-power identity on the international stage. 
Since status claims depend on recognition by others, they are prone to elicit rejections from 
others, the effect of which is to generate “pessimism” about the possibility of securing future 
identity claims.126 This account is rooted in the highly generalized vocabulary of social-
psychological theory: “people (especially those who identify most strongly with the state) care 
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about being able to make positive social comparisons between their state and other states, and 
they want to these positive comparisons to be acknowledged by relevant others.”127 The 
sociocultural pessimism engendered by failures to achieve this desired acknowledgment, Ward 
argues, tends to foster the preconditions for, and increase the support of, the kinds of “radical 
nationalists” conventionally associated with the rise geopolitically competitive revisionist 
states.128 Rejectionist foreign-policy stances — in the form of “violent conflict, a withdrawal 
from an institution, or a policy that explicitly ignores and invalidates international rules and 
norms” — therefore proliferate as a way of “lashing out against the status quo order.”129 
Although the precise balance of causal factors are never explicitly drawn, these policies are 
pursued less for instrumental (economic/security) reasons than because they are “emotionally 
satisfying” from the perspective of a “frustrated nationalist.”130 For such actors, revisionism 
serves both as an emotional outlet for the experience of international humiliation and a way of 
managing the domestic social problems associated with the diminution of national elites. The 
proliferation of foreign-policy statements referencing the struggle between national greatness 
and national decline provide the empirical grounding for these claims in both the German and 
Japanese cases.131  
 
In a similar account of geopolitically competitive recognition struggles, Michelle Murray argues 
from equivalent socio-psychological premises to theorize revisionism as a social construct 
rooted in the ontological security needs of states-as-persons.132 The core argument posits a 
functional relationship between identity-construction and security-policy formation whereby 
the latter operates as the means toward stabilizing the recognition requirements of the former: 
“To alleviate social insecurity as they attempt to gain recognition from the established powers, 
all rising powers take up the recognitive practices constitutive of major power status. Because 
of the way major power identity is constructed and reproduced, these recognitive practices 
encourage risk-taking and steer a rising power’s foreign policy in aggressive directions that 
challenge the established powers.”133 Echoing Wendt’s emphasis on the identity-anarchy 
nexus, Murray situates this dynamic in an account of the “motivational structure of 
anarchy.”134 The insecurity inherent in this international political structure means that identity-
formation plays in a context in which the “logic of securitization” leads both rising and 
established powers to identify status competition in oppositional geopolitical terms.135 On this 
view, the pursuit of battleship fleets and colonial possessions by a rising power like late-
nineteenth century Germany is the function of the manner in which ontological security needs 
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are misrecognized by rival powers, generating a series of geopolitically competitive bids for 
world-power status with the aim of stabilizing a threatened social identity.136 
 
Given the prevalence of well-documented nationalist foreign-policy agendas in the cases 
German and Japanese expansionism, it is not difficult to accumulate evidence in support of 
arguments about the centrality of identity recognition to the era of world power rivalries that 
emerged between c.1880 and 1945. For the kinds of great-power nationalism that proliferated 
in this era were centrally ideologies of geopolitically competitive social progress forged in a 
world where the nationalization of states and armies made problems of cultural identity 
essential to language of external statecraft. The highly generalized and ahistorical vocabulary 
of social psychology lacks purchase on this process of sociocultural transformation. The 
emergence of an aggressive nationalism at the heart of elite political cultures during the late-
nineteenth century was shaped by a range of interlocking historical ruptures — such as the 
democratization of domestic social orders and the onset of intensive global economic 
competition with the Great Depression of 1873-1896 — which helped convert appeals to the 
symbolisms of nationhood into an authoritarian politics of international rivalry. This was a 
profound historical rupture rooted in the conjuncture of societal and geopolitical restructuring 
that marked the age of global imperialism before 1914. For between the French Revolution 
and the uprisings of 1848, the language of nationhood represented a predominantly anti-status 
quo sociopolitical position associated with bourgeois opposition to aristocratic rule, and not the 
kind of geopolitically aggressive national chauvinisms which marked the age of empire from 
the 1870s on. With the onset of a hyper-competitive imperialism in the 1880s and 1890s, the 
increasing nationalization and militarization of elite political cultures was not confined to 
revisionist states like Imperial Germany or Meiji Japan, but also shaped the imperialist politics 
of the Western-liberal heartland. Roosevelt in the US, and Disraeli in England, were central 
figures in the rising chauvinism of late-nineteenth-century world politics.137 By equating the 
nationalist agendas of this era with the status anxieties of “rising powers”, socio-psychological 
approaches risk obscuring the actual pattern of national-imperialisms, which was a general 
feature of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, rather than a unique pathology of 
the German or Japanese political class.  
 
This criticism raises a wider issue with psychological approaches to international status 
competition. Grounding the linkages between culture, identity, and national security in a 
psychological conception of states-as-persons tends to produce an a-historical understanding of 
status competition as a timeless social process. From this angle, it is difficult to assess several of 
the most central features of the world-power rivalries thematized in recent work on status. Why, 
for example, were perceptions of international inferiority initially channeled into the pursuit of 
colonial empires and global markets rather than a direct military confrontation with the British 
or American Empires? What accounts for the unprecedented historical clustering of 
geopolitically competitive nationalisms and international status rivalries during the late-
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nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries? What conditions shaped the openness of political 
actors to the pursuit of imperialism as a promising source of international prestige? These 
questions cannot be addressed through ahistorical models of collective psychology, much as 
they cannot be adequately conceived in terms of rational-choice calculus toward economic 
benefits. On the contrary: the reality is that both status anxieties and economic conflicts were 
deeply entwined within the perceptions of historical backwardness generated by a world 
economy dominated by Anglo-American capitalism. As discussed in Chapter 4 this pair of 
expansive modern empires, the one a vast network structure of colonial enclaves and informal 
spheres of interest, the other a continent-spanning national-colonial formation with an 
unprecedented abundance of natural-resource endowments, were central to the perceptions of 
international hierarchy and social backwardness from which rival strategies of geopolitical 
expansionism flourished. Yet the theoretical vocabulary of social psychology has no way of 
accounting for the familiar fact that the expansionary grand strategies pursued by both 
Germany and Japan, for much of the first half of the twentieth century, were consciously efforts 
to revise a specific inter-imperial world order — one in which the distribution of territorial 
possessions, external spheres of influence, and industrial growth that massively favored the 
British and American Empires.138 In this context, aggressively competitive bids for world power 
had a kind of historical rationality that cannot be accounted for in exclusively psychological 
terms. The cultural construction of national imperialism as a high-status, prestige project was 
an internal feature of a specific intersocietal formation and historical conjuncture.  
 
 
V. For a Global Historical Sociology 
 
The preceding discussion highlights the explanatory and conceptual problems that arise when 
scholars of international-relations theory employ over-generalized theoretical vocabularies 
rather than historically situated analytical perspectives. Against the background of this critique, 
I now seek to outline the basis of an alternative global historical sociology.139 While the 
following chapter establishes the substantive theoretical conception of modern international 
change around which this approach revolves, this section of the argument clarifies two major 
historical-theoretical issues: (a) the intersocietal constitution and systemic historical character 
of the modern international order; and (b) the sociohistorical constitution of “the global” as a 
modern social form. The first part of this discussion proceeds in dialogue with two major 
contributions to contemporary historical sociology: the work of Michael Mann and Alexander 
Anievas. The second draws on the writings of Antonio Gramsci to elaborate the historicist 
conception of the modern global condition that frames the argument of this thesis as a whole.  
 
INTERSOCIETAL STRUCTURES AND GEOPOLITICAL SYSTEMS 
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The a-historical set up of universal political-science theories leads many accounts of interstate 
politics to posit highly generalized mechanisms of international conflict — anarchy and self-
help, ontological security and status-seeking. What is needed to refute such conceptions is a 
controlled understanding of multiplicity of historically embedded causal structures which shape 
the pursuit of power at an “interstate” or “global” level, as well an adequately contextualized 
understanding of the complex, overdetermined character of the actual historical conjunctures 
in which “international politics” plays out. An obvious reference point for such an approach is 
the work of Michael Mann, whose four-volume account of the Sources of Social Power consistently 
theorizes even the most macro-scale of historical questions, from the origins of human 
civilization to the making of national states, as contingently emerging social processes rooted in 
multiple, irreducible power networks.140 Unlike the dehistoricized and often monocausal 
theoretic perspectives reviewed above, Mann’s approach revolves around a more flexible 
understanding of the real-historical complexities of social power relations:141 the existence of 
“multiple overlapping” of “sociospatial networks of power” organized around four distinct network 
structures without any necessary causal primacy: “ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) 
relationships.”142 Focusing on the capacities for logistical, territorial, material and social 
“organization” generated by particular historical configurations of these broad networks, 
Mann’s historical analysis demonstrates the overdetermined character of historical change, 
illustrating the “polymorphous crystallization” of modern bureaucratic states and capitalist 
classes through the intersecting economic, military, and ideological conflicts that constituted 
them.143 The analytical power of this approach is especially clear in Mann’s second volume, 
which provides a subtle analysis of the historical ties between geopolitics and international 
capitalism. Arguing that “capitalism, states, military power, and ideologies contained 
contradictory, entwined principles of social organization” Mann illustrates the shifting patterns 
of industrial change and national state-building which brought the geopolitical dynamic of 
military competition between states into an increasingly chaotic alignment with the 
transnational economic dynamic of commercial competition.144 Instead of a general theory of 
the political economy or geopolitics of interstate rivalries, it appears one can speak of a 
contingent pattern of entwinement between capitalism and militarism, unevenly emerging 
across states, classes, and national-representative institutions.145 This explanatory strategy 
provides a historical sociology of international change better attuned to the complex 
conjunction of sociohistorical causations which make up modern intersocietal formations. 
 
                                                
140 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume 2, The Rise of Classes and Nation-
States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: 
Volume 3, Global Empires and Revolution, 1890-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Michael Mann, 
The Sources of Social Power: Volume 4 Globalizations, 1945-2011 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
141 In the context of debates in sociology and social theory, William Sewell makes a similar point about the 
importance of Mann’s emphasis on the contingency of macro-social dynamics: Logics of History: Social Theory and 
Social Transformation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 114–15. 
142 Mann, The Sources of Social Power, 1986, chapter 1, here at 1, 2. Emphasis in the original. 
143 Mann, 2–3; Mann, The Sources of Social Power, 1993, 3, 6–10, 75. 
144 Mann, The Sources of Social Power, 1993, 258, 291ff. 
145 See, Mann, chapter 8, and 33, 86, 137, 227ff. 
 64 
Despite these achievements, Mann’s vision of social power as multiple, highly autonomous 
socio-spatial networks — or, in conventional Weberian terms, separate ideological, economic, 
military, and political spheres — lacks purchase on the systemic character of such modern social 
forms as capitalism and the global nation-state system. Committed to an a priori model of 
irreducible social power sources, Mann’s welcome emphasis on the typically multifactorial, 
overdetermined character of sociohistorical change sometimes fails to adequately illuminate 
the structures of interconnection that both make such social structures into globalizing 
frameworks for social action and bring contingent historical processes into a larger causal 
dynamic. Given that the central purpose of Mann’s third volume is to examine the relations 
between imperialism, war, capitalism and revolution in the period c.1890-1945, this rejection 
of any systemic understanding of either societies or international relations becomes a major 
analytical obstacle. As Julian Go highlights, Mann’s reliance on the IEMP presents as separate 
historical processes that formed part of the same historical series: the New Imperialism of the 
1890s and the proletarian revolutions of 1917-1923 were not discrete crystallizations of social 
power, but linked responses to the same pattern of global economic crises and interstate 
rivalries.146 Indeed, because Mann’s analytic of “nonsystemic, nondialectical process” refutes 
any notion of “system” or “totality,” 147 he is unable to visualize the extent to which the 
competitive expansion of global empires during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries was conditioned by the same historical dynamics that fostered the coeval development 
of nation-centered industrial societies: how the dislocation of social orders experiencing the 
intensifying pressures of uneven and combined development led both state elites and 
revolutionary political movements to seek powerful central states capable of managing the 
global economic conflicts unlocked by internationalization of industrial capitalism. At a deeper 
sociological level, the elision of this sociohistorical process reflects Mann’s longstanding view of 
capitalism and the international system as inherently independent spheres of social power.148 
While it may be true that there is neither any necessary or functional relationship between 
economic and geopolitical competition,149 this does not mean that there is no higher order of 
systemic process linking the political economy of global capitalism to the conflict dynamics of 
the interstate field. The modern security problematic of military-strategic innovation under 
conditions of constant technological-economic competition exemplifies how far the capitalist 
nature of the modern economy penetrates the rationality of statecraft.150  
 
A direct counterpoint to Mann’s view of the 1890-1945 conjuncture is provided by the work of 
Alexander Anievas. Where Mann argues the priority of irreducible, nonsystemic power 
networks, Anievas casts “the international” as systematic product of “historically unique social 
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structures.” In a powerful account of the geopolitical rivalries which marked the 1914-1945 
era, Anievas describes the two world wars as “an organic crisis of the totality of structures 
constituting capitalist modernity in its spatiotemporally uneven and combined development as 
a global, internally differentiated, sociohistorical whole.”151 This socio-structural perspective 
builds on Trotsky’s idea of uneven and combined development to characterize the geopolitical 
rivalries that culminated in the great-power wars of 1914-1945 as a product of the differentially 
distributed pressures created by the national unevenness of industrial capitalist expansion over 
the course of the long nineteenth century.152 On this view, German policymakers decision for 
war in July 1914 can be explained by the Prussia-Germany’s unique struggle to overcome the 
conditions of historical backwardness mediated by its spatio-temporal location within the 
staggered pattern of European industrialization processes. Stressing the competitive pressures 
generated by German industrialization’s juxtaposition with an early-developing Britain and 
France and a late-developing Russia, Anievas argues that the military-authoritarian turn in 
German foreign-policy after c.1880 reflects the socioeconomic pressures of uneven 
development. As a consequence of these overarching material conditions, national state-
building and capitalist industrialization — which occurred over a much longer historical period 
in Britain — formed a peculiarly rapid process of combined development. The internal crisis-
tendencies generated by this process led political elites and business leaders to seek outlets for 
domestic social problems in aggressive foreign-policy strategies designed to enhance Germany’s 
access to global markets saturated by industrial competitors.153 An almost diametrical opposite 
to Mann’s perspective, the vision of international historical sociology suggested by this account 
roots international politics in the universalizing pressures of a single social system — capitalism 
— and its inner conflict dynamics.  
 
Although the argument of this thesis also builds on the idea of uneven and combined 
development, its social-theoretical foundations are intended to encompass a broader 
conception of international power than the one that seems to underpin Anievas’ incisive form 
of historical materialism. Like Mann’s multi-source conception of social power organization, 
the kind of historical sociology I develop in the following chapters revolves around an emphasis 
on the multiplicity of forms of power transformation which shaped the conjuncture of the New 
Imperialism and the trajectories of American expansionism therein. This, as will become 
apparent, is not to deny the centrality of capitalism’s uneven and combined development to 
dynamics of interstate rivalry. Rather, it is part of an effort to locate the strategic and ideological 
logics of imperial rivalry within a historical sociology of the multiple economic, cultural and 
international social structures that made up the global condition of late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century power politics. For the conflict dynamics of this escalating imperialism were 
not reducible to the socioeconomic positions of states within the emergent capitalist order. They 
involved variable rationalizations of the kind of socioeconomic, symbolic, and coercive 
pressures faced by particular states confronting the pressures of capitalist and colonial 
unevenness on a world scale. These rationalizations, as much ideological as strategic in their 
                                                
151 Anievas, Capital, the State, and War, 7, 216–216. 
152 Anievas, 59–62. 
153 Anievas, 71–84, 100–104. 
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overall calculus of power and interest, generated projects of society-building and world order 
that yoked anxieties about economic rivalry to the larger political-cultural problems of 
integrating national social orders against the background of an encompassing global condition. 
These struggles to constitute political order in the context of a rivalrous and uneven world 
economy and international order were not confined to the capitalist logic of economic 
expansion, but also involved such common features of the national-imperial state as the 
flourishing of domestic militarism and the proliferation of state-centered ideologies of imperial 
prestige and civilizational expansion. In this context, American conceptions of world power in 
the form of an expansive “Open Door” opened out onto a wider “civilizing mission” that 
reflected the status hierarchies of an empire-centered international order. This project of global 
power-projection yoked US grand strategy to the organization of capitalism on a world scale, 
but as underlying ideologies of nationhood and civilizationism demonstrate, its logic was as 
much the constitution of a desired political order as the interests of any sector of American 
capital.154      
 
Capturing these kinds of political rationalization and ideological calculus in historical-
sociological terms calls for a sustained attempt to mediate between subjective and objective 
conceptions of social structure. For when processes of socio-structural development are framed 
in terms of “natural-historical conditions” or “natural-economy conditions,” as for Anievas 
Trotsky framed his conception of uneven and combined development, even a historicized 
understanding of social structure risks subsuming active processes of political and cultural 
practice to a rigid logic of causal necessity.155 The social phenomena usually designated as 
structures in this context — notably class relations, capitalism, the state, geopolitics and 
international system — thus tend to be envisaged as objective material entities that impose 
necessary constraints on political action. Although this conception of social structure captures 
the cage-like quality of modern social and economic forms, it fails to fully acknowledge the ways 
in which such socio-structural formations are made and transformed by the projects, actions 
and desires of “intelligent and suffering human persons.”156 Mechanistic conceptions of the 
“whip of external necessity” and the “privilege of historic backwardness” then become rigid 
metaphors of inevitable structural determinism, rather than ways of locating the particular 
action contexts from which agentive international practices arise.  Missing from such depictions 
of the social as a determining macro-structure is not just the reality of historically constitutive 
human action, but also its meaningful political, cultural, and psychological content. A historical 
sociology trapped in structuralist conceptions of the social threatens to elide the historically 
                                                
154 This cuts against Anievas’s presentation of Wilsonian foreign policy as “the effect and pragmatic response to the 
social-strategic dilemmas arising from the nature of U.S. development and world capitalism as a whole.” Anievas, 
109. My emphasis on the pursuit of political order is not intended to deny the well-documented centrality of 
capitalist interests to American foreign policy. Rather it is intended to avoid reducing the dynamics of strategy-
formation to an unmediated reflection of economic interest. The chaos of uneven and combined development 
confronted by American state-managers during the early-twentieth century demanded the imposition of stabilizing 
and ideologically sanctioned national and international order, not just the pragmatic calculus of interests. I discuss 
Wilsonianism in more detail in Chapter 6, Section II. 
155  Jamie C. Allinson and Alexander Anievas, “The Uses and Misuses of Uneven and Combined Development: 
An Anatomy of a Concept,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 1 (2009): 50, 51. 
156 Sewell, Logics of History, 206. 
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constituted forms of political agency and meaningful social action which mark the pursuit of 
power and influence at an international level, where agents are best understood not as the 
passive bearers of structural necessity, but as the makers of specific strategic and ideological 
projects within particular inter-societal action contexts.157  
 
Consider, for example, the concept of the state which lies at the heart of Anievas’s conception 
of “capitalist geopolitics.” Here, a conception of historical sociology which conceives social and 
geopolitical structures only in objective material terms tends to translate into a limited account 
of the state as a military and economic power-container, co-determined by class and interstate 
conflicts. This conception of state-power brackets the relations of political authority and 
domination through which the state order is reproduced as a political institution and locus of 
elite rule — the construction of political hegemony, for Gramsci, or the organization of legitime 
Herrschaft, for Weber.158  This circumscribed conception of the state is not an adequate basis for 
historicizing relations of global power politics. For as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
visions of world power rivalry associated with the coming of the New Imperialism were partly 
structured around the modernizing social ethos and claims to civilizational superiority which 
underpinned the social authority — legitimate domination — of the modern imperial state. 
The point here is not to say that Marxist conceptions of capitalist development cannot 
illuminate such political and symbolic dynamics. Rather, it is to open this focus up to a greater 
appreciation of the multiplicity of forms and kinds of social power within and through which 
specific logics of international relations emerge historically. It is to suggest that the basic 
desideratum of many IR historical-sociological literatures — a socio-historical as opposed to a 
reified conception of international power relations — demands a more integrated conception 
of the conjunction of coercive, economic, and ideological power transformations that 
characterize modern transformations of internationality. To frame this suggestion, I now turn 
to the writings of Antonio Gramsci. 
 
THE GLOBAL IN HISTORICIST TERMS 
 
To understand exactly what might be meant by the problem of the reality of the external world it might 
be worth taking up the example of the notions of “East” and “West” which do not cease to be 
“objectively real” even though analysis shows them to be no more than a conventional, that is “historico-
cultural” construction…What would North-South or East-West mean without man? They are real 
relationships and yet they would not exist without man and without the development of civilisation. 
                                                
157 A central theme of Jessop’s “strategic-relational” conception of state theory. See, Bob Jessop, State Power 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2008) here at 42. 
158 On this point see especially Bradley S. Klein, “Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection 
and Alliance Defence Politics,” Review of International Studies 14, no. 2 (1988): 133–48; Stefano Guzzini, “Max 
Weber’s Power,” in Max Weber and International Relations, ed. Richard Ned Lebow (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 97–118.  For Weber’s discussion of the centrality of legitimate domination, or domination 
by authority, to the existence of the modern state see, Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, vol. 1–2 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 946, 
952–54. For Gramsci’s idea of hegemony as an active political cultural process see, for example, Antonio Gramsci, 
Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1971), 165–70. 
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Obviously East and West are arbitrary and conventional, that is historical, constructions, since outside 
of real history every point on the earth is East and West at the same time. This can be seen more clearly 
from the fact that these terms have crystallised not from the point of view of a hypothetical melancholic 
man in general but from the point of view of the European cultured classes who, as a result of their 
world-wide hegemony, have caused them to be accepted everywhere. Japan is the Far East not only for 
Europe but also perhaps for the American from California and even for the Japanese himself, who, 
through English political culture, may then call Egypt the Near East.159  
 
— Antonio Gramsci, The “Reality” of the External World160 
 
In order to ensure an analytical focus on the patterns of social transformation and cultural 
restructuring implicated in the formation of the global condition, this thesis is grounded in a 
historicist epistemology of, and approach to, the modern global condition. In a passage 
examining the spatial and epistemological coordinates of modern intellectual culture, Antonio 
Gramsci anticipated such an approach by casting notions of “North-South” and “East-West” 
as historical-cultural constructions rooted in the hegemony of the European cultured class. 
Against understandings of space as natural, ontological, or transhistorical, Gramsci conceives 
the spatial ordering of modern social life as a historically embedded power relationship. The 
categories East and West, in this view, express a condition of cultural, political, and economic 
domination essential to the dynamics of Western hegemony; the organization of space and scale 
is less the objective manifestation of a pre-given physical location than the object and realization 
of a historical power struggle.161 This historicist understanding of space not only rejects 
prevailing forms of philosophical idealism and rationalism, but also opens out onto a broader 
understanding of the evolving sociopolitical and sociocultural processes by which social agents 
come to “objectivise reality” in particular sociocultural forms.162 In this conception, the 
phenomenal appearance of categories like East and West is something more than a 
representational or discursive sign. For much as philosophical thought-systems are to be rooted 
in the “intimate contradictions” by which a particular society is “lacerated,”163 representations 
of space implicate a whole ensemble of social and political dynamics, which allow certain 
categories to become naturalized as quasi-objective forms of historical consciousness. In this 
respect, forms of spatiality are best understood neither as ontological absolutes nor as purely 
discursive constructions, but rather as historically constituted social forms — “real facts” which 
“allow one to travel by land and by sea where one has decided to arrive, to foresee the 
future…and understand the objectivity of the external world.”164 By emphasizing the 
historically specific forms of power and domination implicated in the very possibility of a 
                                                
159 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 447. 
160 This phrase is the subtitle of the section of the Prison Notebooks from which the above quotation derives. Gramsci, 
441–48. 
161 Esteve Morera, Gramsci’s Historicism: A Realist Interpretation (London: Routledge, 1990), 89; cf. Bob Jessop, 
“Gramsci As a Spatial Theorist,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8 (December 1, 2005): 
421–37. 
162 In the passages I am referring to this position was primarily a critique of the idealism of Benedetto Croce and 
the analytical philosophy of Bertrand Russell. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 447. 
163 Gramsci, 404. 
164 Gramsci, 447. 
 69 
dichotomy like East and West, Gramsci opens up a conception of sociopolitical analysis — a 
historical sociology — which foregrounds the historical specificity and constitution of particular 
spatial forms.165  
 
A conception of the real or the objective as a socially mediated form of historical consciousness 
differs markedly from the dichotomy between “subjectivist” and “empiricist” epistemologies 
characteristic of many debates in political science.166 Gramsci emphasizes that “the idea of the 
‘objective’” refers not to any “metaphysical materialism” but to the processes of “historical 
becoming” through which particular ensembles of human practice come to be realized in the 
form of specific ideological and intellectual standpoints.167 This suggests a deeply historicist 
epistemology in which even such seemingly physically constituted categories as space and place 
represent temporally embedded ensembles of social and cultural practice. As Gramsci 
emphasized: “It might seem that there can exist an extra-historical and extra-human 
objectivity. But who is the judge of such objectivity? Who is able to put himself in this kind of 
‘standpoint of the cosmos in itself’ and what could such a standpoint mean?”168  
 
This kind of historicism not only demands an attentiveness to issues of context. More 
fundamentally, it foregrounds the production of, and internal relations between, particular 
spatial, cultural, and political-economic forms. It therefore entails a dual critique: first, of the 
distinction between “history” and “theory” as mutually exclusive analytical strategies; and 
second, of the dichotomy between “objective” and “subjective” as discrete domains of social 
reality and experience.169 In this respect, Gramsci’s historicism might be said to anticipate a 
break with the kind of materialism that Pierre Bourdieu would later charge with occluding the 
relational and symbolic constitution of modern social groups.170 It suggests an integrated 
conception of historical sociology, attentive to the socio-structural underpinnings of particular 
historical  formations, and cognizant of “the fact that the human agent is creative, generative, 
producing mythical representations by applying mental functions, symbolic forms.”171 What 
                                                
165 This perspective partially anticipates the interpretation of cultural imperialism developed in Said’s later work, 
which emphasizes the importance of Gramsci’s political sociology Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism 
(London: Vintage, 1994), 56–57. 
166 For a critique of the philosophical assumptions that often underpin this divide see, Heikki Patomäki and Colin 
Wight, “After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June 1, 
2000): 213–37. 
167 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 446. 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 46ff. 
169 For example, see Gramsci’s claim that “the philosophy of praxis thinks of itself in a historicist manner, that is, 
as a transitory phase of philosophical thought.” Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 404. 
170 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,” Theory and Society 14, no. 6 (1985): 725. For a 
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bears emphasis here is not just the appealing historical sensitivity of Gramsci’s epistemological 
stance, but also its emphasis on the internal relations between historical phenomena that might 
otherwise be conceived in abstraction from one another. In the above-quoted passaged we find 
that historical-cultural constructions of political space are treated as internal to the structures 
of social and geopolitical power generated in the course of European expansion while, in turn, 
such ideological representations figure as a structuring ideological force; one which shaped 
American, European, and Japanese perceptions of inter-societal difference and conflict.  
 
Of particular importance, in this regard, is the way in which Gramsci’s internal-relations model 
of social causation, in conjunction with his historicist epistemological strategy fosters a subtle 
analysis of the new forms of political organization and spatial ordering generated in the era of 
the New Imperialism. His conception of “hegemony” explored how the colonial expansion of 
Europe after 1870 was mirrored by the development of an increasingly integrated form of 
national state that sought to re-organize social and territorial resources into a unified civil and 
political society.172 This movement was not a unilinear national trajectory, but rather involved 
a complex overlapping between political projects and dynamics operating on a variety of scales: 
from the development of “bourgeoisie” as a “concrete world class” 173 to the opposition between 
urban and rural social groups that characterized the modern “city-countryside” relationship, 
whose significance Gramsci emphasized in the case of the Italian Risorgimento and the 
American transition to Fordism.174 The formation of an integrated national society, in this 
conception, hinged on specific political and ideological struggles among a variety of historical 
social forces, intellectuals, elites, and political parties. This conception of national society as a 
contingent sociopolitical product not only serves to historicize the seemingly natural 
phenomenon of a bounded nation-form. Simultaneously, it specified the complex entwinement 
between national and global spheres engendered by, and constitutive of, the deeply 
interdependent historical condition associated with the emergence of the world market during 
the age of European imperialism. Rather than an isolated domestic process, “every relationship 
of ‘hegemony’” is “necessarily an educational relationship” which “occurs not only within a 
nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international 
and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilizations.175  
 
This conception of modern national political orders as overdetermined by social, economic, 
and ideological processes operating on a multiplicity of spatial scales marks a significant 
departure from the binary of “domestic” and “international” politics around which much 
conventional IR theory oscillates. It presents national and global political-economic spheres as 
overlapping and dynamic parts of the same world-historical process. Against this background, 
the following chapter elaborates and concretizes some of the key processes of international 
change which shaped the constitution of global power politics during the era of sociopolitical 
restructuring witnessed by Gramsci. Beginning with an analysis of the Spanish-American War 
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of 1898, I set forth a historical-sociological theorization of modern international transformation 
which illustrates the novel pathways and orientations of strategic power-projection that marked 
the emergence of an inter-imperial international order and capitalist world economy.  
 
 72 
 
 
3. THE SOURCES OF GLOBAL POWER POLITICS 
THEORIZING MODERN INTERNATIONAL CHANGE 
 
 
 
 
I. Conceptualizing Modern International Change: The Spanish-
American War and the Dislocation of Social Order  
 
This chapter provides a historical and theoretical account of the nineteenth-century origins of 
global power politics. To move away from the transhistorical modes of analysis which dominate 
IR theories of power-political competition, we need an analysis of international change and 
historical development which can better comprehend the existence of qualitatively distinct 
geopolitical systems, conflicts, and forms of power. Towards this end, the following discussion 
blends historical, conceptual, and theoretic analysis to highlight the empirical patterns of social 
structure and political agency, global societal change, and geopolitical transformation which 
marked the late-nineteenth century onset of the New Imperialism. By way of introduction, I 
begin with the example of an historical episode that embodies several of the historically-
distinctive features of global power politics itself.  
 
The Spanish-American War began with an unexpected catastrophe.1 On the evening of 
February 15th, 1898, the USS Maine exploded in Havana Harbor, killing two hundred and 
sixty American sailors. That day, on receiving a cablegram informing him of the seemingly 
accidental sinking of the Maine, Admiral George Dewey noted the heightened emotional 
atmosphere of “intense excitement” which surrounded the event, and set out to prepare his 
vessels with coal and fuels, “ready for moving at a moment’s notice.”2 This atmosphere of crisis 
spread quickly throughout American society. On March 27th, the White House received a 
telegram from the editor of the New York Herald, W.C. Reick, informing President McKinley 
that: “Big corporations here now believe we will have war. Believe all would welcome it as relief 
to suspense.”3 Two days later, an official declaration was issued to Spain, demanding full 
reparations for the Maine and a peaceful resolution to the ongoing Cuban crisis.  
 
For it was this event, the nationalist revolution against the Spanish Empire that began in 1895, 
which had originally drawn the American navy to Havana, a key site of US foreign economic 
expansion, with the Cuban sugar and mining industries receiving some $40 million in 
                                                
1 This paragraph is based on Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 
(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1963), 377–406; David J. Healy, US Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 
1890s (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), 40–47; Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: 
How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1998), 4–7.  
2 George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey, Admiral of the Navy (London: Constable & Co Ltd., 1913), 178, 180. 
3 Cited in: LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898, 392. 
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American investment during the 1890s.4 On the same day, the New York Tribune reported that 
“what is wanted first of all is relief from suspense…Even a declaration of war would be preferred 
by bankers and stockbrokers to the continuance of a stagnant market...with rumours of 
impending hostilities.”5 Against this background of acutely-felt instability, McKinley’s efforts 
to avert a war proved futile. On April 25, Congress finally passed the war resolution which 
signalled the end of successive US administration’s policy of neutrality regarding the Cuban 
liberation struggle. Within a week, the fighting began. On May 1st, Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron 
destroyed the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Manila Bay, marking the end of Spanish colonialism 
in the Philippines. Envisioned as a sign of “Manifest Destiny,” victory figured as a conscious 
marker of a future American ascendancy, celebrated in increasingly jingoistic terms by the 
national press and military establishment alike.6  
 
Yet the events of 1898 cannot be adequately represented by such national mythologies. It was 
the Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898), the last of three nineteenth-century liberation 
wars fought by Cuban nationalists against the Spanish Empire, which had originally prompted 
the American intervention, leading one historian to emphasize the “Spanish-Cuban-American 
War” as the more apt title for the conflict.7 Before the American intervention the Liberating 
Army had already taken control of the Cuban countryside, while the Spanish Empire had lost 
100,000 soldiers in a financially draining cycle of revolt and military conflict.8 Frustrated by 
Spain’s failure to resolve a crisis that had begun decades earlier with the outbreak of the Ten 
Year’s War (1868-1877), the United States was gradually moved to intervene in order to protect 
a key site of overseas economic activity and investment, eventually establishing itself as the de 
facto military government of Cuba between 1899 and 1902.9 More crucially, the Cuban 
independence movement and the contemporary Philippine Revolution (1896-1898) revealed 
the fragility of traditional forms of European colonialism, fostering heightened anxieties about 
the United States’ ability to access the overseas markets deemed essential to economic growth.10  
 
In the arc of American grand strategy, the year 1898 thus represents a significant departure 
from long-standing foreign-policy decisions. The posture of neutrality regarding European 
                                                
4 David M. Pletcher, “Rhetoric and Results: A Pragmatic View of American Economic Expansionism, 1865–98,” 
Diplomatic History 5, no. 2 (1981): 99. 
5 Cited in LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898, 392. 
6 Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2014), 502. On the centrality of “Manifest Destiny” to the ideological formulation to 
late-nineteenth century US political culture see Anders, Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the 
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7 Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism: 1895-1902, vol. II (New 
York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 377. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Alan Dye, Cuban Sugar in the Age of Mass Production: Technology of the Economics of the Sugar Central, 1899-1929 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 51–52, 279 n.59. 
10 On the centrality of these anxieties to US grand strategy in this era see also, Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The 
British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 220–22. 
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affairs was a deeply held commitment, originally outlined in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. In 
just three months and twenty-two days, however, the war brought a new sense of worldwide 
geopolitical and economic power to the forefront of American political consciousness. Now, for 
the first time, the United States looked set to become “the controlling World Power, holding 
the sceptre of the sea, reigning with the guiding principle of a maximum of world service.”11 In 
similar terms, Theodore Roosevelt, who acted as a key advocate of the war as Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (1897-1898), viewed the conflict against Spain as “righteous” act — “the 
first great triumph” in the “mighty-world movement” of American expansionism.12 For 
Admiral Stephen B. Luce, likewise, the war against Spain had been “a war in the interest of 
civilization and human progress,” demonstrating the centrality of military power to a civilized 
national life.13  
 
This symbolic framing — figuring the war as the sign and validator of American world power 
— partly reflected the increasingly vast scale of American economic expansion, whose rising 
power could now be seen in the mirror of the contracting Spanish Empire.14 During the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, the United States had established an unprecedented 
continental economic sphere connected by the world’s first transcontinental railway system (est. 
1869). Its economy now entered a century of positive trade balances, with exports exceeding 
imports in all but three years in the period 1876-1970, compared to the mere fourteen years of 
favourable import-export ratios prior to the 1870s. While the Spanish Empire entered a death 
spiral of trade deficits, fiscal crises, and revolt, the post-Civil War trajectory of the United States 
represented the inverse: ascending industrial growth and intensified political-military 
centralization.15 The era of the Spanish-American War was a historical watershed. In the words 
of the one US naval commander:  
 
Considered as a war, the war with Spain was almost insignificant; but, considered as a source of 
influence on our national life, its magnitude can be hardly calculated. Just as the results of the war itself 
expanded from the simple intention of freeing Cuba, to the acquirement of a vast island empire, 
extending from the West Indies to the China Sea; just so the nation has expanded from one almost 
hermit in its tendencies to one of the overshadowing powers of the world. We have left our own isolated 
ocean-bound coasts, and have reached out across the seas, until we have put ourselves in contact with 
all the great world powers now struggling for control in the enormous undeveloped markets of the great 
                                                
11 From a 1902 article reflecting on the war that was published in the North American Review by US Navy Captain 
Richard P. Hobson cited in Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, 229.  
12 Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s sons, 1899), 9, 65. In this book, 
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unwieldy East. And in this East lies the field of the future struggle for supremacy, both political and 
commercial.16 
THE NEW IMPERIALISM AND THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL CHANGE 
 
This vignette highlights the multiform character of international change. The outbreak of war 
is not an isolated happening. It typically involves a period of emergence, a process of gestation 
that structures its advent and trajectory. In the fin-de-siècle United States, the fact that a war 
against the Spanish Empire could not just occur, but figure as a profound transformation of 
prevailing structures of consciousness and political practice represents a complex development 
inscribed within an overdetermined conjuncture of historical causalities. As such, 
notwithstanding its apparently singular, almost inadvertent appearance, even a cursory survey 
of the origins of the Spanish-American War draws attention to a more general feature of the 
relation between historical events and international change: how the “dislocation of normal 
life” — of prevailing structures of social order — that characterizes such moments of ruptural 
change can rearticulate existing structures of internationality — political, symbolic, and 
socioeconomic.17 The sense of rupture and insecurity generated by such a complex dislocation 
of structures can foster a surge of practical and symbolic activities with lasting implications for 
the development of both social orders and international orders.18 A major historical event like 
the Spanish-American War highlights a variety of ways in which processes of international 
transformation emerge and shape the pursuit of power and influence at a global level. 
 
On the one hand, consider how the pattern of dynamics which made the war possible involved 
the interaction between causal processes operating on a number of apparently distinct spatial 
and temporal scales, and involving the interactions between a series of differentially located and 
historically distinct social formations. While it was the growing dynamism of American 
industrial capitalism that brought the United States, so to speak, into increasingly intimate 
relations with Cuban society, it was the uprising of Cuban nationalists against the colonial 
dominion of a semi-feudal Spanish monarchy which prompted US overseas expansion to turn 
from an economic process into an imperial war. The advent of the war and the imaginings of 
US world power which it stimulated were partly rooted in a dynamic process of intersocietal 
unevenness: the ways in which the industrial transformation and military expansion of the 
United States synchronized with a set of profoundly different vectors of modernity: the 
involution of Spain’s imperial monarchy and the advent of a nationalist revolutionary 
movement within its colonies.  
 
                                                
16 John Hood, “The Pacific Submarine Cable: Some Remarks on the Military Necessity and the Advantages of a 
National Cable,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute 26 (1900): 480. In the same issue of Proceedings, the US Navy’s 
official journal, see also the article by Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Frank W. Hackett, which discusses the 
perception of collapsing distances frequently associated with fin-de-siècle notions of imperialism and geopolitics. 
Frank W. Hackett, “An Address Delivered Before the Naval War College,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute 26 
(1900) here at 453. 
17 The term the dislocation of normal life is taken from William Sewell, Logics of History: Social Theory and Social 
Transformation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), chapter 8.   
18 A major theme of Sewell’s theory of the event Sewell, 229. 
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On the other hand, consider that the unfolding crisis of 1898 and its impact on American grand 
strategy depended not just on economic or security calculations, but on the interaction between 
strategic decisions and symbolic structures. The sinking of the Maine was almost immediately 
invested with deep symbolic meaningfulness as a national crisis. Victory in the war which 
followed was then taken as the sign of a world-historical trajectory, portending future greatness. 
The emotional tone of crisis generated by an unanticipated tragedy also seemingly helped to 
frame the war as a normative national cause with existential significance for American society.19 
After the war, the pursuit of world power thus took on new, compelling meanings for American 
political and military elites. In August 1898, the month victory was secured, the US Naval 
Board began to map out a the geopolitical strategy for US expansionism, highlighting the 
Pacific Ocean and Western Hemisphere as the centres of gravity of future imperial rivalries.20 
 
This brings into view two problems in theorizing the relationship between power politics and 
international change. First, the events surrounding the Spanish-American war resonate with 
the global condition of modernity forged over the course of the nineteenth century. From the 
rise of capitalism and imperial nation-states, to the close relations between foreign policy 
decisions and financial markets, battleship warfare and rapid communications technologies, 
national crises and national progress — there seems to be every reason to view the events of 
1898 as a symptom of modernity on a global scale.21 But what exactly does it mean to describe 
such processes as modern? And what constitutes their global character? War between rival 
empires was, of course, a fact of international existence deep into the historical past. And the 
rise and fall of great powers is, according to the authors of the realist tradition, the basic 
dynamic of international politics as such.22 Yet to designate the Spanish-American war as a 
“modern historical event” implies something distinctive about its social and political character 
— something which cannot be collapsed back into the putatively timeless texture of 
international politics.23 How then are modern processes of international transformation best 
identified and theorized? And how can the study of power politics be integrated with the 
analysis of modern historical change?  
 
Second, the complexity of an event like the Spanish-American war brings the difficulty of 
theorizing historically about power-political competition fully into view. The decision to go to 
war clearly involved strategic calculations. But the actors involved are not best understood as 
                                                
19 For Sewell, historical events are characterized by symbolic interpretation, cultural restructuring, and heightened 
emotion. My analysis is modelled on this methodological injunction. See, Sewell, 245, 248ff. 
20 As demonstrated by Dirk Bönker, Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States Before 
World War I (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2016), part I, here 37. 
21 According to the German historian Reinhart Koselleck the notion of crisis as a historically progressive category 
is a distinctively modern development, with origins in the eighteenth century. Reinhart Koselleck, “Crisis,” trans. 
Michaela Richter, Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no. 2 (May 22, 2006): 357–400.  
22 For example, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 7, 
211; Kenneth Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism 
and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 341. 
23 Pace Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 66; also, Robert Gilpin, 
“The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” International Organization 38, no. 2 (1984): 287–304; Barry 
Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism,” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken 
Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 47–65. 
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undifferentiated “conflict groups” wielding greater and lesser coercive capacities.24 The 
historical conditions that structured the conflict between the Spanish and American Empires 
involved a more complex pattern of shaping and controlling forces than the realist model of 
interstate anarchy allows.25 Contrary to standard depictions of the binary between “domestic” 
and “international” politics, the events of 1898 were marked by a dislocation and remaking of 
a variety of political, cultural, and economic structures on a series of interlocking scales, 
undermining conventional levels-of-analysis models of international relations and foreign-
policy making.  
 
In this sense, an adequate appreciation for the complexity of historical episodes points to the 
inadequacy of several conventional analytic dichotomies and ideal-typical oppositions. For not 
only did the events leading up to the war combine radically differentiated yet overlapping 
experiences of state-formation, socioeconomic development, and ideological expression, they 
also involved the deeply symbolic and cultural interpretations of shifting historical 
circumstances. Nevertheless, while IR constructivists are surely right to stress the interpretive, 
normative, and symbolic component of power-political interactions, explaining why ideological 
discourses like world power or imperial prestige acquire the status of authoritative political 
rationales requires something more than attention to “ideational factors.” Like other types of 
historical episode, complex power-political events like the Spanish-American war blur familiar 
distinctions between “societal” and “international” spheres and cross the boundary between 
“material” and “ideational” forms.  How then is the texture of international relations to be 
conceptualized beyond such familiar dichotomies? What, given these concerns, would a 
plausible conception of the relationship between international change and power politics look 
like?  
 
In sharp contrast to the language of dependent and independent variables which dominates 
much positivist IR theory, an adequate conception of the Spanish-American war demands 
something like a historical sociology of the conjunctural transformations, intersecting 
causalities, and emergent political and symbolic practices that constituted such a complex 
dynamic of modern historical change. Yet the highly abstract and over-generalized vocabulary 
of much IR theorizing sidesteps the basic premise of a sociohistorical analysis: that social 
practices are historically embedded, temporally emerging, and relationally constructed forms 
of power.26  
 
 
                                                
24 Contra Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” 290; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 93. 
25 For a somewhat similar point, though one couched more in terms of the relationship between network-structures 
and social identities, see Daniel Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, 
and International Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 22. 
26 This point is modelled on George Steinmetz, “The Octopus and the Hekatonkheire: On Many Armed States 
and Tentacular Empires,” in The Many Hands of the State: Theorizing Political Authority and Social Control, ed. Kimberly 
J. Morgan and Ann Shola Orloff (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 371; cf. Craig Calhoun, “The Rise and 
Domestication of Historical Sociology,” in The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences, ed. Terrence J McDonald (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 327–29; Derek Sayer, The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytic Foundations 
of Historical Materialism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 130–31.  
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TOWARD A SOCIOHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
In this chapter, I develop a way of addressing these issues in historical and analytic practice. 
This approach involves developing a historical-sociological conception of international change, 
power politics, and global modernity. As the above discussion implies, the underlying premise 
of this undertaking is that the task of conceptualizing international politics should proceed, not 
in general terms, but in relation to a meaningful — historically and conceptually specified —  
spatio-temporal context. That is to say, even as the concept of power politics — of conflict and 
domination among political communities — gestures toward a general feature of international 
existence, its concrete expression is always mediated in a particular conjunction of historical-
cultural forms whose inner logic must be deciphered. In what follows, I concretize this 
proposition by examining the novel forms of intersocietal conflict and imperial rivalry forged 
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperial era. In so doing, I offer a first 
cut at the sociohistorical transformations and situated geopolitical logics underlying the 
emergence of the international as worldwide social space and competitive global whole during 
the era of the New Imperialism.  
 
Building on the critique of the conventional international-theory traditions and international-
security scholarship outlined in the previous chapter, I aim to reconceptualize the dynamics of, 
and relationship between, international transformation and power politics in sociohistorical 
terms. This reconceptualization is centered around an account of how the development and 
dislocation of social and intersocietal structures that characterizes modernity makes qualitative 
transformations in the structure and meanings of the international, the multiplicity of social 
formations, an immanent feature of modern political and cultural life. This account is grounded 
theoretically in an attempt to build an understanding of international transformation into a 
conception of the multiple, historical, and mutable character of modern social structures. This 
theorization is intended to: (1) mediate the opposition between both structuralist vs. voluntarist 
and objectivist vs. subjectivist approaches; (2) recognize logics of transformation and dislocation 
that characterize modern social structures as mutable historical; (3) draw attention to key 
processes by which the structural change may articulate historically as transformations in 
international consciousness and practice. On this basis, I situate the analysis of power politics 
within a historical-sociological approach that links the logics and dynamics of intersocietal 
conflict to specific interplay between structure and agency  produced at particular moments of 
structural transformation.  
 
My argument is that the profound sense of change and insecurity generated by the 
characteristically modern experience of structural dislocation is a central driver of the ways in 
which historical actors come to grasp the international as an arena of strategic projects, political 
desires, and, by extension, power politics. Given that no single theory or theoretical perspective 
can be expected to grasp such complex historical phenomena in their entirety, my discussion 
tracks between a range of social and international theories in order to resituate the analysis of 
power politics within a historical sociology of modern international change.  
 
 79 
The argument proceeds in four steps. In the following section, I construct a conception of the 
possibility, dynamic, and international dimensions of modern socio-structural change by 
drawing on the conception of social structure developed by William Sewell and the idea of 
uneven and combined development theorized by Justin Rosenberg. While both these 
contributions to the analysis of modern social structures rest on an understanding of the 
generative multiplicity of societal and international systems, my interest is less the relative 
compatibility of two quite different social theories than the ways in which their articulation 
helps to define the process of international transformation as a distinctive theoretical concept. 
On this basis, the third section turns to the problem of periodizing and identifying modernity 
in international relations. By contrasting the balance-of-power logic of the Utrecht 
international order (c.1713-1815) to the era of the New Imperialism (c.1880-1914), I illustrate 
the theoretical significance of the principle of historical specificity and specify some patterns of 
structural transformation and dislocation which engendered late-nineteenth century 
conceptions of global power politics. The fourth section establishes some of the key power-
political logics which marked the emergent global condition of late-nineteenth century 
modernity.  
 
 
II. International Transformation as a Theoretical Concept  
 
What is international transformation and how is it related to the study of power politics? 
Theorizing modern transformations of the international, I argue, should focus on changes in 
the structure of intersocietal — or more broadly “inter-social” — relations: how the structure 
of relationships between different yet interacting social formations — societies, polities, and 
cultures and other types of social site — generates emergent constellations of internationality.27 
These transformations involve changes in the pressures for, pathways of, and orientations 
toward, the pursuit of power and influence in the international sphere.28 They are therefore 
deeply related to the classical IR problematic of interstate power politics. However, defined in 
this way, the study of power politics undergoes a conceptual shift. For it can be seen not as an 
isolated geopolitical phenomenon, but rather, in fully sociohistorical terms: as deeply connected 
to the frameworks of strategic and symbolic action through which historical actors — state-
managers, military elites, political leaders, foreign policy strategists, and so on — navigate and 
visualize shifting conjunctures of inter-societal relations.  
                                                
27 My formulation here is modelled especially on the idea of intersocietal/inter-social conceptions of social change 
outlined in: Justin Rosenberg, “International Relations in the Prison of Political Science,” International Relations 30, 
no. 2 (2016): 127–53; Justin Rosenberg, “Uneven and Combined Development: ‘The International’ in Theory 
and History,” in Historical Sociology and World History: Uneven and Combined Development over the Longue Durée, ed. 
Alexander Anievas and Kamran Matin (London: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2016), 17–30; George 
Lawson, Anatomies of Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), here at 7 and 48-72; also, George 
Lawson, “Revolutions and the International,” Theory and Society 44, no. 4 (May 17, 2015): 299–319. 
28 This partly echoes the attempt by Nexon and others to conceptualize power politics in terms of its constituent 
social mobilization dynamics. However, by emphasizing the constitutively intersocietal and inter-social dimensions 
of power-political dynamics, as well as the importance of developing broader analyses of long-term structural 
change, my approach differs somewhat from the approach outlined in Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern 
Europe; Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel Nexon, “The Dynamics of Global Power Politics: A Framework for 
Analysis,” Journal of Global Security Studies 1, no. 1 (2016): 4–18. I emphasize these differences further below.    
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MODERN LOGICS OF STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION 
 
The verb “to transform” refers to changes in the form or character of a given entity, to a 
metamorphosis in its function or nature. It is this kind of fundamental process of change that 
IR scholars have in mind when considering transformations in the “texture” or “generative 
grammar” of international relations: the structures of relationship that “shape, condition, and 
constrain social behavior” at an international level.29 Predominant IR theories, as the previous 
chapter showed, offer a variety of approaches to theorizing change in this fundamental sense.30 
What bears emphasis here is the centrality of the concept of social structure to the problematic 
of international transformation: a structural conception of social action is crucial for analysing 
international relations and international power dynamics across virtually all IR-theoretic 
paradigms and traditions. Although I agree that some notion of social structure is a crucial — 
or, in fact, inescapable — basis for analyzing processes of international transformation, a 
sociohistorical conception of structural change demands a radical departure from approaches 
which stress the timelessness of social structures (e.g. neorealism); focus one-sidedly on a single 
structural domain (e.g. world systems theory); or cast social relations in terms of misleading 
dichotomies between “material” and “ideational” forms (e.g. systemic constructivism).  In 
contrast, I conceive processes of international transformation in terms of the intrinsic 
historicity, multiplicity, and agentive mediation of social structures. I conceptualize social 
structures as historically constituted action contexts and draw attention to the multiple, 
interactive and uneven character of structural forms as such. This approach integrates three 
basic theoretical principles which imply, in turn, three further categories of substantive analysis.  
 
HISTORICISM. The subject matter of all social-scientific analysis is rooted in time and place. 
Modern social categories like “war,” “the state,” “the market,” “the economy,” and “the 
individual” refer not to natural or timeless forms, but emergent and evolving patterns of 
relationship forged in history.31 The premise of historicity carries the implication that neither 
social nor international power structures can be adequately understood outside their forms of 
emergence and development: the unfolding processes which mark their origins, trajectories, 
and crises. Moreover, an historicist approach entails a corresponding stress on the centrality of 
conjunctural change, contingency, discontinuity and overdetermination — terms which 
foreground the complexity of human history itself. By combining an emphasis on the 
developmental history of modern social forms with a concern for the conjunctural effects of 
emergent social structures, an historicist form of international power analysis seeks to formulate 
accounts that link the action contexts of political praxis to a wider understanding of the 
historical processes which produce and delimit the possibility of historically effective agency as 
such.  
                                                
29 John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 280; John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and 
Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics 35, no. 2 (1983): 273, 280; cf. 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 66, 88ff. 
30 For an overview see Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe, 23–28. 
31 For a seminal account of historicism in IR see, Robert W. Cox, ed., “Realism, Positivism, and Historicism 
(1985),” in Approaches to World Order, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 49–59. 
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STRUCTURE. This conception of historicism demands attention to historically constituted 
horizons of human practice: the fact that human life is embedded within a particular historical 
arrangement, or structure, of socially reproduced distributions of resources, practices, symbols 
and relationships.32 A sociohistorical conception of structure, more particularly, draws 
attention to the emergent patterning and interactive multiplicity of resources of social power 
within and through which agents seek to realize their ends, projects, desires and so on.33 This 
conception of structure rests on three basic axioms: the structured character of social action; 
the interactive multiplicity of social structures; and the inseparability of their subjective and 
objective dimensions.  
 
Although the terms structure and agency seem to imply a sharp dichotomy of the “levels” or 
“spheres” of social life, they are merely a conceptual pairing that denotes the structured 
character of all social action: the fact that social life is lived within “fields of practices that are 
formed by patterns of events and experiences.”34 Social action thus takes place within a 
multiplicity of distinct institutional spheres; agency is an integral — constitutive and inescapable 
— part of structure, rather than its antonym.35 Terms denoting some notion of structural 
context, like “field,” “system” or “order,” are therefore best understood in terms of a 
multiplicity of social action contexts, rather than a hierarchy of structural levels or institutional 
spheres. The structures that shape and constrain action in the labour market, for example, are 
distinct from those that shape aesthetic, religious, or family arrangements, meaning that agents 
occupy a heterogeneity of social contexts, each with distinct configurations of symbols, 
resources, and relationships.36 
 
This condition of structural multiplicity means that structures can interact, overlap, and 
interpenetrate with transformative consequences.37 While symbols and resources can be 
transplanted from one structural context to another, conflicts over the legitimate boundaries of 
institutional fields, such as the distinction between “public” and “private” areas of the economy, 
indicate that the division of social structures are open and contested. The structure of the 
modern nation state, for example, is inherently open to conflicts between its bureaucratic mode 
of governmental organization and its nationalist mode of symbolic legitimation. Like other 
kinds of complex sociohistorical form, “the nation” is a simultaneously objective and subjective 
                                                
32 Justin Rosenberg, “Confessions of a Sociolator,” Millennium 44, no. 2 (January 1, 2016): 294; cf. Justin 
Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations (London: Verso, 1994), 
46–50. 
33 Sewell, Logics of History, 132, 140–43. 
34 Lawson, Anatomies of Revolution, 62. 
35 A point which both Sewell and Rosenberg emphasize.  
36 While my interest lies with more macro-historical phenomena than the kinds of analysis usually associated with 
“practice theory,” this conception of structure is compatible with the way Pierre Bourdieu describes his conception 
of social theory qua theory of practice: “The theory of practice as practice insists, contrary to positivist materialism, 
that objects of knowledge are constructed, not passively recorded, and contrary to intellectualist idealism, that the 
principle of this construction is the system of structured, structuring dispositions, the habitus, which is constituted 
in practice and is always oriented to practical functions.” Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity, 
1990), 52. 
37 Sewell, Logics of History, 143. 
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structural form, co-constituted by the intersection between material formations of land and 
territory with deeply symbolic relations of political community, belonging, and charismatic 
authority. Even the functioning of a seemingly hard material structure like the capitalist 
economy is closely related to the symbolic power of cultural forms of individuality, labour 
discipline, and taste. In different ways, the social theories of Marx, Gramsci, Weber, and 
Bourdieu each highlight this feature of modern social structure: the interdependence of the 
subjective and objective dimensions of structured social action.  
 
INTERNATIONALITY. Much as the social world comprises a multiplicity of structures — i.e. 
societies comprise many, rather than one, set of social power resources and institutional 
spheres38 — the international comprises a multiplicity of interacting social formations or 
societies.39 This condition of internationality is best visualized as a space of evolving historical 
unevenness: the co-presence of differently structured societies undergoing different kinds, 
degrees, and temporalities of development; the interactions between differentially configured 
social formations, some with greater capacities for military, economic, and symbolic power-
projection than others; the intersection between historical forms and temporalities that Ernst 
Bloch called the dialectic of “nonsynchronism and its heterogeneous contradictions.”40 An 
emphasis on the ontological multiplicity of modern social life — on the reality of “temporally 
coexisting instances, levels and forms of society” — entails a corresponding stress on socio-
historical unevenness as a central feature of historical development.41 In the post-1800 era, 
more particularly, it entails a conception of the constitutive interactions among different forms 
of state, society, and culture under the rising pressures of intersocietal interdependence 
associated with modern forms of capitalist development, colonial expansion, and novel 
communications and transportation technologies. On this view, the development of specific 
modes of international power-projection and intersocietal conflict cannot be understood apart 
from the structural constitution of the international as a substantive social domain constituted 
by the coexistence of multiple societies, and not merely the absence of a state-like governmental 
authority.42  
 
This definition of internationality focuses attention on the generative historical processes arising 
from the co-existence, interaction, and combination of locales with their own developmental 
temporalities, historical backgrounds, cultural forms and institutions.43 Moving beyond the 
image of the states-system as a composite of equivalent political units, it resituates the 
problematic of modern power politics within a broader analysis of world development, seen in 
its political fragmented, culturally varied, and socially differentiated complexity. Rather than 
taking a generic macro-structure, such as the “logic of anarchy” or “balance of power,” as its 
                                                
38 Sewell, 140; also, Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 
1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1–32. 
39 Justin Rosenberg, “Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?,” European Journal of International 
Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 308. 
40 Ernst Bloch, “Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics (1935),” trans. Mark Ritter, New German 
Critique, no. 11 (1977): 36. 
41 Rosenberg, “Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?,” 314. 
42 Pace Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 93. 
43 Rosenberg, “International Relations in the Prison of Political Science,” 13. 
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starting point, such an analytical perspective demands attention to the historical processes by 
which particular configurations of social multiplicity come to organize and represent the 
international as a lived historical arena. In this respect, it is necessary to ask how and why — 
i.e. as a result of which conjunction of social processes and historical dynamics — competition 
logics like “balance of power” or “Machtpolitik,” “imperialism,” “world power” or “hegemony,” 
emerge historically as a cognitive conceptualization of specific formations of internationality, 
rather than assuming that such terms refer to an already constituted geopolitical structure. A 
socio-historical conception of the international thus implies a processual understanding of 
ongoing transformations in the practices and construction of external power relations rather 
than the static replication of given geopolitical structures. At this general level of abstraction, 
the shift from universal international-security theories towards a sociohistorical approach 
implies both (i) a redefinition of the international as a general object domain and (ii) a turn away 
from the kinds of neo-positivism and structural-functionalism which informed much postwar 
IR theory. 
 
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT. From this emphasis on interactive multiplicity and 
unevenness of modern social structures, it follows that processes of international transformation 
must partly concern the dynamics which arise from the interaction between differently 
structured social formations, cultures, states and so on. The concept of uneven and combined 
development captures this dynamic historical process. In particular, it encapsulates a distinctive 
feature of modernity alluded to in the discussion of the Spanish-American War above: how the 
emergence of a universalizing historical dynamic — the increasingly interdependent 
international order and capitalist world economy of the late-nineteenth century — generates 
differentially distributed pressures and opportunities for political, cultural and ideological 
action. Patterns of uneven and combined development produce historical conjunctures with 
varying structural constraints and pathways for international power-projection: the American, 
Spanish, and Cuban political actors discussed above were situated within an evolving 
conjuncture of deeply uneven intersocietal interactions, their pathways and capacities for 
collective political action overdetermined by a range of transnational processes and inter-social 
dynamics. These processes can help to generate new articulations and modalities of 
international power and coercion, such as the possibilities for economic expansion opened up 
by the division between “rich” and “poor” societies under capitalism, or the symbolic 
projection of the United States as a defender of righteous, civilized, modern values which 
emerged from the fateful synchronicity of Spanish imperial decline, Cuban national revolution, 
and American military-industrial expansion. In this light, the interactive multiplicity of social 
and international life represents a generative sociological condition manifested in a range of 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth instances of combined development: the pursuit of 
capitalist industrialization within semi-feudal and predominantly agrarian regions of Eurasia 
(Czarist Russia, Prussia, Italy);44 the colonial incorporation of “non-Western” states into a 
global political-economic hierarchy dominated by industrializing economies and the 
                                                
44 As theorized in Trotsky’s Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, trans. Max Eastman (1932; repr., London: 
Penguin, 2017).  
 84 
corresponding de-industrialization of many Asian and African societies;45 the proliferation of 
anxieties about national competitiveness, transnational competition, and competitive 
modernization that the marked fin-de-siècle discourses of economic nationalism, geopolitics, and 
Social Darwinism.46  
 
STRATEGIC MEDIATION. Structures were defined above as historical configurations of human 
practices, involving a distinctive patterning of social resources, practices, and symbols. This 
implies that even historical macro-structures that are associated with especially powerful 
impersonal constraints, such as the “capitalist economy” or the “international system,” can be 
understood as the realization, object, and medium of sociopolitical action.47 The term strategic 
mediation provides an apt description of the structured yet constitutive, situated yet creative, 
notion of agency which such a conception of structure implies. More particularly, it draws 
attention to a range of ways that the international, the multiplicity of interacting societies, might 
be conditioned and transformed by the strategic political projects of situated historical actors. 
Structural change is possible because agents are not just passive bearers of pre-existing social 
structures, but creative actors whose actions have ramified and unintended consequences. 
Examining the actual thought and practice of living historical subjects is therefore a crucial 
component of structural analysis. In 1898, the decision to send the USS Maine to Havana was 
a fateful act with unforeseen consequences for the subsequent expansion of American power, 
which thereafter acquired the very overseas colonial empire whose acquisition it had 
traditionally abjured. Of course, this process had deep roots in the earlier experience of 
Westward expansion, another form of colonialization, and the processes of industrial expansion 
and national state-formation that proceeded after 1865. Yet at the same time, the dynamics 
which ensued from the war against Spain acquired their own historical effectivity. They 
encouraged, among other things, an increasingly globalist geopolitical outlook that reflected 
the United States’ somewhat haphazard entry into the dynamics of imperial rivalry in East Asia 
and the Pacific.  
 
MODERNITY.  The preceding emphasis on the dynamism, mutability, and multiplicity of social 
structures resonates with a sociohistorical conception of modernity as a structural condition 
and historical epoch. The idea that social and political life revolves around the contestation and 
organization of structural complexes with a universal scope is implicit in the notion of modern 
societies as Gesellschaft communities with multiple institutional fields. Over the course of the 
nineteenth century, in particular, the emergence of structural formations with a universalizing 
global reach, such as industrial capitalism, the world market, and the nation-state international 
order, can be understood as generating increasingly expansive and encompassing fields of social 
action. Indeed, the transition from agrarian land-based political economies to industrial-
                                                
45 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
26. 
46 For an analysis of economic nationalism in this context see, Sven Beckert, “American Danger: United States 
Empire, Eurafrica, and the Territorialization of Industrial Capitalism, 1870–1950,” The American Historical Review 
122, no. 4 (2017): 1137–70 and chapter 5 below. 
47 For a recent attempt to conceive capitalism as contested political-institutional arena rather than an invariant 
macrostructure see, Nancy Fraser, “Legitimation Crisis? On the Political Contradictions of Financialized 
Capitalism,” Critical Historical Studies 2, no. 2 (September 1, 2015): 157–89. 
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capitalist modes of production helped generate an increasingly interdependent economic 
system based on systematic incentives for technological transformation and productive 
efficiency. In contrast to earlier socioeconomic formations, the capitalist economy is primarily 
organized in terms of market-mediated, profit-seeking economic competition among private 
actors; it entails the development of an encompassing world market. This process of world 
market expansion contributes to and intensifies the dynamics of uneven and combined 
development —  revealed in the differential competitive performance of firms, national 
economies, regions, and other centres of production; the articulation between “traditional” and 
“capitalist” socioeconomic forms within industrializing social formations; and the emergence 
of the “development gap” as a major concern of states, political parties, and other actors.  
 
At the same time, the proliferation of secular notions of progress and rationality imbues modern 
cultural systems with expectations of order and development that contribute to a desire for 
structural change. During the nineteenth century, novel expectations of historical progress 
imbued a spectrum of political imaginaries, ranging from highly bellicose forms of nationalism 
and imperialism, to scientific ideologies of societal, cultural, and racial development. In 
particular, the dynamics of inter-imperial rivalry and expansion were frequently couched in a 
framework of “civilizational imperialism” that depended on the application of quasi-scientific 
status distinctions — such as the opposition between backward and superior races, or the 
widely-drawn dichotomy between savage, barbarian, and civilized cultures — to peoples and 
societies organized within an evolving global hierarchy. The proliferation of such forms of 
ideological modernity indicates a shift in the social and symbolic foundations of state-power — 
away from the systems of religious and aristocratic authority which sustained earlier state-
forms, and toward a quasi-rational order of legitimate domination grounded in the prestige of 
secular ideals of historical progress.  
 
SYMBOLIC ACTION AND SYMBOLIC RESTRUCTURING. All this implies that symbolic action and 
interpretation is an important part of socio-structural change. It would be misleading to 
conceptualize the restructuring and mediation of historical configurations and intersocietal 
dynamics in exclusively material terms. The actions of American political elites like Roosevelt 
and Dewey were overdetermined by a surplus of symbolic motivations that already formed a 
constituent part of the cultural structures which constituted them as normative national 
subjects. Likewise, the way that the spirit of national revolt emanating from the Cuban 
independence struggle impacted the crisis of 1898 is only intelligible if we allow for the fact that 
historical conjunctures are marked and made by the symbolic restructuring of prevailing 
cultural orders.  
 
This last point is well captured in Pierre Bourdieu’s critique of objectivism.48 In these terms, 
symbolic action figures not as an internal mental activity, but a deeply social process:  
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The most resolutely objectivist theory has to integrate the agents’ representation of the social world; 
more precisely, it must take account of the contribution that agents make towards constructing the view 
of the social world, and through this, towards constructing this world, by means of the work of representation 
(in all senses of the word) that they constantly perform in order to impose their view of the world or the 
view of their own position in this world — their social identity. Perception of the social world is the 
product of a double social structuration: on the “objective” side, it is socially structured because the 
properties attached to agents or institutions do not offer themselves independently to perception… on 
the “subjective” side, it is structured because the schemes of perception and appreciation available for 
use at the moment in question, especially those that are deposited in language, are the product of 
previous symbolic struggles and express the state of the symbolic power relations, in a more or less 
transformed form.49 
 
This framework of epistemological and methodological suppositions suggests an initial way to 
cut into the problem of theorizing international transformation. An emphasis on the historical 
constitution, multiplicity and unevenness of social structures provides a way to think about the 
international as a lived dimension of political and symbolic action. Not only does this 
perspective capture the co-constitutive nature of the relationship between structures and agents. 
More fundamentally, it draws attention to the variety of ways in which the dislocation of social 
structures articulate historically as transformations in international consciousness and practice. 
The multiplicity of societies and social structures suggests that even seemingly hard, objective 
structural configurations like “the economy” and the “states-system” are far more open to 
meaningful historical transformation than conventional IR theories imply. The profound 
unevenness of societies, cultures, other socio-structural forms across time and space indicates 
the variety of “conjunctions of structures” and agentive constructions of social life that historical 
change entails.50 Structural dislocations and generative restructurings of the international are 
an immanent feature of the social world because of the multiplicity, unevenness, and agentive 
and symbolic mediation of modern social structures.  
 
More concretely, the sociohistorical conception of international change I am outlining here 
serves to foreground the changing horizons of international consciousness and practice made 
possible at moments of historical structural dislocation, such as the Spanish-American War. In 
this episode, there was an intersocietal combination of forms and types of historical 
development marked by profound historical unevenness. The manner of the appropriation and 
experience of this unevenness was figured partly in the terms of prevailing socio-symbolic 
orders, and partly through the supercharged atmosphere of crisis generated by a rapid sequence 
of eventful ruptures. American political and military elites were able to seize upon this moment 
as a sign and opening of future global expansion because the Spanish-American War and 
Cuban War of Independence were bound up with the dislocation of a range of historically 
significant structures — from macro-level political structures like colonialism, European 
absolutism, and the idea of Spanish America, to more local ruptures such as the perceived 
threat to US investments in the Cuban economy and the unprecedented image of national 
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tragedy generated by the sinking of the USS Maine. Subsequent framings of American grand 
strategy as a struggle for world power and the defence of Western civilization integrated such 
experiences into a compelling language of geopolitical priorities and decision-making. This is 
not to overstate the importance of a single historical event. For an event of structural dislocation 
like the Spanish-American War was an immanent possibility of the rising dynamics of 
intersocietal conflict and interdependence which accompanied such features of late-nineteenth 
century modernity as the growing ties between nationhood and statehood and the rapid 
industrialization of production relations.  Rather, what requires emphasis here are the ways in 
which a sociohistorical conception of structural change and social dislocation provides a 
distinctive way to think about modern transformations in the consciousness and organization 
of internationality.  
 
 
III. The Historical Constitution of Power Politics: From the Balance 
of Power to the Machtstaat 
 
In the conventional language of international theory, the expression “the historical constitution 
of power politics” is a paradox. The term is commonly used to signify a domain of international 
relations that is somehow permanent and essential — one that is widely identified with the 
universal conflict dynamics of anarchical geopolitical systems as such. As discussed, in a strange 
reworking of the historical record, the meaning of power politics has been constructed more 
with reference to the regional conditions of early modern Europe than with reference to the 
specific spatial and temporal referents of nineteenth-century Machtpolitik — a term which, in its 
own time, belonged to a wider panorama of discourses about the globalizing dynamic of 
contemporary international change, imperial rivalry, and industrial competition.51 This 
conflation of modern power politics with the geopolitical pluriverse of Westphalia is not only a 
Eurocentric theoretical  maneuver. It also orients historical and conceptual analysis of modern 
geopolitical systems to the institution of the balance of power constructed in the late-feudal age 
of European absolutism.52  
 
Correlatively, a more systematic understanding of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century era of international transformation and imperial rivalries can bolster an alternative 
framework of analysis; one more adequately attuned to the emergent global condition within 
and against which modern conceptions of interstate power politics were forged historically. My 
strategy for building this historical and analytic framework is to begin by distinguishing fin-de-
siècle conceptions of Machtpolitik and world power from the early modern notions of balance and 
equilibrium which preceded them. This necessarily cursory comparison yields a sense of the 
repressed historicity of modern geopolitical categories, paving the way for a theoretical 
perspective more closely aligned to the originating era of global power politics. More than this, 
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it illustrates and concretizes a general feature of the relationship between power politics and 
historical change: how the dislocation of structures can produce new pathways and pressures 
for socio-political and symbolic action, which reflect the deep sense of insecurity engendered 
in historical actors by transformative structural change.53 In this conception, the progressively 
global scale and distinctive national-imperial imaginary figured by such geopolitical discourses 
as Machtpolitik and world power are best understood as efforts to strategically mediate and 
symbolically restructure a rapidly transforming international order in ways that spoke to the 
perceived needs of the imperial elites who articulated them.  
 
Against the dislocations of ordinary life rendered by the fin-de-siècle dynamic of rapid spatial, 
temporal, and socioeconomic restructuring, the pursuit of imperial expansion appeared as an 
appealing strategic and symbolic mediation between the universalizing dynamic of global social 
change and the local experience of social and cultural unevenness. Against the perceived 
dangers of industrial competition, mass politics, and cultural difference, geopolitical discourses 
like Machtpolitik and world power presented the national-imperial state as an organic locus of 
authority and prestige, through which to manage the pressures of an increasingly compressed 
world economy and interstate system. It was against this background that Max Weber came to 
coin the idea the state as an expansionist national-imperial Machtstaat.  
 
The first step in elaborating this argument is to establish some sense of the New Imperialism as 
a distinctive historical period. To establish both the contextual specificity and underlying 
mechanisms of the modern power-political forms, it is necessary to locate them in an intelligible 
historical trajectory  — “we cannot not periodize.”54 As Justin Rosenberg has written, “IR as 
a discipline begins, it may be suggested, when we move beyond the ahistorical generalizations 
of realism, and start to map out something like a periodization of the successive institutional 
forms, agents and scope of ‘international power’ which have accompanied the precursors of 
today’s global nation-state system.”55  
 
PROBLEMS OF PERIODIZATION  
 
The Treaty of Utrecht marked the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-
1714). This was a conflict triggered by the death of the heirless King Charles II in 1700, and 
driven by the ensuing struggle between the Austrian Habsburg and French Bourbon dynasties 
over the inheritance of the Spanish monarchy.56 It may seem incongruous that the putatively 
modern institution of the balance of power should have been prompted by the biological 
coincidence of a disabled monarch — a king likely rendered infertile by generations of dynastic 
inbreeding — yet the war which followed the death of Charles II belonged to an enduring 
pattern of succession wars, which continued in the century after the Peace of Westphalia. 
Typically resulting from the death of a sonless monarch, disputes over dynastic rights and the 
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line of succession were a main cause of the interstate dynamics of early modern Europe, leading 
to such military conflicts as the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697), the Jacobite Risings (1688–1746), 
the War of the Polish Succession (1773-38), the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), and 
the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778-89).57 In the case of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, in particular, the potential union of the vast Spanish Empire with either the French 
House of Bourbon or the possessions of the German Habsburgs revived the fears of “universal 
monarchy” which structured the conflicts of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648). The French 
monarch, Louis XIV, was widely held to be seeking a universal dominion comparable to that 
associated with the medieval Holy Roman Empire.58 It was this concern, in part, which 
triggered a preemptive war against France, launched by the Grand Alliance of the Holy Roman 
Empire, Great Britain, Habsburg Spain and the Dutch Republic in 1701. Much as a dispute 
over the royal line of succession had been the precipitating cause of the war, the diplomatic 
arrangements that brought it to an end were bound up with questions of dynastic rights, 
primarily the recognition of Philip V as King of Spain and his formal renouncement of claims 
to the throne of France, as well as the confirmation of the Protestant Succession in Britain and 
Ireland, which cemented the Stuart claim to the throne against French interference.59 
 
This was the background against which the notion of an equilibrium or balance of powers came 
to be inscribed within the Treaty of Utrecht. Against the perceived universalizing ambitions of 
the House of Bourbon, the peace settlement reasserted the principle of the “liberty of Europe” 
celebrated by such eighteenth-century figures as Montesquieu, Gibbon and Vattel.60 In the 
words of the new King of Spain, in the first peace treaty concluded between France and Britain:   
 
One of the main principles of the peace treaties to be concluded between the Spanish and French 
Crowns on the one hand, and that of England on the other, in order to cement [peace] and make it 
strong and permanent, and to attain general peace, [is] to ensure forever the universal good and rest for 
Europe, and to establish an equilibrium between the powers (équilibre des puissances) so that it could never 
happen that several being joined into only one, the balance of equality (balance de l’égalité) that is to be 
established swings over to the benefit of one of these powers, to the risk and detriment of the others.61 
 
Deploying the language of the “Respublica Christiana”, the Treaty of Utrecht cast the balance of 
power as a term of opposition to the universalizing ambition of an absolutist monarchy, 
principally that associated with the state of France. It figured the European order as a composite 
of monarchical powers associated in a pattern of religious and juridical norms dating back to 
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the Medieval period.62 It was an attempt, in this way, “to settle and establish the peace and 
tranquility of Christendom by an equal balance of power,” enshrining in treaty law “the 
fundamental and perpetual maxim of the balance of power in Europe, which persuades and 
justifies the avoiding, in all cases imaginable, the union of the monarchy of France with that of 
Spain”63 Even as it engendered an increasingly systematic understanding of the European 
states-system,64 then, the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht were rooted in a pre-existing dynamic 
of inter-dynastic power struggles that differed quite fundamentally from the social and cultural 
framework of late-nineteenth century world politics. In at least two fundamental respects, in 
fact, the meanings of Utrecht balance of power were incommensurable with the political and 
social dynamics which would define the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperial 
era.  
 
The first point to note is the extent to which the idea of a balance or equilibrium of power was 
conceived, by the architects of the Utrecht treaty, as a solution to the problem of universal 
monarchy inherited from the middle ages. It was in this sense a discourse and institution 
conceived in a world still anterior to the consolidation of national sovereignty as a regulative 
principle of interstate relations; it was an attempt to organize dynastic rights and confessional 
allegiances between states that were still fundamentally identical with the patrimony of a 
monarchical ruler, not national states whose institutional existence is grounded in an abstract 
conception of impersonal sovereignty and territorial space.65 Monarchia, meaning government 
by one, implied a universal right of rulership the relative boundaries and legitimacy of which 
were central questions of early modern jurisprudence. In order to counter this expansionary 
monarchical imperialism, ideas of Just War and the balance of power provided a juridical 
framework for organizing the relations between dynastic states on a more secure basis.66  While 
they helped to instantiate a conception of Europe as a multiplicity of states, rather than the 
terrain of a universalizing monarchical dominion, 67  they presupposed a world of competing 
dynastic houses rather than the nation-state international order which came into being during 
the nineteenth century.  
 
Although the pressing struggle for foreign territorial possessions which accompanied this latter 
era of “high nationalism” bears a superficial similarity to the late-feudal dynamic of 
monarchical imperialism, the post-1875 era of colonial expansion was centred around 
nineteenth-century forms of mass politics and industrial competition, authoritarian nationalism 
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and racial ideology, which did not exist prior to the nineteenth century. 68 This was a struggle 
to constitute a greater national space centred around a homogenous ethno-cultural core rather 
than expand the territorial claims of a dynastic house.69 Indeed, it developed in tandem with 
the rationalization — depersonalization, bureaucratization, and centralization — of the state 
apparatus, providing a sharp contrast to the spread of venal officialdom which marked the 
expansion of dynastic empires in the Bourbon and Habsburg absolutist polities.70 As Teschke 
has shown, this dynamic — the emergence of Weberian-style states with autonomous systems 
of national taxation and continuous bureaucracies — needs to be understood in relation to the 
gradual conversion of feudal social orders into capitalist societies capable of separating private 
economic accumulation from public political organization.71 In continental Europe, the 
balance of power established by the Utrecht treaty was therefore less a symptom of 
international modernity, than a sign of the ongoing prevalence of dynastic and absolutist 
sociopolitical structures. As demonstrated by the Polish Partitions of 1772-1795, it held in place 
the system of territorial aggrandizement and state-elimination that was the hallmark of dynastic 
imperialism.72 Any conflation of late-nineteenth century world politics with a generic balance-
of-power system is a historical misnomer.73  
 
The second periodizing distinction concerns the character of the balance-of-power principle 
which developed in early modern Britain. Of particular significance for the issues raised in this 
thesis are the combination of mercantile imperialism and naval expansion characteristic of the 
eighteenth-century British state, the most extensive of modern empires and the first 
industrializing power of the capitalist epoch. The so-called “blue-water policy” of 1688-1815 
British Empire revolved around a balance-of-power principle that combined informal overseas 
imperialism with opposition to universal monarchy on the continent. While exercising control 
over vast swathes of the world, early-modern British expansionism operated primarily through 
a two-fold strategy of indirect imperial rule and continental power-balancing. Although it rested 
on an exceptionally efficient and commercialized domestic political economy, this foreign 
policy strategy, operative between the treaties of Utrecht and Vienna (1713-1815), figured a 
relatively loose configuration of networks of trade, territory, and administrative control — a 
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pattern of strategic arrangements built on the maritime supremacy of the Royal Navy.74 In this 
respect, the balance-of-power principle forged post-1688 differed markedly from the rising 
consciousness of a global geopolitical system that characterized the development of the late-
Victorian Empire.  
 
THE SPECIFICITY OF MACHTPOLITIK 
 
The importance of this periodization can be made clear by returning to  the dynamics of 
structural change and dislocation with which this chapter began: the coming of the New 
Imperialism. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, states such as Germany, Italy, and 
Russia followed the example of the United States in adopting roughly coeval strategies of top-
down industrialization and territorial expansion. Mirroring the westward expansion of the 
American polity, the boundaries of these states expanded outwards to acquire new colonial 
possessions, typically conceived as “greater spaces” of regional domination anchored in the 
prevailing national.75 From the 1870s on, the national-imperialist orientation of these states 
developed in tandem with their commitments to state-led programmes of industrialization, 
nation-building, and military expansion. These power struggles sought to carve out spaces of 
autonomy within an increasingly compressed political-economic order. In Japan, likewise, the 
years between the Meiji Restoration and WWI were marked by an intensification of efforts at 
nation-building and military mobilization, after the “Samurai Revolution” laid the foundations 
for an industrial “powerhouse” in East Asia.76 Striving for independence from the widely-felt 
incursions of Western imperialism, Japanese elites supported the annexations of Taiwan (1895) 
and Korea (1910) as part of an ongoing effort to dominate East Asia. Much like the empires of 
the Europe and America, such colonies formed a regionally bounded “Greater Japan” in which 
Korea and Taiwan supplied raw materials in exchange for the products of Japanese industry.77 
These near-simultaneous projects of nation-building colonialism, across the Americas, Europe, 
and East Asia, were frequently animated by the anxieties about the “closing of the frontier” 
which drove US visions of expansionism. Throughout the period, this fixation on the national 
mastery of space, both in terms of direct territorial possession and long-range economic control, 
was enshrined in such formally similar geopolitical-imperial doctrines as German Lebensraum 
and Weltpolitik; French-imperial visions of a Euro-African “civilizing mission;” and Japan’s 
pressing search for pan-Asian integration, followed later by the so-called East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere. In both Britain and the United States, ideologies of the “White Man’s 
Burden” and “Manifest Destiny” expressed similar fixations on the state’s capacity to render 
an expansive political and economic order within an encompassing global order.    
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This pattern of concerns came together in Weber’s discussion of the Machtstaat. Here great 
power rivalries were reimagined as world-wide confrontations between territorially-anchored 
national communities organized into physically outsized political-economic units.  This state-
form was both a national-territorial totality and a community of national culture, presided over 
by an elite class of political officialdom. In this conception, the pursuit of Machtpolitik was not 
confined to a material struggle for power or survival, but rather entailed a contest to “define 
the future character of culture” in the coming order of human civilization; a struggle for the 
dignity of great power prestige driven by a combination of the political desire for international 
standing and the economic needs of domestic social interests.78 The power-political dynamics 
thus envisaged by Weber were not limited to rational calculations about coercive foreign-policy 
strategies, contra subsequent constructions of political realism,79 but opened out onto a wider 
engagement with the conditions of late-nineteenth century modernity — the structured 
dynamic between global capitalism and national statehood, class conflict and inter-imperial 
warfare.80 Always sensitive to the pathological and cultural dimensions of ostensibly strategic 
practices, the model of the nation-state Weber formulated in this context is virtually 
unrecognizable in a positivist register: 
The political community is one of those communities whose action includes, at least under normal 
circumstances, coercion through jeopardy of life and freedom of movement. The individual is expected 
ultimately to face death in the group interest. This gives to the political community its particular pathos 
and raises its enduring emotional foundations. The community of political destiny, i.e. above all of 
common political struggle of life and death, has given rise to groups with joint memories which have 
often had a deeper impact than the ties of merely cultural, linguistic, or ethnic community. It is this 
‘community of memories’ which constitutes the ultimately decisive element of national consciousness.81 
This searching examination of the new conditions of great power politics situated the 
instrumental rationality of modern government into a new ideological and strategic context; 
the state was becoming a “mass phenomenon” embodying the collective responsibility of 
sacrifice in wartime.82 This meant a qualitative shift in the orientations of state-power, from 
Rechtstaat to Machtstaat, which mirrored the wider transition from Classical Liberalism to the 
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New Imperialism evidenced by the expansionist national chauvinism of elite cultures in both 
Europe and the United States.83   
This historical clustering of such projects of national imperialism at the turn of the nineteenth 
to the twentieth century indicates the extent to which the global-scope international system and 
world economy of the fin-de-siècle altered the basic strategic and ideological coordinates of 
interstate power politics. In a world where space and time were being absorbed by the universal 
institutions of money and commodity exchange, development of all kinds — economic, 
military, cultural, and political — became increasingly combined across the international 
system, as societies were inserted within a more systematic framework of interdependence.84 In 
those polities which dominated this transition, the desire to impose order on this integrated 
global space was central to demands for colonial expansionism which the new discourses of 
world power and Machtpolitik elaborated, often on the basis of differentially-applied standards 
of civilization.85 Moreover, the experience of increasing proximity fostered heightened anxieties 
about national economic and military competitiveness. This sense of exposure to the pressures 
of global competition often revolved around anxieties about access to foreign markets, or the 
concerns about overproduction which emanated from the United States after 1873. This 
precipitated reformist efforts to rationalize state institutions, expand war-making capacities, 
and develop stronger systems of national political economy. As in Weber’s discussion of the 
Machtstaat, earlier traditions of laissez-faire and cosmopolitanism were being superseded by 
militaristic, expansionist, and authoritarian political cultures centred on elite rule within mass-
based industrial societies. While the origins of these transitions were diverse across regional and 
local contexts, the perception of an all-encompassing competitive environment provided the 
common frame within and against which ideologies of Machtpolitik and world power, high 
nationalism and colonialism, were articulated historically. Quite unlike the early modern 
balance-of-power-principle, such ideological discourses figured a deeply interdependent global 
geopolitical-economic hierarchy dominated by national imperial states.  
 
IV. Logics of the Global Condition  
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The argument so far can be summarized by saying that a sociohistorical conception of the 
discontinuity, multiplicity, and transformational dynamics of modern social structures serves to 
situate the analysis of interstate politics in a very different theoretical context to that offered by 
conventional international-security scholarship and IR theory. An emphasis on the structural 
dynamics and historical specificity of modern international change embeds global power 
politics in the emergent intersocietal conflicts, strategic political pathways, and socio-symbolic 
resources which marked and made the evolution of the post-1800 international order. To bring 
the various components of this argument together, it is necessary to more fully specify the key 
processes which structured late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century international relations 
in competitive globalizing terms. Towards this end, this section of the chapter provides a 
synoptic overview of some of the major structural dislocations and constitutive social processes 
which conditioned the international order as a worldwide geopolitical space during the 
nineteenth century. In historical terms, the transfer of interstate power politics to a worldwide 
plane in the 1870-1914 age of empire was enabled by the materialization, articulation, and 
intensification of several forms of modern international transformation: inter alia, (1) the 
constitution of an increasingly uneven, global-scope hierarchy of political-economic and 
intersocietal interactions; (2) the strategic and ideological formation of national-imperial states 
as the agents of competitive modernization projects; and (3) the symbolic restructuring of 
political communities and cultural systems in conjunction with the wider political efforts to 
master the emergent spaces of a universalizing world market and interstate field. The structured 
multiplicity, historical unevenness, and simultaneously strategic/symbolic character of this 
process bears out the conception of modern social structures outlined above. I summarize key 
aspects of these processes below in order to specify the terms and focus of the remaining 
chapters.   
 
DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL CONTENTION 
 
GLOBAL FORMS AND STRUCTURAL DISLOCATIONS. The era of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century global restructuring was characterised by a “double movement” toward the expansion 
of an empire-centred global capitalism, on one side, and the consolidation of a national-
imperial great power hierarchy, on the other; the emergence of a supra-territorial world market 
developed concurrently with the competitive and relational inter-state dynamics of the 
geopolitical field and its military-strategic rivalries.86 Between 1870 and 1913, a world 
economic boom occurred in tandem with the spread of industrialization beyond its British 
heartlands, generating an international economy defined by increasingly higher levels of 
intercontinental trade and commodity market integration.87 In 1850, Britain was perhaps the 
sole industrial state, making the scope for international capital flows and world trade relatively 
modest; yet by 1913, the economic output of the United States, Japan, Russia, and Western 
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Europe accounted for two-thirds of world GDP.88 Between 1800 and 1830, the total value of 
international trade increased by just 30 percent, rising from £300 million to around £400 
million; but from 1840 to 1870 its value increased fivefold, reaching some £2,000 million.89 
Between 1500 and 1800, intercontinental trade grew by around 1 percent per year and 
accounted for just 1 percent of global GDP in 1820; yet by 1913, merchandise exports 
accounted for 7.9 percent of world output, while the share of exports counted in the average 
GDP of industrial economies rose from 5.9 to 8.2 percent between 1870 and 1914.90 In the 
same period, an unprecedented overseas investment boom saw overseas lending jump from 7 
to 20 percent of world GDP. Much of this growth was accounted for by newly formed colonial 
economic relationships: colonial systems: 60 percent of British and 66 per cent of European 
foreign investment went to areas of recent European settlement or the New World.91  
 
Quantitative evidence therefore illustrates the extent to which global capitalism is a late-
nineteenth century phenomenon. It is crucial to recognize that this transformation was marked 
by a massive restructuring of global economic power relations: 1800-1900, India’s share of 
world output dropped from 20 percent to 2 percent, China’s from 33 to 6 percent, and the 
modern-day “Third World” from 75 to 7 percent.92 This macro-economic shift was marked by 
profound local dislocations, typically structured by the expansion of colonialism: between 1827 
and 1830, for example, Indian textiles accounted for  29 percent of the cotton products sold by 
British traders in West Africa; yet by 1840, that figure was 4 percent as the distribution of 
industrial power swung firmly in favour of the Lancashire cotton industry.93  
 
During the nineteenth century, the constitution of a global-scope hierarchy of political-
economic power relationships was constitutive of and enabled by a radical expansion in the 
infrastructural and military capacities of the central state.  On the one hand, the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries were marked by a proliferation of attempts at national-state and 
national-economy formation which sought the increasing integration of polities into bounded 
territorial units and political-economic wholes.94 All states now acquired a progressively more 
nationalistic and neo-mercantilist developmental cast, epitomized by the expansion of civil 
bureaucracies, state-infrastructure building projects, and military spending. In the period 1870-
1910, total state expenditures increased by 67 percent in France, by 176 percent in Prussia-
Germany, by 180 percent in Britain, and, between 1902 and 1913, by 428 percent in the 
United States.95 Within this general upsurge of government spending, military expenditures 
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increase dramatically: between 1870 and 1910, defence spending went from 40 percent to 52 
percent of all government budgets in Prussia-Germany, from 25 percent to 37 percent in 
France, from 32 to 40 percent in Great Britain, and from 35 to 68 percent in the United 
States.96  
 
On the other hand, however, the strategic and ideological horizons of the emergent national-
imperial state far exceeded the regional concerns which had animated early conceptions of the 
balance of power. The decades after 1870 were an era of world powers in a dual sense: they 
entailed the simultaneous unfolding of transcontinental empires and national-colonial state 
forms through the international system; they saw the proliferation of attempts to express the 
power of the state on the same global scale as the evolving world economy. These struggles 
involved efforts to establish long-range economic control over formally independent territories, 
as for instance in multiple imperial incursions into China following the Opium Wars (1839-
1860) in conjunction the pursuit of such nation-building colonial projects as the British Raj 
(1858-1947), US colonization of the Philippines (1898-1941), French North Africa (1830-1954), 
German colonialism in Qingdao, Samoa and Southwest Africa (1884/1897/1900-1914), and 
the Japanese annexations of Taiwan and Korea (1895/1910-1945). More particularly, the last 
decades of the nineteenth involved a series of connected efforts to constitute national-imperial 
state as the locus of authority and prestige within an increasingly compressed world-political 
and economic order. In the United States and Germany this saw the birth of a discourse of 
world politics/Weltpolitik and world power/Weltmacht that modelled itself on the image of the 
global British Empire.97 In the British Empire, similarly, the increasingly nationalist and 
territorialist character of late-Victorian imperialism emerged in tandem with the flourishing of 
global political consciousness articulated in the “Greater Britain” debates.98 
 
What is striking here is the fact that such projects of national-imperial expansion emerged not 
as isolated projects of domestic reform, but as part of a remarkable clustering of efforts to master 
a shared world-political and economic space. The structural similarity, historical synchronicity, 
and overlapping trajectories of such projects were deeply conditioned by the existence of a 
universal system of global political economy within and against which all projects of national-
imperial state-formation came to be tested en route to modernity.99 The emergence of an 
inherently universalizing model of industrial-capitalist modernization — a profoundly modular 
and transposable structure of socioeconomic and state-society relations — made possible new 
pathways and pressures for competitive expansionism whose formal similarities were 
structurally related to the increasingly capitalist basis of social development.100 The complex of 
material resources (industrialization, economic surplus, technological advancement) and socio-
symbolic form (national economy, developmentalism, world space) which modern capitalism 
helped to generate were indissoluble features of a globalizing interstate power politics.  
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While this geostrategic dynamic was never subjected to direct theorization by him, Marx 
conceived this process of globalizing social change as perhaps the signal feature of capitalist 
modernity. Much as Weber saw the modern state as an increasingly abstracted model of legal-
rational authority relations, Marx’s social theory foregrounds the growing universality of such 
modern institutions as the individual, the market, and civil society.101 Central to this 
universalizing social dynamic is the possibility of an encompassing economic system, 
enveloping all human societies within the same competitive dynamic. With its pressing search 
for markets and raw materials, “capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier,” 
generating the social and technical preconditions for what Marx, anticipating later discussions 
of globalization, memorably called “the annihilation of space by time.”102 The emergence of 
capitalist society is, in this respect, the emergence of a new spatio-temporal condition, 
epitomized by the development of “free competition” as the “regulating principle of 
production” and the corresponding elimination of earlier political or juridical barriers to 
socioeconomic intercourse.103 For, “if the progress of capitalist production and the consequent 
development of the means of transport and communication shortens the circulation time for a 
given quantity of commodities, the same progress and the opportunity provided by the 
development of the means of transport and communication conversely introduces the necessity 
of working for ever more distant markets, in a word, for the world market.”104 This conception 
explicitly historicizes the world market as a modern social product: 
 
Thus, while capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e. to 
exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives on the other side to annihilate this space 
with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum the time spent in motion from one place to another. The more 
developed the capital, therefore, the more extensive the market over which it circulates, which forms 
the spatial orbit of its circulation, the more does it strive simultaneously for an even greater extension of 
the market and for greater annihilation of space by time…There appears here the universalizing 
tendency of capital, which distinguishes it from all previous stages of production.105 
 
A critical understanding of capitalism as a historically constituted form of universal space-time 
and impersonal social dependency helps clarify the novel processes of cultural, and 
socioeconomic restructuring associated with late-nineteenth century modernity. Indeed, 
Marx’s theorization of the world market as an encompassing universal space-time provides a 
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powerful argument for viewing the category of the global as a distinctively modern historical 
formation rooted in the constellation of societal and economic transformations that 
accompanied the advance of modern capitalism. Indeed, the image of the world as a deeply 
interdependent geopolitical and economic space was delimited, in part, by the increasingly 
abstract form of social interdependence that characterized the evolving nineteenth-century 
world market; the advent of a universal space-time and economic system was deeply shaped by 
the expansion of modern capitalism. In sharp contrast to the early modern landscape of feudal 
Europe, the gradual emergence of capitalist society as the dominant form of social organization 
brought the forms of economic surplus, industrialization, and impersonal social dependency 
constitutive of the possibility of a world market and world economy as such. By generating an 
unprecedented upturn in trade, economic growth, and interaction capacity, it helped fashion 
the globalized political-economic order which the authors of the Communist Manifesto could 
envisage as an increasingly post-national constellation, a world fashioned in the very image of 
capital itself. As Manu Goswami explains, however, the evolving global spaces of late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century modernity were constitutively uneven: “hierarchically 
organized and internally differentiated in the specific sense that the relations between particular 
places — metropole and colony, urban and rural, local and national and the like — are shot 
through with power inequalities and unevenness.”106 Globality, in these terms, is best 
understood not as homogenous social formation, but through the complex interlocking between 
the universal and the particular: “the local does not disappear . . . it is never absorbed by the 
regional, national or even worldwide level. The national and regional take in innumerable 
“places;” national space embraces the regions; and world space does not merely subsume 
national space, but even precipitates the formation of national spaces through a remarkable 
process of fission.”107  
 
COMPETITIVE MODERNISMS. All of the above points to the conflictual geopolitical environment 
fostered by of the global-scope structural formations forged over the course of the nineteenth 
century. Most fundamentally: the post-1870 international order was marked by a structured 
dynamic between the globalization of political-economic competition, on the one side, and the 
“nationalization” and “statization” of cultural and political orders, on the other.108 The 
archetypally modernist agenda of “progressive” and “civilized” social development thus 
converged around a highly competitive political ethos which valorised national military 
strength and overseas expansionism. 
 
In this context, Weber’s conception of the modern state’s transition from Rechtstaat to Machtstaat 
aptly summarized the ways that many national military and political elites sought to 
reconstitute the institutions of the state for a new era of world power rivalries. In states such as 
Germany, Japan, Italy, anxieties about relative socioeconomic backwardness shaped the 
projects elite-led state-building and societal modernization which proceeded between 1870 and 
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1913. These efforts at national regeneration typically converged around the conflation of 
people and state with a homogenous ethno-cultural core — a nation defined against external 
competitors and foreign ethnic groups.109 This was the process which Treitschke, paradigmatic 
theorist of a xenophobic Machtpolitik, had in mind when describing how the “exertions of the 
state” in military and political reform had cleared the way “for the great personalities which we 
call the Nation and the State to build up a national character to all.”110 In the United States, 
similarly, Alfred Thayer Mahan linked global competition to the social power struggles of the 
industrial age, writing in 1894 that increased geopolitical assertiveness could help strengthen 
the foundations of American capitalism by fostering that “reviving sense of nationality, which 
is the true antidote to what is bad in socialism.”111 Envisioning an American Machtstaat 
dominated by military officials and naval elites, political reformers like Mahan sought to 
reconstitute the institutions and practices of the American state in geopolitically-expansionist 
terms.112 Anxieties about military rather than economic backwardness often lay behind such 
concerns, especially after the Russo-Japanese War revealed the rising military industrial 
capacities of Imperial Japan.113Reflecting the efforts of political and military elites like Luce 
and Mahan, the US gradually acquired a modern warfare state: in the period 1870 to 1910, 
the numbers of US military personnel rose from fifty thousand to one hundred and thirty-nine 
thousand employees, in line with the ongoing rationalization and bureaucratization of 
American state-formation.114 
 
The paradigmatically modernist link between nationhood, war, and state power was a 
constitutive feature of the emerging condition of global power politics. Whereas dynastic and 
absolutist states were reliant on local notables and nobiliary elites to mobilize armed force, the 
nineteenth-century national state combined a national-citizenship model of society-wide 
legitimation with the rational-bureaucratic governmental system of an efficient war-
machine.115 Such state-forms established a universalistic model of formal equality and male 
suffrage which differed markedly from the religious and aristocratic hierarchies envisaged by 
the makers of Treaty of Utrecht and the Congress of Vienna. The highly competitive conditions 
of the late-nineteenth states and global economy thus converged with the expansion of more 
statist forms of nationalism, engendered partly by the rise of  mass electorates and mass suffrage 
systems seen in France (1848), the post-Civil War United States (1868), the German Reich 
(1871), British Empire (1884), and Italy (1871-1912).116 Against this background, the struggle 
by political and military elites to forge national-imperial states typically played out in the 
context of mass-society conflicts over social and economic policy. Geostrategic decisions and 
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foreign-policy strategies could no longer be formulated simply within the aristocratic social 
milieus associated with eighteenth-century “cabinet wars.”117 Rather, as in the case of the 
Spanish-American War, the mobilization of mass societies through highly mediatized forms of 
national culture now emerged as a key factor in the pursuit of overseas expansion and the 
development of geopolitical-military rivalries.118 
 
Cognizance of this structured overlap between political-military, socioeconomic and 
sociocultural fields indicates the extent to which, rather than proceeding from any single 
institutional field, the evolving global condition of late-nineteenth power politics was shaped by 
strategic mediation of, and overlap between, distinct forms of social structure. Consider, for 
instance, the strange amalgam of modernizing socioeconomic agendas and militaristic 
imperialism which characterized the formation of the national-imperial state. This 
combination of social forms was not somehow given by the internal logic of any single structural 
formation, such as “global capitalism” or the “international system,” but rather entailed a 
complex economy of political and ideological terms whose articulation spoke to the evolving 
connections between the hypercompetitive logic of the world market, the modernizing ethos of 
state-rationalization and national development, and the strategic military relations of an 
increasingly compressed interstate system.  The competitive modernism of late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century world politics thus attests to the constitutive unevenness and structural 
multiplicity of the modern international order as such. The formation of a global political-
economic space in conjunction with the growing “nationalization” and “statization” of cultural, 
political, and economic fields transformed the terrain of modern statecraft because it offered 
new resources, logics, symbols, and pressures for the creation of political identities and 
ideologies. In particular, it made possible the presentation of the national-imperial state as the 
locus of progress and authority in a context of rising global competitiveness. This shift — the 
efforts by local elites to convert the state into a nationally-oriented, war-making institution 
rather than a dynastic patrimony or liberal night-watchman — highlights the agentic and 
symbolic transformation of political structures that characterizes modern processes of 
international change. An adequate account of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century 
dynamic of world-scale power-political competitiveness must therefore consider the historically 
specific strategies of political development and state-transformation by which national political 
communities were converted into rival imperial states.  
 
SYMBOLIC RESCALING. This was not a purely institutional or material process, but entailed the 
symbolic transformation of political communities through a range of novel discursive and 
ideological practices. The reconstitution of the state as a Machtstaat in conjunction with the 
projection of national-imperial power onto an emerging global horizon was a symbolic process 
of cultural-historical transformation — not just a reaction to more primary material forces. It 
involved the appropriation and transposition of popular cultural symbols of nationhood and 
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peoplehood as legitimating principles of imperial prestige and great power status; the self-
presentation of political elites, military leaders, and colonialists as homo nationalis; and the 
growing reciprocity between nationalist, racialist, and civilizational discourses of political 
hierarchy and inter-societal differentiation. Although the development of such symbolic 
resources can be traced back into the eighteenth century, their entwinement with an 
increasingly bellicose and state-centred conception of the national-imperial state is a 
predominantly late-nineteenth century phenomenon. In an important theorization of the 
production of the modern national community, Etienne Balibar has highlighted the centrality 
of the operations of classification, hierarchy, and racial distinction to the production of the 
modern nation-form.119 In these terms: “every social community reproduced by the functioning of 
institutions is imaginary, that is to say, it is based on the projection of individual existence into the 
weft of a collective narrative, on the recognition of a common name and on traditions lived as 
the trace of an immemorial past.”120 It is important to recognize that these symbolic processes 
not only operated through the idealization and institution of a bounded national scale, but 
necessarily opened out onto the emerging dimension of global political-economic space. Within 
the evolving imperial core, the structuration of the state as a bounded national community 
emerged in tandem with the symbolic rescaling of political order along global-imperialist lines.    
 
Of particular importance, in this regard, was the elaboration and institutionalization of a 
civilizational ideology of world-political hierarchy and inter-imperial rivalries. During the mid 
to late-nineteenth century era of societal and international restructuring, the notion of a 
culturally distinct core of Western powers — an imagined community of states, tied to a 
prevailing geopolitical hierarchy, and rooted in a mythical history of European development 
— emerged as a key foundation of imperial power politics.121 The structure of international 
relations expressed by the imaginary of “the West,” in this context, was that of a European and 
North American core of imperial powers being rescaled and superimposed across “non-
Western” spaces of political and economic control. As Hobson and Sharman, have argued, 
Western imperial expansion was in this sense a “moral vocation” enabled by prevailing 
discourses of racism and Orientalism.122 More than this, what needs to be recognized is that 
the symbolic and ideological classifications through which the modern international order came 
to be grasped as a worldwide space were given not just by the institutions of state and capital, 
but also by the framework of civilizational hierarchy and difference produced by the prevailing 
system of imperial hierarchy.123 The hierarchical structure of the nineteenth-century 
international order fostered imaginings of globality that were often as much about notions of 
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race and civilization as they were political economy. This was significant for the dynamics of 
both imperial expansion and imperial rivalry because it served to naturalize and foster the 
representation of foreign rivals as deeply “other” politico-cultural formations or ethno-racial 
groups. In his multi-volume work The Winning of the West, Theodore Roosevelt, formulated an 
argument for American imperialism very much along these lines, casting the past experience 
of Westward expansion as the validator of future great power status. On this view, 
expansionism was a duty of the civilized Anglo-Saxon peoples of the British and American 
Empires: 
 
The count against the British on the Northwestern frontier is, not that they insisted on their rights, but 
that they were guilty of treachery to both friend and foe. The success of the British was incompatible 
with the good of mankind in general, and of the English-speaking races in particular; for they strove to 
prop up savagery, and to bar the westward march of the settler-folk whose destiny it was to make ready 
the continent for civilization…To encourage the Indians to hold their own against the Americans, and 
to keep back the settlers, meant to encourage a war of savagery against the border vanguard of white 
civilization…124 
 
This kind of ideological framework, as the following chapters elaborate in more detail, was a 
central feature of the ways in which US political and military elites came to grasp the 
international as a worldwide space of geopolitical and economic competition.  
 
 
V. Conclusions: Why the Modern International Order Produced 
Global Power Politics  
 
It should be clear from the argument of this chapter that the relations of power politics that 
characterize the modern international order are not best understood in terms of generic 
military capacities or universal strategies of Realpolitik and power-balancing. For the nineteenth-
century emergence of a global-scope capitalist world economy and national-imperial states-
system engendered new pathways of symbolic and strategic power-projection which cannot be 
grasped without analyzing the forms of modern social structure which shaped and constituted 
them. More than this, I have tried to show that an emphasis on the intrinsically historical, 
multiple, uneven and symbolic character of modern socio-structural grounds a compelling way 
of theorizing dynamics of international change, in general, and the emergence of global power 
politics, in particular. On this view, transformations in the scale, dynamic, and orientations of 
inter-state politics are a historical and systemic feature of the multiple structural complexes 
which comprise the international as an intersocietal domain and lived political-cultural arena. 
The task of accounting for qualitative shifts in the social textures, political logics, and ideological 
grammar of international power politics is thus best approached in contextualized 
sociohistorical terms, rather than as an abstract analysis of generic state-forms or geopolitical 
systems. More fundamentally: an adequate account of the emerging global scale and worldwide 
political horizons of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperialisms must consider the 
                                                
124 Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West: Part V (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1900), 228–29. 
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historically specific pathways of international change which marked and made the formation 
of national-imperial states and highly competitive modernist political cultures in the shadow of 
an encompassing world market.  
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4. WORLD POWERS IN AN AGE OF EMPIRE 
AMERICAN EXPANSION AND IMPERIAL RIVALRY, 1875-1913  
 
 
 
England has been fertile in soldiers and administrators; in men who triumphed by sea and by land; in 
adventurers and explorers who won for her the world’s waste spaces; and it is because of this that the 
English-speaking race now shares with the Slav the fate of the coming years…The enemies we may 
have to face will come from over sea; they may come from Europe, or they may come from Asia. Events 
move fast in the West; but this generation has been forced to see that they move even faster in the oldest 
East. Our interests are as great in the Pacific as in the Atlantic, in the Hawaiian Islands as in the West 
Indies. Merely for the protection of our own shores we need a great navy, and what is more, we need it 
to protect our interests in the islands from which it is possible to command our shores and to protect 
our commerce on the high seas.1  
— Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (1897) 
 
We have often heard of the “Chess-board of European Politics.” The game-board, now, is the globe 
itself; and America, by her very geographical position, between two great oceans, is not the least 
important of the several contestants...Civilization is ever saying to the barbarian, and to the semi-
civilized, “accept the bountiful gifts of nature, or make way for those who will.” Thus there is a continual 
struggle for supremacy before which barbarism is constantly retreating. The stream of human progress 
is still sweeping on; and woe betide those who oppose its course. This means much for us, here, today.2 
— Rear-Admiral Stephen B. Luce, US Navy (1903) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter established the nineteenth-century sources of global power politics: the 
ways in which state power came to reside in and operate through the long-distance 
interconnections of an imperial world economy; the uneven transformation of societies 
generated by this relational political-economic structure; and the emergence of the national-
imperial state as the political locus of industrial societies. In the pages below, this discussion is 
extended by locating the development of American world power ambitions within the 1875-
1914 age of empire. The escalation of imperial competition in this era — highlighted by the 
increased collaboration between national governments and private capital in the pursuit of 
overseas markets and the expansion of European territorial possessions by some 18 per cent3 
— had-far reaching consequences for the foreign policy strategies pursued by the American 
state. For the New Imperialism, with its violent reordering of world territory and space, gave 
                                                
1 Theodore Roosevelt, “Washington’s Forgotten Maxim,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute 23, no. 3 (1897): 451, 
456. 
2 Stephen B. Luce, “Address Delivered at the United States Naval War College,” in The Writings of Stephen B. Luce, 
ed. John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf (1903; repr., Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 1975), 40. 
3 Grover Clark, The Balance Sheets of Imperialism: Facts and Figures on Colonies (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1936), 5–6; D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century, 2nd ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1982), 178; Heinz Gollwitzer, Europe in the Age of Imperialism, 1880-1914, trans. David Adam 
and Stanley Baron (London: Thames & Hudson, 1969), 9–13, 35–36; Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of 
the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 65. 
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rise to a new dynamic of competitive coexistence which linked the rapid expansion of American 
capitalism to the geopolitical organization of a global economy divided between distinct 
national-imperial states. The of aim of this chapter is to explain the relationship between these 
escalating imperial rivalries and the emergent world power ambitions of the American political 
and military elite. 
 
The centrality of this inter-imperial setting, as a both a medium and object of American grand 
strategy, is obscured by the analyses of domestic policy activism and national politics and 
culture that dominate much of the existing literature.4 In light of the historical and analytic 
framework developed in the chapters above, it is possible to locate the strategic and ideological 
coordinates of American world power advocacy in a broader historical context: the unique 
conjuncture of intersocietal unevenness generated by the emergence of American capitalism as the 
leading edge of the Second Industrial Revolution from 1870 on. In this conception, the shaping 
and controlling forces of American expansionism are to be found not in any independent 
national history, but rather the staggered global pattern of the industrial revolution itself: in the 
intersections between the rapid industrialization of a continent-spanning national economy in 
the United States and the corresponding experience of an arrested “late development” in the 
semi-industrial regions of Western Europe and East Asia. Its productive potential outstripping 
that of any other industrial state, American capitalism emerged as a key foundation of the 
international power hierarchies which drove the geopolitical pressures and status anxieties that 
encouraged imperial expansionism. Since this developmental sequence centered around the 
competitive coexistence of distinct national-imperial states, the organizing focus of this chapter 
will be the United States’ relationship to a pair of empires — Germany and Japan — whose 
own bids for world power were shaped by, as well shaping, the dynamics of American 
expansionism. On this basis, it will be possible to lay bare the relationship between the United 
States’ increasingly activist world policy — exemplified by an extensive program of naval build-
up and the official declaration the “Open Door” for American commerce (1899-1900) — and 
the emergent global condition of intersocietal rivalries that defined the New Imperialism as a 
historical process.  
 
More specifically, by exposing the international tensions triggered by the late-nineteenth 
century takeoff of American capitalism, the inter-imperial analytic employed in this chapter 
illustrates how far American conceptions of world power were framed against a pattern of 
international reactions provoked by the character and timing of the United States’ own 
industrial expansion. In this context, the strategic and ideological coordinates of American 
                                                
4 For IR interpretations of American expansionism in the 1890s  that stress the role domestic economic preferences 
and changes in national state capacity, see Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American 
Foreign Policy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 94–95; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The 
Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 37–43, 179–81, 191; K. 
Narizny, “The New Debate: International Relations Theory and American Strategic Adjustment in the 1890s,” 
Security Studies 11, no. 1 (September 1, 2001): 162ff, 173; Benjamin O Fordham, “The Domestic Politics of World 
Power: Explaining Debates over the United States Battleship Fleet, 1890–91,” International Organization 73, no. 2 
(2019): 463–64. The key historiographical reference point for much of this scholarship is the work of the Wisconsin 
School of Diplomatic History, which has traditionally emphasized the primacy of domestic commerce for the 
dynamics of American expansionism (see section I, below).    
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grand strategy came to hinge on the interlinked principles of economic nationalism, informal 
imperialism, and maritime force. These widely-supported strategies of global penetration 
worked to establish American world power in the form of an extensive sphere of informal 
economic control, entrenched by protectionist tariff walls, and backed by maritime force when 
necessary. While this world-imperial project was tightly bound to the perceived needs of the 
US economy, its trajectory was inseparable from the intersocietal conflicts through which the 
tensions of uneven development — the military and economic power gaps generated by the 
concentration of industrial capitalism within a preponderant Anglo-American core — were 
translated into the expansionary foreign-policy strategies of states like Wilhelmine Germany 
and Meiji Japan. As will emerge, the unsettling impact of the United States’ territorial and 
economic expansion was to central to the lived sense of strategic vulnerability which drove the 
convergence of many fin-de-siècle elites on the desirability of overseas expansionism. The 
feedback effects of this escalating imperialism were a central determinant of the US-centered, 
Open Door international order projected by the most prominent advocates of American world 
power. This unfolding dynamic illustrates much about the intersocietal foundations of global 
power politics as a historical condition. 
 
The argument proceeds from the geopolitical and socioeconomic setting of American world 
power ambitions (Section I), to the long-term unevenness of the industrialization process itself 
(Section II), in order to locate the historical rationalization of American grand strategy (Section 
III) within a broader conception of the coercive and ideological practices specific to the era of 
industrial capitalism and the related expansion of the national-imperial state (Section IV). This 
analytical procedure locates a sociohistorical structure to the New Imperialism by tracing the 
linkages between the uneven development of industrial societies, considered as a geopolitical 
and sociocultural condition rather than a merely economic process, and the late-nineteenth 
descent of the Pax Britannica into a series of escalating naval arms races and rival forms of 
economic nationalism. This emphasis on the uneven and combined character of national-
imperial trajectories is intended to challenge several prominent theoretical tendencies, both in 
the IR literature on great-power expansion and the wider study of modern imperialism.  On 
the one hand, it goes beyond the conventional dichotomy between “geopolitical” and 
“domestic” explanations for great-power expansion by showing how the driving forces of 
American world power lay in the competitive coexistence of distinct societies: that is, in internal 
relations between the industrialization of US capitalism, the uneven expansion of an empire-
centred world economy and international order, and the patterns of strategic competition and 
status anxiety generated by the United States’ growing industrial ascendancy.5 On the other 
hand, therefore, it provides a multilinear conception of historical development that is missing 
from many existing accounts of the New Imperialism. Rather than the treating the central units 
                                                
5 Among the most developed IR accounts of the way in which domestic coalition politics might shape the pursuit 
of “security through expansion” is  Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 1, 17, 133, 155, 190, 316–19; on the US case in particular, cf. Zakaria, From 
Wealth to Power.  In the constructivist literature, accounts of international status-seeking have also privileged the 
domestic-level socio-psychological sources of great-power expansionism. See for example, Steven Ward, Status and 
the Challenge of Rising Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 3, 33, 204. In the neorealist tradition, 
The best example of an a primacy of geopolitics perspective is John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2001). 
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of imperial competition as homogenous state-forms, this approach foregrounds the deeply 
patterned international hierarchies, differentiated by both material and symbolic power 
structures, on which the geopolitical rivalries of the fin-de-siècle hinged. While a “full” 
explanation of the New Imperialism lies beyond its scope, the account of the historical logic of 
American world power goals provided in this chapter suggests that a wider conception of the 
intersocietal unevenness and multi-linearity of historical development is a key step toward a 
systematic theorization of the late-nineteenth century escalation of imperial competition.6  
 
 
II. Explaining American World Power: Empire and Expansionism at 
the Fin-de-siècle  
 
The quotations attached to the beginning of this chapter encapsulate the “growth of the world” 
envisaged by many American political and military elites during the era of the New 
Imperialism.7 At the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, American strategic 
planners converged on a shared conception of “world politics” revolving around the naval and 
commercial expansion of US power overseas.8 When the Mckinley Tariff Act (1890) raised 
import to duties to 50 per cent on most products, these discussions of external expansionism 
became increasingly inseparable from the kind of economic nationalism that dominated 
American foreign and economic policy.9 Underlying this agenda was the unique synthesis of 
rapid population growth, frontier land expansions, and protected national-colonial markets 
which helped make the United States the world’s emerging economic hegemon. By 1900, the 
US economy achieved levels of industrialization some 30-60 per cent above those of Western 
Europe, while its total industrial potential exceeded that of Britain and Germany by 25-55 per 
cent respectively.10 This was a historical watershed rather than a temporary rebalancing: the 
United States now entered a century-long era of positive trade balances and industrial 
expansion backed by the growing international power of the American state. By 1908, its navy 
was the second largest in the world behind the vast fleets of the British Empire, the original 
                                                
6 For a critique of classical Marxist theories of imperialism along these lines, see, Alexander Anievas, Capital, the 
State, and War: Class Conflict and Geopolitics in the Thirty Years’ Crisis 1914-1945 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2014), 31–32. On the centrality of a multilinear conception of historical change to the theory of uneven and 
combined development as such, see,  Justin Rosenberg, “International Relations in the Prison of Political Science,” 
International Relations 30, no. 2 (2016): 11. 
7 John Hood, “The Monroe Doctrine: Its Meaning and Application at the Present Day,” Proceedings of the US Naval 
Institute 35, no. 3 (1909): 657. 
8 For the most widely read discussions of “world politics” in this context, see, Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence 
of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Sampson Low, Marston & Co. Ltd: London, 1890), 45; The Influence of Sea 
Power on the French Revolution and Empire, vol. II (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1892), 380; 
“Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies,” in Retrospect and Prospect (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1902), 180.    
9 See, Marc-William Palen, The “Conspiracy” of Free Trade: The Anglo-American Struggle over Empire and Economic 
Globalisation, 1846–1896 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), chapter 7, here at 178. 
10 For the figures, see P. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” Journal of European 
Economic History; Rome 11, no. 2 (Fall 1982): 283, 292–94, tables 8-9.  
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epicenter of industrial capitalism whose economic potential the American economy was now 
eclipsing.11  
 
From the last quarter of the nineteenth century, this dramatic process of economic 
restructuring became the locus of an expansive imperial imaginary, animated by the prospect 
of an interoceanic canal system and the perceived imperatives of commercial rivalry.12 As 
Brooks Adams, an advisor to the Republican party and a lecturer at the US Naval War college, 
described in 1901, there was no “reason why the United States should not become a greater 
seat of wealth and power than ever was England, Rome, or Constantinople.”13 For such 
advocates of American economic nationalism and naval build-up, “material wealth” and 
“manifest destiny” were now united in signifying American “World Power.”14 In this context, 
American military commanders called for muscular strategies of global assertion to advance 
US interests across the Americas, the Caribbean, China and East Asia.15 This world-imperial 
stance looked beyond the hemispheric framework of the original Monroe Doctrine toward a 
global future of naval arms racing revolving around the struggle for external spheres of strategic 
influence and economic control.16  
 
Shaped by the perceived threat of rising industrial power-centers like Wilhelmine Germany 
and Meiji Japan, such world power ambitions provide a concrete illustration of the competitive 
ties which marked the emergence of global power politics during the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries.17 Impelled by an escalating “race for the world’s markets,” American 
                                                
11 On the changing the military and economic bases of British-American relations in this context, see, Phillips 
Payson O’Brien, British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936 (London: Praeger, 1998), 122; John 
Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 273. 
12 Among many discussions of the growing importance of ocean highways and inter-oceanic canal networks to US 
grand strategy, see  Ensign Charles C. Rogers, “Naval Intelligence,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute 9, no. 25 
(1883): 683; Captain W.T. Sampson, “Outline of a Scheme for the Naval Defense of the Coast,” Proceedings of the 
US Naval Institute 15, no. 2 (1889): 179; Henry C. Taylor, “The Control of the Pacific,” Forum 3 (1887): here at 409, 
412; Charles H. Stockton, “The Commercial Geography of the American Inter-Oceanic Canal,” Journal of the 
American Geographical Society of New York 20 (1888): 75–93; S. B. Luce, “Our Future Navy,” The North American Review 
149, no. 392 (1889): 56. 
13 Brooks Adams, America’s Economic Supremacy (1900; repr., New York: Harper, 1947), 51. 
14 George W. Melville, “Our Actual Naval Strength,” North American Review 176 (1903): 390. 
15 Among many examples of the world power theme discussed in this chapter, the following articles capture a 
broad spectrum of agreement among US political-military elites on the necessity of imperial, economic, 
geopolitical and military expansion: Stephen B. Luce, “The Dawn of Naval History,” Proceedings of the US Naval 
Institute 24, no. 3 (1898): 441–50; Lieutenant John M. Ellicott, “The Composition of the Fleet,” Proceedings of the US 
Naval Institute 22, no. 3 (1896): 537–60; Roosevelt, “Washington’s Forgotten Maxim”; Richard Wainwright, “Our 
Naval Power,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, no. 24 (1898): 39–87; “The Naval Policy of America,” Proceedings 
of the US Naval Institute 23 (1897): 509–21; Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Persian Gulf and International Relations,” 
in Retrospect and Prospect (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1902), 209–54; Melville, “Our Actual Naval 
Strength”; George W. Melville, “The Important Elements in Naval Conflicts,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 26, no. 1 (July 1, 1905): 123–36; Bradley Fiske, “American Naval Policy,” Proceedings of the 
US Naval Institute 31 (1905): 1–80.  
16  For arguments linking US economic expansion to the need to expand the purview of the Monroe Doctrine see 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Monroe Doctrine,” in Naval Administration and Warfare (1904; repr., London: Sampson 
Low, Martston, & Company Limited, 1908), 357–409; Hood, “The Monroe Doctrine.” 
17 For some especially clear illustrations of this comparative, inter-imperial framing, discussed further below, see 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Policies (Boston, Little, Brown and 
Company, 1900); Rear Admiral French Ensor Chadwick, “The Mastery of the Sea,” Munsey’s Magazine, March 
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economic expansion was widely-felt to necessitate a corresponding process of naval 
“upbuilding.”18 As Theodore Roosevelt wrote to the former Navy Secretary Benjamin Tracy, 
this policy was marker of the kind of “broad and far-sighted patriotism” demanded by the 
expansive needs of American society.19 Anything less than a large battleship fleet would “mean 
jeopardy to the nation’s interest and honor.” The defense of these values would require the 
“elements of force” lacked by the “little powers of Europe” and the collapsing Chinese Empire 
— military capacities that were now being rapidly acquired by the European and Japanese 
empires.20 
 
Cognizance of such transnational connections underscores the inter-imperial context of the 
United States’ emergence as an industrial powerhouse. Despite its historical significance, this 
international setting plays a remarkably limited role in what has become the traditional 
interpretation of American expansion in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. In 
this view, the central drivers of US empire-building and external power-projection, from the 
final decades of the nineteenth century on, lie in the domestic economic interests of American 
commerce, whose pursuit of international markets are said to have underpinned a “liberal 
policy of informal empire or free trade imperialism” modelled on the laissez-faire political 
economy of the British Empire.21 So conceived, the drivers of American expansionism were 
both commercial and domestic, while the character of its political orientations were 
economically liberal. Notwithstanding the important elements of truth this position contains, it 
misstates the driving forces of American world power ambitions — the international context of 
their articulation, their underlying economic nationalism, and the proliferation of strategic 
rivalries and international tensions to which they gave rise.22 As result, the “liberal imperialism” 
perspective inherited from the Wisconsin School tends to obscure some of the most general 
dynamics of the United States’ global rise: the increasingly competitive world economy 
engendered by its “closed door” strategy of high-tariff national-colonial markets; the far-
reaching unevenness fostered by the comparatively vast extent of its domestic markets and 
natural resource endowments; and the deeply politicized international economic relations 
                                                
1906, 749–53; Newton A. McCully, The McCully Report: The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05, ed. Richard Doenhoff 
(1905; repr., Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1977). 
18 Chadwick, “The Mastery of the Sea,” 745. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. 
Library of Congress Manuscript Division. https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-
Library/Record?libID=o184764. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. 
19 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Benjamin F. Tracy. March 19, 1903. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress 
Manuscript Division. https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o40653. 
Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. 
20  Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore E. Burton. February 23, 1904. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress 
Manuscript Division. https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o187493. 
Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University.  
21 For this  interpretation, see the seminal work of the Wisconsin School: William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy 
of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, 1959), 39–40; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An 
Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1963), 60, 85–101; Thomas 
J. McCormick, China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire 1893-1901 (Chicago, IL: Quandrangle Books, 1967), 
22–27, 107–17; Marilyn Blatt Young, The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy 1895-1901 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1968).  
22 For a critique of the open door, free-trade imperialism argument that stresses the centrality of economic 
nationalism to American imperialism see Marc-William Palen, “The Imperialism of Economic Nationalism, 
1890–1913,” Diplomatic History 39, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 157–85. 
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which the economic nationalism of the late-nineteenth century Republican party helped to 
foster. The basic indices of this nationalist agenda are provided in table 4.1, below. This 
demonstrates the comparatively protective character of the US political economy, 1890-1914.    
 
Contrary to the presumptively liberal narrative of American expansion, the Republican 
administrations of William McKinley (1897-1901), Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), and 
William Howard Taft (1909-1913), actively undermined the free-trade imperialism of the Pax 
Britannica by entrenching a nationalist political economy that linked principles of domestic 
protectionism with coercive trade reciprocity. The expansive “Open Door” for American 
products envisaged by the advocates of this strategy was not a free-trade system, but rather an 
expansive imperial economy made up of American-dominated markets. By design, this project 
was intended to both supercharge the process of US industrial growth and forestall the 
competitive expansion of its major rivals.23 The conflictual domain of “world politics” 
envisaged by the architects of American naval build-up and imperial expansion was directly 
bound to the clashing forms of economic nationalism to which this imperial economic strategy 
gave rise.24  
 
To understand the historical forces which channeled American grand strategy into the evolving 
imperial rivalries of the fin-de-siècle, an adequate conception of this international environment 
is needed. Missing from the received image of the United States as a free-trade power is any 
real sense of the empire-centered international order and world market that linked American 
capitalism to a wider geopolitical field. Beyond the imprecise categorization of “liberal 
imperialism,” the historical particularities of American political and economic development 
need to be viewed in relation to development of an international power hierarchy dominated 
by the Anglo-American Empires. It will then be possible to see the driving forces of American 
world power ambitions in their proper inter-imperial setting. In the first instance, this emergent 
condition of unevenness can be visualized by registering some of the basic socioeconomic 
coordinates of the industrialization process: the coexistence of societies undergoing the 
transition to sustained capitalist growth at very different rates and speeds. After examining 
these overarching trends, the key drivers of American expansionism come more fully into view: 
the perceived geopolitical requirements of industrial development, their interaction with the 
status hierarchies of an empire-centered international order, and the international pattern of 
economic competition and status anxiety triggered by the American takeoff.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 8, 488, 490; Marc-William Palen, “Protection, Federation and Union: The Global Impact 
of the McKinley Tariff upon the British Empire, 1890–94,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 38, no. 
3 (September 1, 2010): 399. 
24 As well as the works cited in n.8, above, see Stephen B. Luce, “The Benefits of War,” The North American Review 
153, no. 421 (1891): 672–83; Brooks Adams, “War as the Ultimate Form of Economic Competition,” Proceedings 
of the US Naval Institute 29 (1903): 829–81. 
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Table. 4.1. Indices of Economic Nationalism: Average Tariffs, 1890-1914 (percentages). 
 
Data: Kevin H. O’Rourke, “Tariffs and Growth in the Late 19th Century,” The Economic Journal 110,  
no. 463 (2000): 463, Table 1. 
 
STRUCTURES OF UNEVENNESS 
 
The broad features of the international economic hierarchy forged during the age of empire 
provide an initial context in which to situate the world power logic of American imperialism. 
In form, the hierarchical political-economic structures of the nineteenth century were deeply 
shaped by the highly coercive processes territorial expansion summarized in tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
The dramatic take-off of US industrial capitalism in the period c.1880-1900, when the United 
States began to surpass the industrial potential of the British Empire, took place in the context 
of a wider scramble for global territory. In the period 1830-1880, Europe’s colonial domain 
grew by 16 million square kilometers, before the rate of annual expansion rose sharply in 1878-
1913. In these years, the major Western empires seized some 83,000 square kilometers of 
territory per year —  an area roughly the size of modern France — and the Japanese Empire 
took control of a further 115,000 square kilometers of colonial holdings. The process of colonial 
settlement entailed by American westward expansion belonged to this overarching pattern, 
more than tripling the size of the United States in the period 1800-1850, and increasing the 
overall cropland of the United States by between 678.99 and 2,879.30 hectares per annum 
(1800-1870/1870-1910). In a time when economic growth tended to be heavily linked to 
agricultural and mineral production, the resource abundance generated through this process 
of colonial settlement was a driving force of the US economy, its emergent industries typically 
concentrated within national commodity chains dependent on the primary products of 
  
1890-1894 
 
1895-1899 
 
1900-1904 
 
1905-1909 
 
1910-1914 
 
AVERAGE 
 
USA 
 
23.5  
 
22.7  
 
26.8 
 
23.0 
 
18.3 
 
22.86 
 
France 
 
9.7 
 
10.4 
 
8.6 
 
8.6 
 
8.5 
 
9.22 
 
Germany 
 
8.9 
 
9.3 
 
8.4 
 
7.6 
 
7.0 
 
8.24 
 
UK 
 
4.8 
 
4.8 
 
6.1 
 
5.3 
 
4.8 
 
5.16 
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American lands.25 This gave American industry a significant comparative advantage compared 
to much smaller territorial empires like Germany and Japan. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2. Additions to the Territory of the United States, 1800-1900 
 
 
Data: Oscar P. Austin, Steps in the Expansion of Our Territory (New York, NY: D. Appleton and 
 Company, 1903), Appendix, 252. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 Clark, Balance Sheets, 3–6; Gavin Wright and Jesse Czelusta, “Why Economies Slow: The Myth of the Resource 
Curse,” Challenge 47 (February 1, 2004): 9–10; Bouda Etemad, Possessing the World: Taking the Measurements of 
Colonisation from the 18th to the 20th Century (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 131; Sven Beckert, “American Danger: 
United States Empire, Eurafrica, and the Territorialization of Industrial Capitalism, 1870–1950,” The American 
Historical Review 122, no. 4 (2017): 1148; Edward Barbier, Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies Have Developed Through 
Natural Resource Exploitation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 382. 
Year Territorial Division Area Added 
(KM sq.) 
 
1808 Louisiana Purchase 2,266,304 
1819 Florida 181,576 
1845 Texas 880,065 
1846 Oregon Territory 747,701 
1848 Mexican Cession  1,356,640 
1853 Gadsden Purchase 93,786 
1867 Alaska  599,446 
1897 Hawaiian Islands  174,5652 
1898 Puerto Rico  93,23  
1898 Guam 453 
1899 Philippine Islands 370,368  
1899 Samoan Islands 189,069 
1901 Additional Philippines 176 
    
   Total      84,312,36 
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Figure 4.3. The Growth of Empires, 1878-1913 
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Source: Clark, Grover. The Balance Sheets of Imperialism: Facts and Figures on Colonies. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1936, 23-24, Table I. This table shows the division of world territory 
between five of the major industrial states of the 1873-1913 era. The figures for total area includes the 
“mother country” plus dependencies, which, as defined by Clark also includes mandates. The total area 
of the British Empire also includes self-governing territories.  
 
Table 4.4. Relative Shares of World Industrial Output by Country (percentages) 
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Data, Tables 4.4-4.5: Bairoch, P. “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980.” 
Journal of European Economic History, 11, no. 2 (Fall 1982): tables 1 and 9, 273, 294.,   
What is striking about the processes of industrial take-off visualized in the tables above is both 
the rising extent of US economic superiority and the profound unevenness of economic growth 
within the imperial core. Beneath their surface similarity, the expansionary imperialisms of the 
late-nineteenth century were enacted by societies in which industrial production was 
developing at very different speeds: 1.8 per cent per annum in France; 2.2 per cent per annum 
in Britain; 3.9 percent per annum in Germany; and 4.9 per cent per annum in the USA (1860-
1920).26 By the first decade of the twentieth century, the scale of British and American 
industrialization was vastly beyond that of any other major imperial power. Equally striking is 
the speed at which American industrialization emerged as a dominant international force. The 
fin-de-siècle period between the late 1880s and early 1900s were years of far-reaching global 
economic restructuring dominated by the advent of American growth. The magnitude of the 
United States’ industrial take-off in this period meant, for example, that in the years 1870-1914 
the overall size of US economic output grew from being around one-third larger than that of 
Imperial Germany to roughly twice its size. By 1900, the national income of the United States 
was twice that of the United Kingdom, and four times the size of France or Germany.27  
 
More specifically, the broad scale comparative data contained in tables 4.1 and 4.4-4.6. provide 
evidence of the close historical ties between the political economy of American protectionism 
and the global trajectory of a broader world-economic transformation. The central storyline is 
clear. On the one hand, the peaks of US tariff protection were reached in the final decade of 
the nineteenth century, when duties reached an unprecedented 56% according to some 
calculations. Between 1894 and 1897, national production rose from 73 to 257 million tons, or 
from one-quarter to three-quarters of domestic consumption. Despite the proliferation of 
retaliatory tariff laws, US manufacturing thus found ready outlets within a closed domestic 
market. This was a paradigmatic case of industrial expansion through protectionism: tariff 
policy fostered a rapid process of capital accumulation in the northern manufacturing sectors 
by increasing the rate of profit through higher prices and rebalancing the structure of the 
economy from agricultural production to industrial growth.28 Although the “Open Door” 
announced by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 seemed to promise the extension of free-
trade imperialism to China, in practice the policy simply called for the equality in the treatment 
of goods, rather than establishing a system of multilateral commercial treaties that might 
                                                
26 W. Arthur Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, 1870-1913 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1978), 17–18, chart 1. 
27 Richard R. Nelson and Gavin Wright, “The Erosion of US Technological Leadership as a Factor in Postwar 
Economic Convergence,” in Convergence of Productivity: Cross-National Studies and Historical Evidence, ed. William J. 
Baumol, Richard R. Nelson, and Edward N. Wolff (Oxford,: Oxford University Press, 1994), 136; Adam Tooze, 
The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New York, NY: Penguin, 2006), xviii.   
28 William Letwin, “American Economic Policy, 1865–1939,” in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the 
Decline of the Roman Empire: Volume 8: The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies, ed. Peter 
Mathias and Sidney Pollard, vol. 8, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 657; Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900, 6–8.  
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subvert the Republican commitment to high tariffs. European imperialists soon condemned 
the “hypocrisy” of the United States’ expansionary aims.29 On the other hand, the 
comparatively open economies of Europe — where tariff duties were often two or three times 
less than those of the US — experienced a process of relative decline that can be been described 
as a “commercial invasion” portending a future “American Century.”30  These emerging 
differences are best captured by the per capita data for GDP growth and industrialization levels 
in tables 4.4.-4.6. These trends illustrate the division of the imperial economic order between 
an Anglo-American industrial core and a wider semi-core comprising continental Europe and 
Japan. This was a constitutively uneven world economy that linked together societies acquiring 
the most advanced forms of industrial capitalism at very different speeds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data: Jutta Bolt et al., Maddison Project Database, version 2018. “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income 
comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development”, Maddison Project Working paper 10, 
issued 2018, https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-
database-2018. The data is adjusted for purchasing power parity using 2011 dollars. * Figures for Japan’s 
GDP in 1860 are not available.  
                                                
29 Paul Wolman, Most Favored Nation: The Republican Revisionists and U.S. Tariff Policy, 1897-1912 (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000), xiv–xvi; Palen, “The Imperialism of Economic Nationalism, 1890–
1913,” 174; A. G. Hopkins, American Empire: A Global History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 435. 
30 Matthew Simon and David E. Novack, “Some Dimensions of the American Commercial Invasion of Europe, 
1871–1914: An Introductory Essay,” The Journal of Economic History 24, no. 4 (December 1964): 591–605; Kevin 
H. O’Rourke, “The European Grain Invasion, 1870–1913,” The Journal of Economic History 57, no. 4 (December 
1997): 775–801; Beckert, “American Danger.” 
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DRIVERS OF EXPANSION 
 
The intersocietal power hierarchies of the industrial era shaped the international historical 
context from which American world power ambitions flourished. Against this background, the 
geopolitical requirements of US economic expansion lay in the Open-Door policy articulated 
by Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, John Hay, between 1899 and 1902. The hegemonic 
conceptions of strategy and interest in this framework were less territorialized empire than 
control of world markets and specific regional positions. Like the highly protective economic 
policy which underpinned American industrial strategy, this international stance resonated 
with the comparative advantages of the United States’ global economic setting: the vast 
domestic markets and natural resource endowments produced by the colonization of North 
America making formal colonialism overseas a lesser priority than the effective domination of 
foreign economic systems. Under the Roosevelt Taft administration, the pursuit of “Dollar 
Diplomacy” in Venezuela, China, and the Dominican Republic, exemplified this novel 
conception expansion: the Monroe Doctrine would be extended, as with the Roosevelt 
Corollary of 1904, in the form of an extensive sphere of informal influence, backed by maritime 
force, and working to ensure the stability of US investments and trading concerns abroad.31  
 
To grasp the driving forces of this project, however, it is necessary to emphasize the intersocietal 
context in which American grand strategy was formulated; for the Open-Door model was 
deeply embedded in the pattern of inter-imperial rivalries that led the American military 
planners to seek more sustained strategies of global penetration. Already in 1890, Alfred 
Thayer Mahan had argued that the “growing production” of the US economy demanded an 
end to the policy of isolation originally enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine: “within, the home 
market is secured; but outside, beyond the broad seas, there are the markets of the world, that 
can be entered and controlled only by a vigorous contest, to which the habit of trusting to 
protection by statute does not conduce.”32 In this view, the emergent world market was a deeply 
conflictual global space involving the rival projects of imperial expansion evolving across East 
Asia, Chia, and the Middle East.33 The informal-empire project of the Open Door, therefore, 
cannot be separated from the fact that American economic interests were being put at risk by 
                                                
31 According to Veeser’s study on “Dollar diplomacy” in Venezuela, the policy was virtually “sui generis” in the 
history of imperialism since it involved a government-directed strategy of capitalist expansion based on a “statist” 
form of corporate power, rather than the export of surplus capital aboard. Cyrus Veeser, A World Safe for Capitalism: 
Dollar Diplomacy and America’s Rise to Global Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 159–60. For Gareth 
Stedman-Jones, this was the “maturation of the US imperial system” into its core twentieth-century form: “The 
Specificity of US Imperialism,” New Left Review, I, no. 60 (1970): 79. 
32 Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The United States Looking Outward,” in The Interest of America in Sea Power: Present and 
Future (1890; repr., London: Sampson Low, 1897), 4. 
33 Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea,” in The Interest of 
America in Sea Power: Present and Future (London: Sampson Low, 1897), 299; also Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Hawaii 
and Our Future Sea Power,” in The Interest of America in Sea Power: Present and Future (1893; repr., London: Sampson 
Low, 1897), 39–40; Mahan, “The Persian Gulf and International Relations.” 
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the advent of rival centers of industry and empire.34 International competition in the form of 
rival imperial systems placed hard military imperatives on American world power ambitions.  
 
For now, according to an influential Navy Department report of 1890, the “comparative 
isolation” of the United States would “soon cease to exist.” With the expansion of the US export 
trade and the anticipated opening of the Panama Canal, the United States was coming into 
“sharp commercial competition with others in every part of the world.” In this context, 
American commerce was “certain to reach out and obstruct the interests of foreign nations,” 
generating a corresponding anxiety about the “weakness and total lack of preparation” of the 
US navy as a global fighting force.35 Moving forward, the US Naval Policy Board demanded, 
“we should maintain a navy at least equal in strength to the most powerful navy in the world, 
on the theory that we might have to fight such a nation.”36 At the same time, a wider network 
of island bases and coaling stations should be constructed to allow the navy to act with over a 
comparable range to the fleets of the British Empire.37 This was how Mahan explained the 
necessity of American naval build-up, conceived as a direct extension of the competitive 
development of rival national-colonial economic systems:   
 
The provision of markets for the production of an ever-increasing number of inhabitants is a leading 
political problem of the day, the solution of which is sought by methods commercial and methods 
political, so essentially combative, so offensive and defensive in character, that direct military action 
would be only a development of them, a direct consequent; not a breach of continuity in spirit, however 
it might be in form. As the interaction of commerce and finance shows a unity in the modern civilized 
world, so does the struggle for new markets, and for predominance in old, reveal the unsubdued 
diversity. Here every state is for itself; and in every great state the look for the desired object is outward, 
just as it was in the days when England and Holland fought over the Spice Islands and the other worlds 
newly opening before them.38 
 
In light of these perceived priorities, the American state launched an unprecedented build-up 
of naval force. This project departed fundamentally from the traditional pattern of peacetime 
demobilization, which had seen the US Navy shrink from 700 to just 45 ships within fifteen 
years of the Civil War. In the period 1880-1905, the share of the federal budget devoted to 
military spending increased from 20 percent to more than 40 percent. While the budget for the 
US Army tripled, the Navy budget rose almost eightfold, receiving over 20 percent of overall 
federal spending in 1905, compared to less than 6 percent in 1880. This investment drive, 
increasingly backed by the high-income Republican states of the northeast and north central 
United States, enabled the creation of an increasingly large and professionalized American 
navy. This process of naval expansion mirrored the growth of the American export trade. From 
1888 to 1898, US exports increased by more than 75 percent in value, from $695 million to 
$1,231 million, and by a further 51 percent between 1898 and 1908, to $1,861. By 1908, 40.9 
percent of this exports were made up of manufactured goods, which rose from 4.1 percent of 
                                                
34 Rear Admiral French Ensor Chadwick, “Opening Address Delivered by the President of the War College,” 
Proceedings of the US Naval Institute 28 (1902): 251–68; Fiske, “American Naval Policy.” 
35 US Navy Department, “Report of Policy Board,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute 16, no. 2 (1890): 204. 
36 US Navy Department, 206. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Mahan, “Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies,” 146–47. 
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total world exports in 1886-1890 to 11.7 percent in 1899 and 13 percent by 1913. At the same 
time, overseas investments increased by 257 percent, from $700 million in 1897 to $2,500 
million in 1908, with the total income earned from this outlay rising from $38 million in 1900 
to $108 million in 1910. Even though a large domestic market made world trade a relatively 
minor component of American growth, the protection and extension of American commerce 
was one of the most cited justifications for increased military investments during the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.39 
 
While the strategic policies advocated in this context were diverse, the late-nineteenth century 
US military elite were generally united in stressing the American economy’s vulnerability to 
European naval power in an era of rising protectionism; 40  the importance of governmental 
coordination of the relationship between the navy’s commercial and strategic functions;41 
military practices of commercial “blockading;”42 and “the economical and defensive value of a 
prosperous merchant marine.”43 These analyses shared a common framework of 
understanding which yoked the apparent needs of the United States’ “foreign commerce” to 
the conflicts of “imperialism” associated with the tightly integrated spaces of world politics and 
economy. 44 Within the US political-military establishment this orientation to imperial 
globalism became the locus of geopolitical outlooks and strategic decision-making — a 
framework of priorities that not only sought the control of overseas markets through maritime 
force, but also fostered a broader project of national society-building which yoked American 
liberalism to the highly-militarized dynamics of industrial-era power politics and battleship 
rivalry.45  
 
The appeal of such expansionary imperial projects, as noted in previous chapters, was directly 
bound to the existence of an empire-centered international order built on exclusionary 
standards of civilization.46 In Roosevelt’s terms, the extension of the American state into a kind 
                                                
39 The statistics in this paragraph are from Ben Baack and Edward Ray, “The Political Economy of the Origins 
of the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States,” The Journal of Economic History 45, no. 2 (June 1985): 370–
71, 374. This drive for commercial outlets is a well-established feature of the traditional interpretation of US 
expansion discussed above.  
40 Alfred Thayer Mahan and Charles Beresford, “Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion,” The North American 
Review 159, no. 456 (1894): 558. 
41 Lieutenant-Commander F.M. Barber, “A Practical Method of Arriving at the Number Size, Type, Rig and 
Cost of the Vessels of Which the U.S. Navy Should Consist in Time of Peace,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute 
12, no. 38 (1886): 419–21; Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Preparedness for Naval War,” in The Interest of America in Sea 
Power: Present and Future (1896; repr., London: Sampson Low, 1897), 203–10. 
42 Commander Charles D. Sigsbee, “The Reconstruction and Increase of the Navy,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval 
Institute 11, no. 1 (1885): 27. 
43 Lieutenant J.D.J Kelley, “Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline and the Means to Be Taken for Its 
Revival,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute 8, no. 3 (1882): 37. 
44 Kelley, 73; Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Retrospect and Prospect,” in Retrospect and Prospect (Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Company, 1902), 30; Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Motives to Imperial Federation,” in Retrospect and Prospect 
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1902), 104. For a vivid illustration of the technological changes underlying 
such perceptions, see, Captain C.H. Stockton Stockton, “The American Interoceanic Canal,” Proceedings of the U.S. 
Naval Institute 26 (1899): 753–98. 
45 For the full discussion of this later, societal dimension of American world power goals, see section III, below. 
46 On the nineteenth-century Standard of Civilization as a stratificatory mode of status hierarchy see, Gerrit W. 
Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 5–16; Ayşe Zarakol, After Defeat: 
How the East Learned to Live with the West (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 21, 51; cf. John M. 
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of international “police power” was justified by the maintenance of a “civilized society” where 
the “wrongdoing or incompetence” of inferior peoples would incur an adequately forceful 
response.47 At the same time, the potential expansion of “uncivilized countries” provided an 
additional impetus toward military preparedness, especially given the possibility that the 
spreading of Western military techniques might equip “savages” with “highly trained and 
equipped” armies.48 For the late-nineteenth century generation of American political and 
military elites, the seemingly natural link between American world power and the expansion 
of “Western civilization” — a virtual ever-present in the discourse of the time — provided a 
source of political legitimation and imperial prestige that made the pursuit of expansive 
strategic goals an appealing symbol of national status.49 At a deeper sociocultural level, 
therefore, the kind of international status hierarchy within which American conceptions of 
world power emerged was a central driver of their ideological character. This helps to explain 
both the persistently civilizational framing of US geopolitical goals and the deep-rooted 
ideological appeal of an expansive foreign policy. The perceived threat of radically different 
civilizational systems — Slavic, Asiatic, or Teuton — was thus a hallmark feature of the 
consciously tough-minded Anglo-Saxonism which governed much American world power 
advocacy.50 When war with Germany struck in 1917, the leading Republican statesman Elihu 
Root argued that the American role was to fight on behalf of Western civilization itself. This 
was a war “to preserve all the progress that the civilization of a century has made toward 
Christianity…It was a war between Odin and Christ” to determine whether “the world shall 
be free.”51 
 
The shaping effect of these factors — strategic, economic, and cultural — on American grand 
strategy cannot be fully understood outside the context of intersocietal unevenness traced 
above. For the increasingly competitive inter-imperial conditions envisaged by American world 
power advocates were, in part, the product of the destabilizing impact of the United States’ 
rapid industrial takeoff — its highly protective political economy, unprecedented scale, and 
far-reaching penetration into world markets. In a letter of 1897, the Austrian foreign minister, 
Count Goluchowski, captured the dynamic international counter-reactions provoked by this 
rising “American menace:”  
 
Europe has apparently reached a turning point in her development. The solving of the great problem 
of the material well-being of nations, which becomes more pressing from year to year, is no longer a 
distant Utopia. It is near at hand. The disastrous competition which, in all domains of human activity, 
                                                
Hobson and J. C. Sharman, “The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of 
Hierarchy and Political Change,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 1 (2005): 63–98. 
47 This description of the Roosevelt Corollary is cited in Veeser, A World Safe for Capitalism, 4; for Roosevelt’s idea 
of “police power” see Roosevelt, “Washington’s Forgotten Maxim”; James R. Holmes, Theodore Roosevelt and World 
Order: Police Power in International Relations (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007). 
48 Wainwright, “Our Naval Power,” 40; Fiske, “American Naval Policy,” 2. 
49 The discourse of “civilizational imperialism” is discussed in detail in the next chapter. For a clear overview, see 
Frank Ninkovich, “Theodore Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology,” Diplomatic History 10, no. 3 (1986): 221–45. 
50 Chadwick, “Opening Address,” 265; Mahan, The Problem of Asia, xix, 67. See also, Paul A. Kramer, “Empires, 
Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910,” The 
Journal of American History 88, no. 4 (2002): 1315–53. 
51 Cited in Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 
1954), 121. 
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we have to submit to from over the seas, and which we will have to encounter in the future, must be 
registered if the vital interests of Europe are not to suffer, and if Europe is not to fall into gradual decay. 
Shoulder to shoulder we must ward off the danger that is at our doors...the twentieth century will be a 
struggle for existence in the domain of economics.52 
 
This economic struggle for survival was the power transition which the German nationalist 
economist Friedrich List envisaged, in the 1850s, when he described how the emigration of 
workers to the United States was turning areas of southwestern Germany into so many “dwarf 
economies.”53 Indeed millions of German immigrants were drawn to the United States as 
agricultural settlers and laborers over the course of the nineteenth century.54 The kind of 
territorially expansionist vision of economic development inscribed by List’s conception of 
Nationalökonomie was one solution to this condition of emerging backwardness.55 In this context, 
the imperial pursuit of a German-dominated Mittelafrika and Mitteleuropa promised to place 
Germany on equal terms with the most of expansive of contemporary world powers: the British 
Empire, Russia, and the United States.56 Of this triangle of empires, however, it was the United 
States whose rapid industrial development had done the most to transform the textures of world 
economy and international order, imposing powerful competitive pressures on late-
industrializing powers. “American colonization,” Frederick Jackson Turner summarized, had 
“become the mother of German colonial policy.”57   
 
For Japanese political and military leaders, equally, the rise of American world power — 
highlighted by the forcible opening of Japan to American commerce by means of gunboat 
diplomacy (1854-1858) — was an important background to the turn toward overseas 
expansionism. Having witnessed American encroachments into the Korean Peninsula in the 
1860s, the Meiji Government eventually emulated the Western powers by imposing an 
“unequal treaty” over Korea in 1876.58 In the name of a “civilized” and “modern” colonial 
nation-state, Imperial Japan developed a highly industrialized social system capable of 
sustaining the strategies of mass-mobilization warfare seen during the Russo-Japanese war over 
control of Manchuria in 1904-1905.59 The hyper-competitive international conjuncture of the 
                                                
52 Cited in David E. Novack and Matthew Simon, “Commercial Responses to the American Export Invasion, 
1871-1914: An Essay in Attitudinal History,” Explorations in Entrepreneurial History; New York 3, no. 2 (Winter 1966): 
134–45. 
53 As cited in Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
23. 
54 Barbier, Scarcity and Frontiers, 252, table 5.4.  
55 For List’s conception of the relation between national advancement, territorial expansion, and growth, see 
Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, trans. Sampson S. Lloyd (1841; repr., London: Longmans, 
Green and Co, 1909), 113–14. 
56 For the proliferations of these views in the 1890s and 1900s, views, see Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German 
Policies From 1911 to 1914, trans. Marian Jackson (London: Chatto and Windus, 1975), 230–70, 262–67, 538–39. 
57 Jens-Uwe Guettel, German Expansionism, Imperial Liberalism and the United States, 1776-1945 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 76, quotation at 2. 
58 For the general point see, Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 33–36, 47; also, Jamie C. Allinson and Alexander Anievas, “The 
Uneven and Combined Development of the Meiji Restoration: A Passive Revolutionary Road to Capitalist 
Modernity,” Capital & Class 34, no. 3 (2010): 81ff. 
59 For the links between civilizationism, militarism, and colonialism in the Meiji era, see Chushichi Tsuzuki, The 
Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan 1825–1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chapter 6; Carol Gluck, Japan’s 
Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 254–56; Duus, The Abacus 
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New Imperialism thus brought into being a struggle for greater spaces of national economic 
and political control that, at least for many German and Japanese elites, was framed by the 
“comparative light” of American development.60 The following section of the chapter 
addresses these patterns of uneven and combined development by demonstrating the 
intersocietal forces which shaped the turn toward imperial expansionism in Imperial Germany 
and Meiji Japan. 
 
III. The New Imperialism in Intersocietal Perspective  
 
The intensification of uneven development — or, more particularly, intersocietal 
differentiation in the form of a sustained military and economic power gap — was perhaps the 
defining outcome of the long-nineteenth-century process of industrialization.61 In a highly 
interdependent world economy, the unevenness of industrial change was a simultaneously 
strategic and ideological condition expressed in a variety of historical forms: in the pressure to 
emulate or outmatch the technological and administrative infrastructures of more advanced 
societies; in the demands for political and cultural regeneration produced by the perception of 
national backwardness; and in the proliferation of foreign-policy strategies aiming to mediate 
the impact of uneven development in geopolitical terms. Accordingly, the nationally uneven 
patterns of industrial growth illustrated above not only transformed prevailing international 
economic hierarchies, but also entwined with the ideological and coercive power structures 
that underpinned the construction of national-imperial states. The uneven historical geography 
of industrial capitalism gave rise to a powerful sense of strategic vulnerability linked to the 
competitive relationality of the inter-imperial field and world economy.62  
 
This experience of geopolitical exposure was central to the discourse of encircling “world 
empires” — typically, British, American, and Russian — that characterized German Weltpolitik 
advocacy, with its fixation on the perceived centers of territorial expansion and industrial 
potential.63  In 1891, an internal memorandum of the Japanese government was especially 
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explicit about the imperatives which underpinned such thinking: “steel is the mother of 
industries and the foundation of national defense.”64 This imagery cast the process of catch-up 
development as an urgent duty of the national state, revolving around the dialectics of 
autonomy and survival. In his account of the origins of the Russian Revolution, Leon Trotsky 
concluded that the driving force of such state-led developmental strategies had to be understood 
not in terms of any “single-track” or “national criteria” but rather with reference to the 
“international conditions” specific to the capitalist epoch. The exercise of state power was now 
impelled by the demands of “world development,” which exist, like a whip, outside formal 
political boundaries.65 
 
In this light, the outlines of an intersocietal understanding of the New Imperialism come into 
view. In contrast to approaches that are based on a uniform systemic tendency — such as 
“monopoly capitalism” (Lenin-Bukharin) or “anarchical competition” (Neorealism) — this 
would begin from an understanding of the international power gaps generated by the uneven 
and combined character of industrialization as a historical process.66 These power differentials 
were rooted, in the first instance, in the historical geography of industrial capitalism itself. As 
classically formulated by Alexander Gerschenkron, the global pattern of the industrial 
revolution was defined by a systematic unevenness: the fact that, rather than occurring either 
simultaneously or separately, the long-nineteenth century pattern of industrial development 
formed a staggered sequence of interactive regional transitions. Thus, the takeoff of British 
industry in 1780-1790 was followed by the industrialization of the US, France, and Germany 
in the period c.1820-1850, before industrial capitalism spread to Russia, Japan, and Italy in the 
1880s.67 This internationally differentiated process of industrial takeoff gave rise to both a 
“whip of external necessity,” through the economic and military pressures exerted by the most 
advanced centers of industry, and a rising economic nationalism, in form of attempts to secure 
the competitive autonomy of industrializing states against more powerful rivals.68 In 
consequence, every rising industrial economy tended to contain, as part of its emergent 
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intersocietal ties, a tendency to modify its external environment by adding new sources of 
external pressure to the prevailing conditions of international unevenness. Any major process 
of industrial restructuring — such as that generated by the colossal growth of American 
capitalism from 1870 on — was therefore always likely to produce rival strategies of catch-up 
development marked by the selective emulation of the most advanced forms of economic and 
military power. 
 
There was thus a deeply patterned intersocietal context to the competitive geopolitical 
strategies which made up the New Imperialism. In particular, within a specifically empire-
centered international hierarchy — where imperial power was the ideological standard to 
which “civilized” great powers should aspire — the pursuit of economic and strategic resources 
in form of an extensive overseas domain spoke directly to the sense of strategic vulnerability 
generated by an Anglo-American dominated international order. In this section, I demonstrate 
this intersocietal foundation of the New Imperialism by examining the manner in which the 
experience of American economic expansion constructed the experiences of historical 
backwardness that shaped the pursuit of imperial expansionism in both Wilhelmine Germany 
and Meiji Japan.  
 
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT: ROOTS OF THE IMPERIAL CONJUNCTURE 
 
To see the intersocietal forces which shaped the escalating imperial competition of the late-
nineteenth century, it is first necessary to visualize the long-nineteenth century pattern of 
industrial development which preceded it. In this era, the international expansion of industrial 
capitalism from on took place in the context of an increasingly interdependent international 
system defined by a high degree of transnational connectivity. Linking together societies and 
regions undergoing socioeconomic transformation at vastly different speeds, the nineteenth 
century world economy formed a “mighty reality” capable of rapidly “enhancing the 
differences” between distinct national states.69  As a result, the staggered international spread 
of industrial capitalism beyond its original British heartland tended to produce political-
economic formations which differed markedly from the “first” industrial revolution.70 
 
Typically, the type of political economy generated by this internationally-mediated process of 
industrial change was marked by a three-fold series of “graduated deviations” from the British 
transition to industrialization.71  First, the national industrial revolutions of the mid to late-
nineteenth century were comparatively rapid: the transferal of the most advanced industrial 
technologies and techniques into less industrialized regions powerfully accelerated the process 
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of industrial takeoff in the Americas and continental Europe. Second, this exceptionally fast-
paced dynamic of socioeconomic transformation tended to proceed in tandem with more 
intensive developmental strategies: the competitive demands of overcoming backwardness 
meant that investment banks and state bureaucracies would play a correspondingly greater role 
in the process of late-development, generating a political economy markedly different to that 
of Great Britain. Third, this set of conditions meant that late-developing societies were unlikely 
to replicate the liberalizing, laissez-faire character of the first industrial revolution: the more 
statist industrial development became, the more likely its politico-ideological foundations were 
to assume collectivist, nationalist, and even virulent fascist forms.72 This set of departures from 
the original pattern of the Britain’s early-developing industrial capitalism encapsulates what 
Trotsky conceptualized as “the law of combined development — by which we mean a drawing 
together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam 
of archaic with more contemporary forms.”73 Under pressure to rapidly acquire the 
foundations of industrial modernity, societies like Meiji Japan and Imperial Germany thus 
tended to amalgamate market institutions with ideological and geopolitical drives, toward 
militarism and expansionism, whose historical articulation marked the reality of development-
as-combined. Great powers would now be defined by their capacity to translate a rapidly 
evolving collection of industrial technologies into extensive means of global-power projection, 
as the naval arms races of the last-quarter of the nineteenth century illustrate.74  
 
The global economic hierarchy which shaped this highly competitive international 
environment was originally defined by the privileges of industrial priority enjoyed by the British 
Empire and its colonial extension. From around 1870 on, however, the distinctive temporal 
sequencing and territorial structure of American industrialization fostered a novel dynamic of 
intersocietal unevenness which powerfully intensified the experience of Anglophone 
dominance. Located within an exceptionally favorable pattern of socioeconomic trends, the 
nineteenth-century pattern of American agricultural settlement coincided with the proliferation 
of industrial farming systems, transatlantic freight shipping, and abundant reserves of British 
finance capital. Thousands of British companies set up to invest in the United States, with UK-
based investments in the American railroad system rising from $486 to $2,850 million between 
1870 and 1910.75 Receiving about one-fifth of British foreign investment by 1913, the 
American economy occupied a privileged position within Anglophone finance capitalism, 
rooted in its strong historical and cultural ties with the City of London.76 These patterns of 
foreign investment and technological change helped the United States establish a continent-
spanning national market integrated by the world’s largest railway network. This extensive 
national economy was directly bound to the process of American territorial expansion, as 
settlers pushed westward to acquire the new frontier crops in the wheat-belt region of the Great 
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Plains.77 The advantages which accrued to the particular context and timing of American 
growth thus helped make agriculture rather than manufacturing the initial driver of the United 
States’ transition to sustained economic growth and expansion.   
 
As a result, the distinctive sequencing of US economic development laid the foundations for 
the European “grain invasion.”78 Wheat exports played a key role in this transformation, rising 
from 31.2 to 153.5 million bushels between 1871 and 1880, of which 94 per cent was sent to 
Europe.79 This outflow of cheap US agricultural exports helped reduce the value of farm rents 
by between 10 and 20 percent in Britain, France and Germany (1870-1913).80 Given the 
predominantly agrarian character of most late-nineteenth century European and East Asian 
economies, this fact hastened the rise of protectionist tariff policies and brought landowning 
aristocracies into permanent decline.81 Indeed, Germany (1879-1902), France (1885-1894), 
and Italy (1887-1894) now imposed, and later raised, duties on agricultural imports, generating 
the abandonment of free trade that dominated the escalation of international economic 
rivalries down to WWI.82 The external expansion of American agriculture thus played a central 
role in the breakdown of a laissez-faire world economy. It helped engender the territorialization 
of political economies along national or colonial lines that marked the advent of the New 
Imperialism.       
 
At the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the expansion of US manufacturing 
redoubled the effects of this growing power-shift. With US productivity growing faster than any 
other industrial power in the period 1870-1950, the American economy acquired an 
unprecedented international dominance.83 By 1913, the United States was the world’s 
dominant producer of mineral resources and fossil fuels, producing 36 per cent of all iron ore, 
39 of all coal, 56 per cent of all copper, and 65 per cent of all petroleum. By 1914, its 
manufacturing output was more than that of Britain, Germany, and France combined. For 
many European economies, this marked a permanent subordination of economic fortunes. In 
Germany, for example, American imports increased by some 316 per cent between 1889 and 
1913 while German exports to the United States grew by just 75 per cent, establishing a 
significant trade deficit. By 1900, Germany relied on US imports for 83 per cent of its 
petroleum, 82 per cent of its cotton, 22 per cent of its wheat, and 79 per cent of its copper. To 
mitigate these external pressures, European economies would have to acquire new sources of 
national competitiveness within global markets, not least because the United States imposed 
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such tight tariff restrictions on imports.84 This high tariff policy reflected the fact that the success 
of American industry was largely a product of its large domestic market, which, for example, 
consumed around 90 per cent of American cotton production as late as 1914.85 Yet over the 
course of the nineteenth century, this closed door strategy of national development combined 
with rapid export growth as American exports grew from 3.2 to 15 per cent of the world total 
by 1900. In the decade before WWI, the total size of US exports increased by some 240 per 
cent sparking an unprecedented Americanization of the world economy (1895-1914).86 
 
Contemporary European observers thus began to look anxiously upon the “American 
invaders” flooding European markets.87 In his widely-read account of the “Americanization of 
the World,” British journalist W.T. Stead concluded that there was “something pathetic in the 
heroic pose of the Germany emperor resisting the American flood. It is Canute over again, but 
the Kaiser has not planted himself on the shore, passively to wait the rising of the tide in order 
to rebuke the flattery of his courtiers; he takes his stand where land and water meet, and with 
the drawn sword defies the advancing tide.”88 As this depiction of American global 
expansionism implied, the external growth of the US economy was a supremely political 
process, which transformed international relations as well as the structural equilibrium of the 
world economy. Its supercharged industrialization, massive natural endowments, and insulated 
internal market, made the United States a central factor in the conceptions of comparative 
backwardness and economic nationalism within and against which projects of external 
expansionism were typically framed.89 From the perceptions of industrial competition and 
territorial rivalry formed in this context, a new imperialism of world power rivalries was 
formed.90  Like the “English agitation for Greater Britain, and Russian plans for world power,” 
wrote German economist Gustav Schmoller to German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz in 1897, 
the “enormous dangers of Panamericanism” demonstrated the necessity of an assertive “export 
and naval policy.”91  
 
Although the effects of the American export invasion were felt most acutely in Europe, Japan 
too was subject to the external pressures US expansion in both economic and geopolitical 
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terms. After the US annexation of Hawaii in 1898, Japanese hostility to American expansion 
led to increasing nationalist opposition to the Open Door policy. Against the wider background 
of imperial encroachments into China, this sense of strategic vulnerability was central to the 
Meiji oligarchy’s efforts to replace feudal forms of social and military organization with a 
modern conscription army and merchant marine. Like the German elites who oversaw the 
process of national-state building after 1871, perceptions of backwardness played a key role in 
this process, which was shaped by Japan’s comparative lack of either natural resource 
endowments or industrial capacity.92 Even after the industrialization drive of the late-
nineteenth century, Japan produced just 107,000 tons of crude steel in 1905, as compared to 
the US total of 20.3 million tons; by 1913, one Indiana steel mill produced five times as much 
as the entire Japanese steel industry.93 It is not surprising, then, that the Japanese navy came to 
view its US counterpart, backed by vastly superior industrial resources, as the preeminent 
threat to the strategic and economic interests of Japan in Manchuria and the wider Pacific 
Rim.94 As described by Barrington Moore, such threats of “foreign partition, or a repetition of 
the fate of India and China” combined with the “lure of markets and glory” to unite the Meiji 
elite around the desirability of an increasingly activist foreign policy.95 As in Germany, external 
expansionism was the common direction of this strategic orientation. Thus, with the 
annexation of Korea and Taiwan, the Meiji state this doubled the area of arable land under 
Japanese control in the period 1895-1910.96  
 
More will be said about the actual strategic outlooks which shaped the rising tensions between 
the US and Japanese empires below. What bears emphasis at this stage is the constitutive 
impact of American territorial and economic expansion on the wider New Imperialism. In 
restructuring the prevailing distribution of territorial and economic resources, it can now be 
seen, the late-nineteenth century emergence of the United States as a world power generated 
a complex of comparative and interactive causal mechanisms which helped transform the 
organization of international politics itself.  
 
On the one hand, the comparative example of American industrial prosperity helped impose 
a distinctive territorialism upon the struggle to access and control global markets.97 Although 
European colonialism long precedes the nineteenth century, the emergence of the United 
States as a continent-spanning nation-state with tightly protected economic borders shaped 
wider a politics of territorial mastery and economic nationalism, not least because the resource-
intensive character of late-nineteenth century capitalism was seen to demand the expansion of 
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frontiers in order to access the raw materials of industrial takeoff.98 On the other hand, the 
forms of intersocietal unevenness generated by American expansion fostered the structured 
dynamic between modernity and backwardness from which the desire for an expansive 
national-imperial state flourished. Exemplifying this trend were the state-led strategies of 
socioeconomic modernization pursued by states like Germany, Japan, and Russia after c.1880. 
While these projects were shaped by local social forces and ideologies, their temporal 
synchronicity, formal similarities, and common orientation toward imperial expansion 
indicates their shared location within an imperial world economy dominated by the British and 
American Empires. The dominant shapes of fin-de-siècle imperialism — involving a proliferation 
of efforts to territorialize of economies along national-colonial lines and control world markets 
by maritime force — were thus conditioned by the timing, character, and scale of the United 
States’ emergence as a leading industrial power. To illustrate this point, it is worth more fully 
considering how the American-centred conditions of industrial unevenness were mediated by 
the foreign-policy strategies of the German and Japanese empires.  
 
THE POWER POLITICS OF LATE-DEVELOPMENT: LOGICS OF EXPANSIONISM IN MEIJI 
JAPAN AND IMPERIAL GERMANY 
 
Of particular importance to the concerns of this chapter are the rationales for territorial 
competition and imperial rivalry that brought those societies in the orbit of US industrialization 
into conflict with the expansive project of the Open Door.  Within the general framework of 
analysis elaborated so far — the structured dynamic between uneven development, national-
imperial state-formation, and the material and symbolic power struggles of the emerging 
international order — it is possible to identify at least two distinct logics of expansionism from 
the foreign-policy records of Meiji Japan and Imperial Germany. Enumerating these will better 
illustrate the pattern of international transformations which constructed world power rivalries 
of the fin-de-siècle.  
 
First, there is the familiar fact that both German and Japanese imperialisms were part of a 
conscious effort to access global markets in a world widely thought to be defined by escalating 
economic rivalries. A 1902 memorandum to the cabinet by Japanese foreign minister Komura 
Jutarō illuminates some of these motivations: 
 
Competition through commercial and industrial activity and through overseas enterprises is a 
phenomenon of grave importance in recent international relations. Its emergence has been most 
prominent in the Far East. For a number of years the Western countries…have been zealous in 
expanding their rights in mining, or in railroads, or in internal waterways, and in various other 
directions on the Asian continent, especially in China…However, when we look at the measures [taken 
by] our own empire, which has the most important ties of interest in the area, separated only by a thin 
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stretch of water, there is not much to be seen yet. Both those in government and those outside it regard 
this as highly regrettable.99 
 
For the late Meiji oligarchy, an active export trade represented an essential route to overcoming 
long-term balance-of-payments problems and affording the raw materials and armaments 
necessary for independent industrial power. By the late 1890s, there was a concern that the 
continued growth of food imports might undermine this political-economic strategy, making 
the ability to penetrate foreign markets an essential part of the strategic calculations which 
underpinned Japanese expansionism. Much like the US experience of naval build-up in 1890s, 
legislative efforts to promote a merchant marine and stimulate export growth went hand in 
hand with the desire for a large maritime force capable of defending economic interests 
overseas. This project of external penetration was focused on the markets of an Asian continent 
where European and American influence threatened to undermine Japanese competitiveness.  
Early supporters of Pan-Asianism thus emphasized the importance of a Japan-led regional 
order centered on the military and economic dominance of the Meiji state.100 While this project 
anticipated the so-called “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” of the 1930s and 1940s, 
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries Japanese expansionism revolved around a 
series of incursions into the vaunted “China Market” — with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-
1895 and the Twenty-One Demands in 1915 the most prominent examples. By the time of the 
Russo-Japanese War, the Chief of the Army General Staff and future Prime Minister, General 
Yamagata Aritomo, considered Manchuria an economic “life line.”101  The penetration and 
later annexation of Korea was framed very much in these terms, with Japanese policy-makers 
seeking to “establish foreign settlement zones,” secure mining rights, and “monopolize the 
concessions to build telegraph lines” and railroads.102  
 
In Germany, the architects of Weltpolitik expressed similar concerns about the control of world 
markets in the context of rising international competitiveness. The famous “Place in the Sun” 
speech delivered by German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow in 1897 encapsulated the 
search for new spheres of external economic and strategic interest that underpinned these 
anxieties:  
 
…It is unwise, from the outset, to exclude Germany from competition with other nations in lands with 
a rich and promising future. The days when Germans granted one of its neighbors the earth, the other 
the sea, and reserved from themselves the sky, where pure doctrine reigns — those times are past. We 
are happy to respect the interests of other great powers in China, secure in the knowledge that our own 
interests will also receive the recognition they deserve. In a word: we do not want to put anyone in our 
shadow, but we also demand our place in the sun. In East Asia as in the West Indies we will be anxious 
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to protect our rights and our interests without harshness, but also without weakness, true to the 
traditions of German politics.103 
 
Like their Japanese contemporaries,104 German advocates of Weltpolitik and Flottenpolitik 
confronted the escalation of imperial rivalries during the 1890s from a position of perceived 
weakness.105 A “Place in the Sun” implied a struggle for access to world markets increasingly 
dominated by American and British industries, where long-range plans for naval expansion 
would be required to further the interests of domestic commerce, and through which political 
and military elites believed war against rival world-empires might rapidly emerge.106 During 
the 1890s, powerful pressure groups like the Navy League and Pan-German League advocated 
the projects of colonialism and military buildup that underpinned the Naval Bills of 1898 and 
1900, doubling the size of the German battle fleet. Aware of the growing “Anglo-Saxon 
fraternization” championed by US geopolitical strategists such as Mahan and Roosevelt, the 
German naval elites who supported this policy, like as Admiral Bendemann and Otto von 
Diederichs, were pessimistic about the Germany’s fate in an era of “industrial competition,” 
even looking toward  an alliance with Russia as possible solution to dominance of the Anglo-
American powers.107 After the Spanish-American War of 1898, Tirpitz’s calculus for naval 
expansion was often framed against the comparative prosperity of the United States, whose 
“absorption” of German economic migrants and growing maritime capacities became both a 
mirror of national backwardness and symbol of the Reich’s obstructed path to “world-power 
status.”108 “Without sea-power,” he lamented, “Germany’s position in the world resembled a 
mollusc without a shell.”109  
 
The German and Japanese elites who pushed the expansionist agenda of the 1890s and 1900s 
were thus responding to the ways in which the regional pattern of the industrialization process, 
its deeply uneven intersocietal structure, turned the experience of late-development into a 
pressing geopolitical dilemma. Their imperial projections and geopolitical strategies spoke 
directly to the external whip of competitive pressures generated by a hierarchy of industry and 
empire dominated by the Anglo-American Empires. This could be termed the power politics 
of arrested development.  
 
Second, the expansionist dynamic of the modern, colonial era imbibed the shared ideological 
architecture of a stratified international order built on exclusionary standards of civilization.110 
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The widely-felt existence of a civilizational league table, divided between civilized/modern and 
barbarian/undeveloped states gave imperialist bids for world power status a sense of cultural 
meaningfulness that went beyond any purely material-economic calculus. Both German and 
Japanese imperialists advanced projects of expansionism with the aim of creating modern 
civilized states capable of dominating prevailing status hierarchies. This concern with status 
explains why the overseas empires of both Meiji Japan and Imperial Germany typically 
produced complex socio-cultural systems that aimed to transform foreign societies into civilized 
forms, rather than simply treating colonial possessions as a space of unmediated economic 
extraction. Equally, it provides a basis for understanding why such doctrines of imperial 
expansion were so often characterized in terms of the cultural or ethnic virtues, if not outright 
superiority, of the imperial core itself.  
 
In this context, the claim by Japan that its imperialism was a civilizing mission111 partly inverted 
the power hierarchies of the European standard of civilization, turning it into a pretext for 
external expansionism. During the build-up to the war against Russia during the 1890s and 
1900s, the portrayal of Japan as a civilized power in a struggle against a barbarian Slavic enemy 
became increasingly commonplace.112 In the words of one editorial that appeared in the 
newspaper Yorozu chōhō in 1904: “Russia is the shame of Europe, we need to defeat this nation 
in the name of civilisation, in the name of peace, and in the name of humanity. Europe should 
be pleased that there is a new nation in the Far East which will bear the torch of their 
civilization and is suppressing the troublemaker, Russia.”113  Given the existence of such 
politicized civilizational standards, the problem of international status anxieties was intrinsic to 
the dialectic between modernity and backwardness generated by the dynamic of uneven 
development. In this context, no project of imperialism could ever be a straightforward duel 
for global markets; they also carried the weight of claims to civilizational standing and great-
power status. For German advocates of Weltpolitik like Tirpitz and Bülow, naval expansion in 
response to rise of “Anglo-Saxon” dominance thus represented a valid response to the 
“insecure politico-economic foundations of our whole civilization and power.”114 The tendency 
to visualize Russia as a “barbarian colossus” seeking some kind of pan-Slavic hegemony spoke 
directly to these perceived status anxieties, as did the familiar conception of Japan as a “yellow 
peril.”115 These civilizational claims cast the German political elite as a potential Herrenvolk with 
claims to world power that required the support of military force. This could be termed the 
power politics of civilizationism.  
 
These distinct logics of expansionism — developmentalist and civilizational — came together 
with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, which many contemporaries looked to as the 
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epitome of a new global power politics centered on the “cult of the offensive.”116 For Mahan, 
like other members of the US military establishment, it demonstrated the primacy of 
“diplomacy using force” to the conduct of modern interstate relations while also raising the 
possibility that other polities outside the imagined orbit of Western civilization might achieve 
similar victories, unless the European powers embarked on adequate programs of military 
expansion.117 For Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, commander of the Imperial Navy at the Battle of 
Tsushima, the war was similarly a sign of the primacy of naval power and, more importantly, 
proof that the Empire of Japan was once more able to compete with the imperial powers of 
Britain and the United States.118 In Russia, by contrast, defeat was felt as a landmark 
humiliation: many of the naval commanders defeated at the Battle of Tsushima reported that 
they would opt for suicide after Rear-Admiral Nebogatov announced the surrender of the 
Baltic Fleet.119 More broadly, the world-historical significance of Japan’s victory became a 
central theme of debates about the future of imperialism. In Europe, it devastated a prevailing 
discourse of civilizational supremacy, generating a series of increasingly racialized lamentations 
on the decline of the West, which became crucial to conservative notions of geopolitics and 
lebensraum. Among anti-colonial movements and intellectuals, it offered a concrete model of 
state-led modernization as a possible response to Western dominance.  
 
This combination of developments made the Russo-Japanese War a threshold to modernity: a 
historical breakthrough that defined and motivated an emerging imperial age.  On the one 
hand, its diplomacy and political economy demonstrated the advent of Anglophone finance 
capitalism as an overarching condition of interstate rivalries. Wall Street and the City of 
London, which accounted for over half of Japan’s war-effort,120 provided the framework of 
global finance that made Japanese victory possible, while the Tsarist state’s relative 
marginalization in global capital markets — an effect of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 
— provided a harsh demonstration of the geopolitical implication of economic 
backwardness.121 On the other, the way the war catalyzed the outbreak of the 1905 Russian 
Revolution122 demonstrated the capacity for the new conditions of mass-mobilization warfare 
to translate into revolutionary openings for class politics. Moreover, the war’s aftermath was in 
many ways a marker and precursor of future conflicts. For some Japanese nationalists, victory 
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over Russia was a stepping stone toward a future war against the United States.123 As American 
financial interests penetrated South Manchuria under the sign of the Open Door, between 
1907 and 1912, Imperial Japan concluded a series of diplomatic conventions with Tsarist 
Russia intended to carve out regional spheres influence and prepare for the possibility of war 
against the US empire and its British allies.124 As would be the case in the era of the two world 
wars, strategic rivalries now moved within a globalized political economy dominated by Anglo-
American finance capital.125 As Aritomo put it in 1918, “before our wounds from the war with 
Russia had healed…we sedulously concluded the agreements with the Tsar to counter the 
establishment of American power.”126   
The transformative effects of American industrial growth after 1870 amount, as Sven Beckert 
has argued, to a “second great divergence” defined by the rebalancing of global economic 
power along Anglo-American lines and the forging of national and colonial territorial political 
economies as the dominant units of the world market.127 Faced with the rising fact of American 
industrial supremacy, social elites throughout the international order sought strategies of 
external power-projection that would mediate or constrain what many viewed as a diminishing 
international status. More than any direct commitment to a realist logic of power-balancing or 
Realpolitik, what emerges from this history is the extent to which the advent of the United States 
as a new model of industrial power — a territorially integrated, continent-spanning national 
economy fundamentally different from the informal empire of British capitalism — 
transformed the character of power politics itself. The desire for greater spaces of national 
political-economic control overseas figured by the ideal of a “Place in the Sun” called not for 
the imposition of a balance of power, but rather a series of high-stakes bids for imperial 
expansion as a promising strategic mediation between the conditions of backwardness and the 
rising pressures of industrial competition. The uneven and combined development of industrial 
capitalism within the empire-centered international order and world economy of the 
nineteenth century therefore gave the pursuit of world power its distinct historical rationality. 
In the following section, I examine how the geopolitical backlash generated by American 
expansionism shaped the world ambitions of the US political-military itself. By encouraging 
the pursuit of more sustained strategies of global penetration, the intersocietal context of 
American political and economic development played a decisive role in the United States’ own 
trajectory toward imperialism.  
 
IV. Grand Strategy and World Economy   
 
The rationalizations of US expansionism now need to be reconstructed in further detail. For 
one of the decisive features of the United States’ transition to world power status in this era was 
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the leading influence of a political-military elite which, organized within the American state 
apparatus, exercised a high degree of policy autonomy and national cohesion. With 
exceptionally high levels of labor repression and domestic militarism, the American state 
crystallized around forms of elite rule that were cohesive in their support for industrial 
capitalism, maritime force, and progressively more centralized political institutions.128 A 
detailed examination of the US political-military elites’ rationalizations of external expansion 
and great-power rivalry is therefore essential for establishing the political drives which 
transformed a the United States — formerly a regionally fragmented polity lacking significant 
military capacities —  along national-imperial lines. It will then be possible to assess the ways 
in which the United States’ own rationales for world power rendered the pressures of 
intersocietal unevenness in a highly particular political form — one that revolved centrally 
around the tensions between the territorialization of American society as a bounded national 
order and its imbrication within the global conflict dynamics launched by the competitive 
expansion of states like Germany and Japan. In this context, the pursuit of world power not 
only signified an expansive scale of economic and security concerns but, more fundamentally, 
a conservative project of political order building aimed at the creation of a nation-centered 
industrial society prepared for extensive engagements in global power politics. This was the 
strategic mediation linking the domestic to the international.   
 
RATIONALIZATIONS FOR WORLD POWER 
 
In 1889, a year before the US Naval Board announced its plans for a global-scope battle fleet, 
Admiral Stephen B. Luce, set the tone for future conceptions of American world power. In a 
time of increasing world trade and commercial rivalries, he argued, any state lacking an 
adequate “offensive navy” faced the prospect of “national disaster.”129 Like other members of 
the US military establishment, Luce regarded military preparedness as a basic prerequisite of 
both economic and cultural development. If the “instrumentality of the sword” was a central 
driver of “human progress,” the creation of a naval force capable of defending and enlarging 
American power overseas was a pressing moral and material imperative.130 Emphasizing the 
connections between military power, commercial expansion, and civilizational development, 
US elites viewed war preparedness as an urgent social necessity 131 catalyzed by the growing 
technical and economic demands of battleship warfare.132 The predictions of future conflict 
which underpinned this evolving militarism were often couched in a language of necessity with 
direct echoes of Social Darwinism.133 “In the economy of nature,” Luce stressed, “war is sent” 
for the “forming of national character, the shaping of a people’s destiny, and the spreading of 
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civilization.” Like the “law of evolution,” warfare was part of the “operation of the economic 
laws of nature for the government of the human family.”134 As illustrated by the ongoing decline 
of China — an “immovable civilization” unqualified in the conduct of “war against a superior 
race” — the “law of the rise and fall of nations” was an impending challenge which demanded 
an aggressive policy of military preparedness and global penetration.135 Such conceptions of an 
emerging global political-economic space thus held a distinctly intersocietal component bound 
to the geopolitical and geo-cultural dynamics of imperial competition. 
 
US imperial imaginings of world power thus figured a hypercompetitive international 
environment centered around rival strategies of economic expansion. “For the manufacturer 
of the United States the export trade has become a necessity,” argued the US Minister to 
China, Charles Denby, “and it should be fostered with a jealous care.”136 With the European 
powers struggling to annex territorial possessions and secure economic concessions in East Asia, 
a critical period of geopolitical and economic restructuring had emerged, exposing the United 
States to unprecedented international competition.137 Whereas the “free-trade imperialism” of 
the 1840s and 1850s had been a relatively multilateral enterprise, the 1890s saw imperial 
powers struggle to secure exclusive territorial, political and economic enclaves from which 
rivals would be excluded.138 US naval commanders now called for the “development and 
maintenance of a naval force sufficient for our future predominance,” stressing that the 
American military must now “assist other American nations to resist foreign territorial 
encroachment” and, if “driven to war” against a rival power, “be able to strike telling blows 
upon its nearer possessions and its commerce.”139 This emphasis on the linkages between 
commerce and great power rivalry was a virtually constant feature of the discussions of 
“manifest destiny” and “naval strength” which proceeded in the aftermath of the Spanish-
American War.140  
 
While during the 1880s US military elites hoped that the United States’ “control of the Pacific” 
would foster a harmonious international environment, by the early-twentieth century the 
perception of heightened economic and territorial rivalries meant US overseas expansion was 
increasingly figured as a test of “greatness.”141 For Rear Admiral Henry Clay Taylor, the 
emerging horizons of American world power would be defined by a militaristic imperialism: 
“Providence seems to have ordained that the world's history for many centuries shall be 
strongly affected by the efficiency or non-efficiency of the American Navy; by the quality of the 
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weapon which the great republic wields in its imperial path of progress and development.” 
Now it was imperative that the US political-military establishment seek to “foster that military 
spirit which is indispensable to the success of our future war fleet.”142 By the mid-1890s, such 
calls for military and overseas expansion were colored with the anxieties about industrial 
development and international competition that accompanied the onset of a deep “financial 
depression.”143 The widespread belief that the US economy was burdened by effects of an 
overproduction crisis144 encouraged US naval strategists to portray the pursuit of foreign 
markets and larger military capacities as a solution to domestic economic problems.145 Even 
the disastrous prospect of great power war could be envisaged as the “ultimate form of 
economic competition.” 146  
 
Central to the conflicts of “imperialism” which animated this discourse was a shared image of 
the “conditions of world politics” — a consciously systemic optic for visualizing the political, 
military, and economic rivalries between “great world powers” operating on a global scale.147 
In a 1902 article for the British Tory publication, the National Review, Mahan highlighted the 
increasingly universal character of modern geopolitical conditions. There was now, as an 
emerging social fact, an inescapable global system: “As the phrase ‘world politics’ more and 
more expresses a reality of these latter days, the more necessary does it become to consider 
each of the several centres of interest as not separate, but having relations to the whole.”148 As 
a result, judgements about strategy and possibility would have to contend with competitive 
projects of national self-strengthening epitomized by the apparent “occidentalizing of Japan,” 
whose victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) underscored the instability of the present 
imperial order.149 For conservative political reformers like Mahan, the socialist and anti-
imperialist movements of the time threatened to undermine the very bases of civilized 
modernity by exposing the Western world to a dangerous return of the repressed. Military force 
would be the guardian of civilization against barbarism:  
In this our day, the development of the world may be said to present two principal factors: European 
civilization, and the civilizations, or barbarisms, as the case may be, which are not European in origin 
or derivation. As regards energy, especially organized energy, the European is far the most powerful; 
and the demonstration of that energy lies not only in the vast social and industrial progresses 
accomplished, but in armament, the ultimate exponent of national independence and power…In the 
matter before us, mass is on the side of the non-European. The equivalent velocity, energy, is on the 
side of Europe; the term Europe including in this respect its offshoot, America. In the future processes 
of adjustment, in which we doubtless shall see the superior organization of European civilization 
imitated as it has been successfully in Japan, it is of the first importance that the European family of 
states retain in full the power of national self-assertion, of which the sentiment of nationality is the spirit 
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and armaments the embodiment; for so only, by the national force of the several states in active 
competition with one another, can the force of the whole be depended upon for maintaining itself, and 
thus ultimately reducing by assimilation the opposing external forces. Eliminate, if you can, the 
competition between the several nationalities, so as to suppress the armaments; substitute for these the 
artificial system of compulsory arbitration, and disarmament; and you will have realized a socialistic 
community of states, in which the powers of individual initiative, of nations and of men, the great 
achievement of our civilization so far, will gradually be atrophied. The result may be that European 
civilization will not survive, having lost the fighting energy which heretofore has been inherent in its 
composition.150 
The competitive imperial conditions figured by such conceptions of grand strategy mirrored 
the conflictual processes of socioeconomic restructuring associated with the industrial 
foundations of the “New Empire.”151 Within its long-term pattern of expansion, American 
industrial development was punctuated by remarkable instability: periods of economic crisis 
appeared almost every ten years between 1861 and 1915. While the years 1873-1879, 1882-
1885, 1893-97, 1907-1908, and 1913-1915 all saw economic downturn and mass poverty, 
there were more than 1000 strikes per year between 1899 and 1905.152 The internal logic of 
world power advocacy developed symbiotically with the concerns about social instability, 
overproduction, and national cultural cohesion that shaped American responses to these 
socioeconomic crises. The geopolitical outlooks of American political and military elites thus 
did more than visualize the expanding scale of strategic and commercial interests. Their overt 
nationalism and reformist political agenda also spawned a future-oriented conception of 
politics as the state-led transformation of industrial society. This was a consciously modernizing 
project of American state-building predicated on the rationalization of military institutions and 
the integration of society around a centralized national state.153 Indeed, the expansionist 
outlooks of the fin-de-siècle were closely bound to the growing social reformism of the 
Republican political elite, whose increasing concern for the pursuit of “moral regeneration” 
forged the so-called Progressive Era of American state-building (c.1890-1920).154 Among other 
achievements, these reforms brought the gradual institutionalization of taxation on income and 
inheritance that enabled the further growth of military spending.  
 
Like many “New Liberals” of the 1890s and 1900s, such key national political reformers as 
Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root believed that the fin-de-siècle environment of rising social 
and international turbulence demanded the forging of a militarized nation-state backed by a 
domestic society prepared for extensive global conflicts. Critical of the failure of more 
commercialist forms of liberal politics to forge a cohesive national society, theirs was a 
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nationalistic social politics valorizing the ideals of “hardihood and manly courage” perceived 
as necessary for combatting the “terrible social problems which all the civilized world is now 
facing.”155 The sphere of social policy thus increasingly came to be defined in the same terms 
as that of grand strategy proper: the problem of national competitiveness forged close practical 
and symbolic ties between the internal and external domains of American statecraft.  
 
As such, the kinds of social imperialism and national militarism associated with the escalation 
of European power politics also shaped the development of American world ambitions. “We 
shall be a potent factor for peace largely in proportion to the way in which we make it evident 
that our attitude is due, not to weakness, not inability to defend ourselves, but to a genuine 
repugnance to wrongdoing,” Roosevelt emphasized in 1902. “We need to keep in a condition 
of preparedness, especially as regards our navy, not because we want war, but because we 
desire to stand with those whose plea for peace is listened to with respectful attention.”156 Like 
the German elites who came to embrace the militarized global foreign policy of early-twentieth 
century Weltpolitik, American progressives thus agitated for the expansion of American power 
abroad partly in order to ensure the stability of the domestic social order.157 For those who 
endorsed this program of military preparedness, “the competition of interests” associated with 
power politics promised to engender “that reviving sense of nationality, which is the true 
antidote to what is worst in socialism.” Here lay best hope for “European civilization.”158 
 
In this sense, the kind of power politics engendered by the conflicts of imperialism signified 
something much more than the narrow interest-calculus associated with conventional 
definitions of Realpolitik.  While the escalation of imperial competition transformed the world 
market into a rivalrous strategic force-field, the underlying logic of US world power advocacy 
was never motivated by any independent conception of economic or security concerns. On the 
contrary: because the economic rivalries among empires were framed by the problem of 
securing an autonomous and competitive national core, anxieties about the oversaturation of 
American markets and the pressing realities of industrial rivalry were typically of a piece with 
the wider socio-cultural problems that were thought to bear on the creation a cohesive social 
order. Arguments in favor of external expansion and military build-up therefore tended to 
situate the strategic problems of power politics within a broader framework of concerns about 
moral reform, class politics, and cultural purity. The so-called conflict between Western 
“civilization” and foreign “barbarism,” in conjunction with the fostering of national patriotism, 
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were the key markers of this blending of societal and geopolitical concerns. The dilemmas of 
power politics, in other words, were intrinsically related to the maintenance of social order 
itself; the formulation of external strategy demanded the strengthening of political authority 
within domestic society.  
 
Exemplifying these linkages between the inner and outer spheres of statecraft were the efforts 
at cultural assimilation launched with Americanization Movement of the 1910s. One of the 
largest mass mobilization campaigns in American history, Americanization campaigns brought 
federal, state, and local political activism together in a society-wide effort to convert immigrant 
labor — the “hyphenated Americans” decried by Roosevelt — into normative national 
subjects.  In its most coercive aspects, these efforts to instill the sociocultural discipline of official 
nationalism saw the withholding or withdrawal of citizenship rights for involvement in strike 
activity alongside a wider proliferation of industrial violence and anti-immigration riots.159 In 
continuity with the aggressive response to Japanese expansionism advocated by American 
strategists, these efforts to promote a cohesive national security state saw rising opposition to 
East Asian immigration, which spelled, in turn, diplomatic crisis for US-Japan diplomatic 
relations. This inflaming of anti-Japanese sentiment help provoked war scares in both 1907 
and 1913, when naval planners and political elites in both societies were convinced of the 
likelihood of military conflict.160 Through such an event, it is possible to see both the 
intersocietal character of power politics and its specific cultural constructions.  
 
This blending of societal and geopolitical conflicts was closely related to the advent of a mass-
based industrial society. Emerging from a largely uncoordinated process of colonial settlement 
dating back to the early-sixteenth century, the American polity of the pre-Civil War era lacked 
the mass-cultural order of collective nationalism around which later notions of statehood and 
great power rivalry would cohere. Defined by a highly-localized devolution of political 
authority, the state-apparatus which emerged from the American Revolution operated through 
a system of courts and parties organized in primarily regional terms: its confederal and 
decentralized institutional structure remained tied to a social order in which religious divisions 
and local identifications mitigated against the outpourings of mass patriotism which 
characterized fin-de-siècle politics.161 By contrast, the rationalizations for world power forged 
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperial era bore the imprint of a state-
centered nationalism. In these terms, the geostrategic rationales of external expansionism 
translated directly into a broader society-building project closely tied to the elite politics of 
American society. 
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THE WORLD ECONOMY AS A STRATEGIC FIELD 
 
During the first decades of the twentieth century, the geopolitical stakes of American world 
power ambitions became progressively more concrete. Envisaging the globe as an integrated 
political and economic system, American political-military elites focused their attention on the 
perceived core of great power antagonisms: the relations between the major coal and oil 
producing states, notably Britain, Germany, and Russia.162 For the advent of a new system of 
expansionary global empires had imbued established forms of political economy and 
diplomacy with a spirit of militaristic Realpolitik that broke away from the earlier configurations 
of empire and international order, especially those associated with the laissez-faire liberalism 
of the contemporary Pax Britannica.163  
 
Typical of this geostrategic outlook was the 1911 argument of US Rear-Admiral Bradley Fiske: 
that the imitation of advanced industrial and military techniques by states like Imperial Japan 
was generating an increasingly competitive international environment — and that, with the 
“opening of undeveloped countries,” the expansion of world trade would likely produce “a 
stupendous competition involving in a vast and complicated net, every red blooded nation of 
the earth.”164 In this conception, the diffusion of advanced industrial and military technologies 
was generating a volatile international environment where the advent of new industrial and 
imperial power centers promised to produce periodic geopolitical crises for the “civilized 
world.”165 American geopolitical theorists and naval planners thereby figured the problem of 
uneven and combined development as an acute geopolitical reality and lived historical process: 
their imaginings of world power gave shape and meaning to a universalizing social dynamic, 
of competitive industrial transformations, whose local unevenness gave the evolution of global 
political space its distinct historical character. Societal multiplicity — in the form of rival 
civilization systems and competing industrial economies — was in this sense constitutive of the 
internal grammar of US grand strategy.  
 
The conflictual-yet-interdependent global condition generated by these interactions was given 
particularly intense expression by the growing crisis in US-German relations during the first 
decade of the twentieth century. During the Venezuela crisis of 1902-1903, the German 
Army’s plan to use military intervention to collect its debts from the Venezuelan government 
provoked a forceful response from the Roosevelt administration, which sent a larger naval force 
to repel the threatened invasion, and lift the sea blockade imposed by the British, German, and 
Italian navies. Compelling Germany to back down from its planned intervention, the US Navy 
confirmed its primacy in the Americas, and illustrated the hard geopolitical realities blocking 
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the Kaiserreich from assuming its “Place in the Sun.” In this respect, the Venezuelan crisis was 
not only a sign of the growing antagonism between the German and American Empires, the 
former refusing to recognize the Monroe Doctrine, the latter asserting its regional hegemony. 
More fundamentally, it illustrated the structured dynamic between intersocietal unevenness 
and geopolitical competition that transformed the early-twentieth world economy into a 
contested strategic field. In a direct continuation of the anxieties of German backwardness, the 
pressure groups in favor of German expansionism — the Colonial League, the Pan-German 
League and the Navy League — had supported the export of German capital and settlers to 
South America since the late-1880s. Yet the actions of the United States showed that the 
desired “German India” would remain a fantasy. In response, as Herwig’s study of the episode 
illuminates, the Wilhelmine government’s refusal to recognize the Monroe Doctrine was 
motivated by fears that accommodation would engender a backlash from the domestic Right 
who favored an aggressively expansionist colonial policy. In turn, the perception that Berlin 
was seeking to seize colonial possessions in the Americas exacerbated the diplomatic crisis in 
US-German relations on which the future division of the international order hinged. For its 
part, the British Empire ultimately came to endorse the US’s Monroe-Doctrine based claims 
to regional hegemony; the prospect of a “pax Americana” in the Americas was to be preferred to 
the dangerous advance of an “imperium Germanicum.”  Venezuela, far from peripheral to the 
movements of global power politics, thus became a decisive factor in the “parting of ways” 
which set the Anglo-American Empires on course for conflict with the Imperial Germany.166  
 
The structured overlap between power politics and political economy illustrated by an episode 
like the Venezuelan crisis demonstrates the destabilizing impact on uneven and combined the 
trajectories of social development forged in the context of the wider global condition.  In this 
context, commercially-oriented societies like the United States forced to pursue projects of 
military self-strengthening they might otherwise have lacked. Rather than the kind of 
“commercial reason of state” characteristic of Britain’s earlier “imperialism of free trade,”167 
the dynamics of competitive coexistence confronted by the American political class demanded 
a more sustained militarization of domestic society, in conjunction with the forging of close 
partnerships between state-public institutions and private-commercial actors. This statist vision 
of political reform bestowed a privileged status on the national military as the core institution 
of the desired Machtstaat.168 It was now the duty of “naval men,” as the “students of the history 
of wars” to remind the “broader-minded statesman” of the permanent possibility of war, 
especially given that “the control of commerce” was now recognized as “the greatest war 
producing factor.”169 This struggle to rationalize the contested unevenness of the emergent 
world economy was given particularly acute expression by Rear-Admiral French Ensor 
Chadwick in 1903 address at the US Naval War College:   
                                                
166 This paragraph is based on Holger H. Herwig, Germany’s Vision of Empire in Venezuela, 1871-1914 (Princeton, 
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Along with the immense fact that the Slav, the Teuton and the Anglo-Saxon are the great increasing 
races of the world, is the almost more important one that they are the chief coal and oil owners. Italy 
no coal whatever, Spain an area of but 2800 miles, and France and Belgium but 2500; Austria-Hungary 
but 1800. The only coal fields which, from our present knowledge, can offer possible rivalry to the fields 
of the United States are those of Australia and China, and we can venture to predict that it will be over 
these Chinese fields and the development of their potentialities that the future struggle for supremacy 
in Eastern Asia will take place, unless China herself shall show an unexpected ability to control and 
defend these interests.170  
Here was an American naval commander insisting in an urgent, highly bellicose register, on 
the need to map US geostrategic policy according to the new political geography of resource-
led economic development — as seen in the mirror of pre-existing divisions between Slavic, 
Anglo-Saxon, or Teutonic civilizations. This source confronts us in the most direct way possible 
with the strategic and symbolic mediations of intersocietal unevenness demanded by the global 
condition of late-nineteenth century modernity.  
 
V. Power Politics Beyond the Rise and Fall of Great Powers    
 
This chapter has tried to elaborate a historical-sociological interpretation of the United States’ 
emergence as a world power during the 1875-1914 age of empire. I have sought to uncover 
and explain the distinct pattern of strategic and ideological calculations, geopolitical pressures, 
and political-economic transformations which shaped the underlying logic of American grand 
strategy, its emergent global imperial frame, and the basic conceptions of security and interest 
underpinning it. To unlock the deeper sociohistorical causalities which governed the US 
political-military elites’ commitments to world power, the chapter located the evolution of the 
American Empire in the wider dynamics of uneven and combined development and interstate 
rivalry generated by the intersocietal power hierarchies of the New Imperialism. In contrast to 
the cyclical, “rise and fall of great powers,” associated with contemporary realism, this 
approach suggests that the emergent world power status of the early-twentieth century 
American state was based on a qualitatively distinct conjuncture of social power structures and 
strategic rationales which cannot be understood outside its emergent international context. 
Quite the opposite: the fusion of economic nationalism, informal empire, and expansive naval 
power-projection that characterized US grand strategy in this era were intrinsically related to 
a historical conjuncture of intersocietal unevenness generated by the spatio-temporally uneven 
trajectory of the industrial revolution on a global scale. If this argument is convincing, it draws 
attention to a wider theoretical issue related to the sociohistorical perspective elaborated in the 
chapter above: that is, how the dynamics of international change not only track with so-called 
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“shifts in the international distribution of power” but also entails, more fundamentally, 
qualitative transformations in the sources, conduct, and meanings of power politics itself.171  
 
In light of the preceding analysis, the logic of the world power ambitions forged in this era can 
be best understood as an ideological force field structured by a combination of three decisive, 
yet distinct, components of the intersocietal setting of American global expansion. The first of 
these was a historical causality that was at least partly visible to American expansionists 
themselves: the decisive external effects of the US economy’s rapid post-Civil War 
industrialization. This process changed not only the material equilibrium but, more 
importantly, the political and social texture of the emerging world economy by generating a 
new model of capitalist development: a territorially integrated national economy combining a 
competitive industrial system with the control of abundant raw materials. After 1870, the 
increasingly self-evident success of this continental economic system became a “whip of 
external necessity” that impelled the very national projects of military-industrial self-
strengthening against which American anxieties about international competition were typically 
framed. The second component was, in a sense, the logical accompaniment of these 
developmental contradictions: that is, the novel emergence of a nationalist agenda of 
consciously modernizing domestic reformism. The problem of maintaining national 
competitiveness underpinned a mobilization of political elites around a politics of national-
imperialism that was central to pursuit of world power as such. The third constituent of this 
global-imperial conception of grand strategy was given by the imaginative juxtaposition of the 
United States to radically different foreign cultural formations. The dynamics of this experience 
provided a range of symbolic archetypes against which the fitness of American society could be 
defined and measured, and in terms of which its pursuit of external mastery could be 
established as a legitimate goal. Without the constituting presence of such external influences, 
the representation of American expansion as a civilizing mission or a struggle against foreign 
barbarism would have been conceptually impossible.  
 
This conjunction of forces help explain how a highly commercialized capitalist society could 
spawn an expansionary Machtstaat so seemingly out of kilter with any formal logic of market 
expansion. The socioeconomic structures of modern industrial society were now being 
penetrated by a combination of geopolitical-military and intersocietal pressures whose 
articulation served to foster a series of novel political-ideological hybrids. The militaristic 
coloration and civilizational outlooks of American imperialism were not the products of a 
pristine capitalist social order, but a symptom of its relational construction within and through 
the dynamics of competitive coexistence generated by a deeply uneven world economy. These 
fin-de-siècle visions of global imperialism, which effectively helped invent the modern idea of 
world politics as a systemic field, were a product of the interaction between societies undergoing 
connected yet uneven processes of cultural and economic restructuring. Their elaboration was 
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a key feature of the transformations of power politics engendered by the advent of the modern 
global condition.  
 
In the next chapter, I expand this argument by examining a deeper ideological driver of 
American world power ambitions: the emergence of the idea of “the West” at the heart of US 
political culture. Visions of “Western civilization” became a key factor in the kinds of 
sociopolitical authority possessed by the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth elites who oversaw 
the projection of American world power traced above. 
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5. VISIONS OF THE WEST 
THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF THE NATIONAL-IMPERIAL STATE  
 
 
 
 
As we gradually accustomed ourselves to the new and strange conditions of primitive barbarism, our 
recollections of a civilized life faded into the unreal imagery of a vivid dream. 
— George Kennan, American explorer, on Siberia (1881).1 
 
Steam and electricity have mightily compressed the earth. The elbows of the nations touch. Isolation 
— the mother of barbarism — is becoming impossible. The mysteries of Africa are being laid open, the 
pulse of her commerce is beginning to beat. South America is being quickened, and the dry bones of 
Asia are moving; the Nineteenth Century is breathing a living soul under ribs of death. The world is to 
be Christianized and civilized.2 
— Josiah Strong, American theologian, on the civilizing mission (1885). 
 
 
I. Introduction   
 
The idea of “the west” is today a central category of international politics. As a taken-for-
granted frame of contemporary reference, appellations of “East” and “West” might properly 
be ranked alongside terms like “nation” and “race” as one of the fundamental identity markers 
of modern world politics. Yet unlike other such classifications, the metageography of the 
“Western world” is distinctive in anchoring a universal set of international power structures to 
a specific regional geo-culture: its conventional order usually confined to the most powerful 
states of Western Europe and North America, the term serves to distinguish those societies at 
the leading edge of modern power transformations since of the onset of the industrial era. In 
this role, notions of “Western civilization” encode a complex series of status distinctions — such 
as the developmental schema of backwardness-to-modernity or barbarism-to-civilization — 
grounded in a pattern of imperial domination and capitalist unevenness dating back to the mid-
nineteenth century. Since the first sustained articulations of Occidentalism during 1890s, the 
of idea of “the West” has thus revolved around the opposition between a Euro-American core 
and its geopolitical exterior: in the nineteenth century, the “Oriental” empires of Russia and 
Japan, alongside the more “uncivilized” world of colonial rule; in the twentieth, the Communist 
Bloc and the Third World; today, primarily, the post-Soviet states and the universe of Islam.3 
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To explicate the development of this geo-cultural formation, the following chapter locates some 
of the key origins of modern Occidentalism in the global condition of intersocietal conflict and 
historical unevenness forged during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century era of the 
New Imperialism. In this context, I describe the underlying dynamics of cultural and 
geopolitical change which gave rise to a distinctively “civilizational” form of imperial ideology 
with an exclusive conception of the West at its heart. In particular, I argue that the strategic 
practices and ideological dynamics of global power politics — the task of mobilizing mass-based 
industrial societies for imperial competition, of legitimizing military violence and expansion, 
and of imposing structures of social meaning an emergent international hierarchy — played a 
key role in the production of “the West” as a form of political subjectivity grounded by the 
national-imperial state. Building on the work of the previous chapter, I focus on the historical 
rationalizations for world power associated with the evolving American Empire.4 To grasp the 
international origins of modern Occidentalism, however, it is necessary to situate the American 
Empire within the vectors of competitive coexistence and cross-cultural comparison generated 
by the emergent global condition. This requires an assessment of the United States’ location 
within the international dynamics of national-imperial state-formation, its relation to a British-
American Anglosphere, and its exposure to the forms of geopolitical conflict unleashed by the 
dynamic of catch-up development outside the imagined Western core.5 By situating the fin-de-
siècle architects of American expansionism in this intersocietal context, it becomes possible to 
uncover some of the key sociohistorical transformations which made identification with “the 
West” into a core principle of “vision and division” within the US political-military elite.6 
 
The argument divides into four main parts.7 Against the background of a wider conception of 
the relation between “strategic” and “symbolic” power relations, the first of these establishes 
the historical specificity of the modern notion of the West by examining the nineteenth-century 
pattern of sociocultural, institutional, and geopolitical transformations which bound American 
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Press, 2011), 22–54. 
6 The analytical vocabulary of different “principles of vision and division,” denoting the symbolic categories 
through which authoritative meanings are imposed on the social world, is how Pierre Bourdieu describes the 
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and Society 14, no. 6 (1985): 726, 731. 
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imperialism to the process of Western identity-formation. The openness of historical actors to 
a hierarchical and exclusive form of Occidentalism in this period can be explained with 
reference to the ways in which the late-nineteenth century proliferation of ethno-nationalist 
and expansionist ideologies of state power interacted with the conjunctural effects of two wider 
processes: specifically, how the expansion of an empire-centered international order emerged 
in conjunction with a wider transformation in the social foundations of political hierarchy — 
away from the systems of religious and aristocratic authority which sustained earlier state-
forms, and toward a quasi-rational order of legitimate domination grounded in the prestige of 
secular cultural symbols (Section II). By connecting this pattern of geopolitical change and 
cultural rationalization to a more a more detailed discussion of US imperial culture, the second 
section demonstrates the manner in which appeals to Western civilization promised to 
legitimize US power-projection as a form of cultural modernity. American expansionism, its 
mission associated with the advancement of the civilized world itself, was framed by an ideology 
of social progress that resonated with the modernist expectations about the functions of political 
order. In an era of growing cultural essentialism, the core sociopolitical function of such 
ideological forms was to integrate both social elites and popular masses into the political 
framework of a modern nation-state predicated on legal-rational standards of political authority 
(Section III). The third section examines the wider intersocietal forces which grounded the 
shared Occidentalism of British and American imperial cultures. Facing the prospect of an 
uprising of “backward” states, Anglo-American appeals to Occidentalism were shaped centrally 
by the efforts of societies like Russia and Japan to overturn prevailing hierarchies of wealth and 
power. In this respect, the conditions of intersocietal unevenness and competitive modernism 
which shaped the emergence of the wider global condition turn out to also be a key driver of 
the forms of geo-cultural development underpinning the modern identity of the West (Section 
IV). In conclusion, the final section considers the impact of such ideological systems on the 
development of American power in the early to mid-twentieth century (Section V). 
 
What is the significance of this argument for the wider conception of power politics advanced 
in this thesis? On the one hand, it has been widely claimed that realism, with its narrow 
definition of international power as military capacity operating in a context of systemic 
anarchy, is incapable of addressing the role of authority, status, and identity in the construction 
of international politics.8 The present chapter takes this claim in a somewhat different direction 
to much constructivist IR theory, suggesting that the symbolic elements of political action also 
possess a historical sociology that is related to the specificity of hierarchical order in modern 
                                                
8 For various statements of this kind, see Wendt’s argument about the primacy of identity over material structure: 
“Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 
02 (March 1992): 391–425; Klein’s attempt to reinterpret the concept of strategic culture along Gramscian lines: 
“Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics,” Review of 
International Studies 14, no. 2 (1988): 133–48; Guzzini’s critique of the absence of authority relations and political 
rule from the realist conception of power: “Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis,” 
International Organization 47, no. 3 (July 1993): 443–78; and Mattern’s conception of representational force as a 
mechanism of international coercion: “Why `Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the 
Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Millennium 33, no. 3 (June 1, 2005): 583–612. More 
recently, see the literature on status competition discusses in chapter 2: Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of 
Rising Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Michelle Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in 
International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).  
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political and international systems: the proliferation of the idea of the West at the heart of fin-
de-siècle imperialism exemplifies the extent to which the cultural textures of global power politics 
have been shaped by the tensions between the progress-oriented ideological systems ushered in 
by modernity and the conflictual constitution of a stratified and uneven global condition.9 On 
the other hand, therefore, this discussion demonstrates that the conditions of global power 
politics — and hence the intersocietal character of modern international relations — open out 
onto a deeper cultural history of ideological transformations, in this case partaking in the 
formation of a central identity category of contemporary world politics.10 These two arguments 
can be better unfolded by examining the complex interlocking between geopolitical change and 
cultural transformation in the making of the nineteenth-century imperial order. It will then be 
possible to locate the generative conditions of Occidentalism within what might be described 
as the cultural logic of the national-imperial state: the growing pressure to anchor political 
orders in categories of social belonging and division that spoke directly to the competitive 
coexistence of societies within a deeply uneven global condition.   
 
 
II. Theorizing Civilizational Imperialism: Symbolic Systems and 
Intersocietal Hierarchies in the Modern International Order  
 
Few political categories are so normatively and historically bound to the rivalry of empires as 
the idea of Western civilization. In Edward Said’s powerful conception, the climax of the “rise 
of the West” during the late-nineteenth century was deeply linked to the pursuit of “imperium” 
which, as an “almost metaphysical obligation to rule over subordinate, inferior, or less 
advanced peoples,” operated in a sense “beyond the level of economic laws and political 
decisions” to become a central component of the “national culture” of empires.11  While the 
twentieth-century era US hegemony has seen numerous attempts to broaden the concept to 
encompass the values of liberal democracy, the historical origins of Occidentalism lie 
fundamentally in the late-nineteenth century era of the New Imperialism.12 In this time of 
                                                
9 As discussed in Chapter 2, Zarakol’s account of the nineteenth-century international order illustrates many of the 
historical conditions (of state-formation, cultural rationalization, and imperialism) which made Western 
dominance a key locus of status hierarchies in modern world politics. Ayşe Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned 
to Live with the West (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 38–56. 
10 An attempt to thematize the strategic dimensions of the relations between culture and imperialism is arguably 
at the heart of Edward W. Said’s seminal postcolonial theory of cultural power. Rather than being only a source 
of “identity,” Said’s account explains how “culture is a sort of theatre where various political and ideological 
causes engage one another. Far from being a placid realm of Apollonian gentility, culture can even be a 
battleground on which causes expose themselves to the light of day and contend with one another.” Edward W. 
Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1994), xiv.  
11 Said, 6, 10, 12. 
12 In a typical formulation of its kind, for example, John Ikenberry connects the contemporary idea of the West to 
the so-called “Pax Democratica” designed by postwar American strategists: “Implicit in this emerging American 
vision was the view that the West itself could serve as the foundation and starting point for a larger postwar order. 
The West was not just a geographical region with fixed borders. Rather it was an idea a — universal organizational 
form that could expand outward driven, driven by the spread of liberal democratic government and principles of 
conduct.” G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), 35, 189. On the ideological legacies of the colonial era within 
such representations of the United States, dating back to the origins of the Cold War, see William Pietz, “The 
‘Post-Colonialism’ of Cold War Discourse,” Social Text, no. 19/20 (1988): 55–75. 
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escalating international rivalries, representations of cultural and political identity came to be 
tied to a series of increasingly essentialist and exclusive ideological schema, centered around 
the categories of race, nation, and civilization. The symbolic systems through which the 
purposes and boundaries of political regimes were defined thus became both more secular in 
their determination of authority sources and more categorical in their designation of “insiders” 
and “outsiders.” A brief examination of the forces which controlled this fixing of identity 
relations will bring the historical specificity of the modern ideology of Western civilization more 
fully into view.13 
 
LOGICS OF ESSENTIALISM IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE 
 
The most well-documented instance of the late-nineteenth century’s growing cultural 
essentialism lies in the proliferation of state-centric and ethnically-exclusive nationalisms. In 
Manu Goswami’s incisive formulation, such emergent ideological systems “converged around 
an invocation of an already existent, internally homogenous, and externally distinctive nation; 
widely shared organic understandings of the relationship between people, history, territory, and 
state; and a profoundly statist orientation that reflected the progressive conjoining of the link 
between nationhood and statehood.”14 The underlying dynamics of this process — the 
homogenization and territorialization of social identities in relation to a bounded locus of 
sociopolitical authority — were no accident. For their generative conditions lay in the 
emergence of the mass forms of sociality and centralized territorial statehood that came into 
being over the course of the industrial era.15  Unlike agrarian societies, where political 
communities tended to be organized around relatively localized social ties, the industrializing 
societies in which modern nationalism flourished were social formations in which the growing 
density and expanded scale of social interactions gave cultural integration a new urgency.16 
Indeed, the forms of local dislocation and economic organization brought by the advent of 
industrial growth tended to foster the kind of mass society figured by nineteenth-century 
discourses of nationhood, while externally, the competitive logic of imperial expansion helped 
establish the competitive international conditions in which national patriotism flourished.17 Far 
from being an isolated domestic process, the proliferation of such nationalist ideological forms 
toward the end of the nineteenth century was rooted in an emergent dynamic between global 
                                                
13 For this transition to distinctively modern, rationalized conceptions of nation, race, ethnicity, and state power, 
see especially Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “The Varieties of the Nation State in Modern History: Liberal, Imperialist, 
Fascist, and Contemporary Notions of Nation and Nationality,” in The Rise and Decline of the Nation-State, ed. 
Michael Mann (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 210–26; Ho-Fung Hung, “Orientalist Knowledge and Social 
Theories: China and the European Conceptions of East-West Differences from 1600 to 1900,” Sociological Theory 
21, no. 3 (2003): 268–74; C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 462–64; 
Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 118–
22. On the close ties between racial and international thought in this era, see also, Musab Younis, “‘United by 
Blood’: Race and Transnationalism During the Belle Époque,” Nations and Nationalism, 2016. 
14 Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (London: University of Chicago Press, 
2004), 262. 
15 See especially, Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the 
Modern Era,” The American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (June 2000): 807–31. 
16 Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, 115. 
17 Perry Anderson, “Internationalism: A Breviary,” New Left Review, II, no. 14 (2002): 11–12. 
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integration and local unevenness, which is finely captured in Goswami’s study of colonial India. 
To generalize from her argument, it may be said that within the evolving “global field” of late-
nineteenth century modernity, forged out of the growing unevenness of capitalist and colonial 
expansion, culturally essentialist ideologies of nationhood came to represent “the embodiment 
of a form of universality grounded in particularity,” a specific mediation of the economic and 
geopolitical pressures that bound societies together within a single system of world politics.18 
 
By analogy with this process of nation-formation, the late-nineteenth century proliferation of 
Western-centric identity categories and political ideologies — during the same fin-de-siècle 
period, roughly 1880-1910, in which Goswami locates the rise of state-centric nationalisms — 
can understood in relation to a quite similar conjunction of historical transformations. Like the 
process of nation-formation, an exclusivist and essentialized conception of “Western 
civilization” offered a range of symbolic and cultural resources — a legitimate foundation for 
international hierarchy, a progressive rationale for external expansionism, and a purposeful 
justification for elite rule — through which to integrate culturally the kinds of social and 
international hierarchy that came into being during the fin-de-siècle era of imperialism. More 
specifically than this, ideologies of the Occident linked domestic political orders to a global 
vision of the forms of societal and cultural multiplicity surrounding them, thereby establishing 
a spatial representation of the world that corresponded to the emergent hierarchies of colonial 
and capitalist expansion. Typically shaped by the kinds of ethnocentrism promoted by 
prevailing forms of Social Darwinism, such depictions of political order had more than an 
analogous connection to the development of modern nationalism. Like the kinds of militaristic 
and state-centered patriotism that shaped the New Imperialism, ideologies of the Occident gave 
the conflict dynamics of the industrial era a symbolic order and meaningfulness they would 
otherwise have lacked.19 This goes to the heart of the cultural logic of the national-imperial 
state, which, like a fixed point in a rapidly contracting world, promised to stabilize relations of 
cultural difference and political community within an institutional power structure capable of 
projecting power on a global scale.20 
 
In both Europe and North America, such processes of cultural development were marked by 
the proliferation ideological discourses stressing the superiority and distinctiveness of a Western 
civilization.21 Indeed, the notion of a “Western world” now arose, for the first time, as a 
designation for the trans-Atlantic sphere of Western European and North American societies 
— world regions brought together through social and economic ties, of trade, emigration, and 
                                                
18 Goswami, Producing India, 17, 41, 67, 279. 
19 See also, Manu Goswami, “Rethinking the Modular Nation Form: Toward a Sociohistorical Conception of 
Nationalism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 44, no. 4 (2002): 786ff. 
20  On the development of Social Darwinism and its relation to geopolitics, see, Paul Crook, Darwinism, War and 
History: The Debate Over the Biology of War from the “Origin of Species” to the First World War (Cambridge University Press, 
1994); Andrew Heffernan, “Fin de Siècle, Fin Du Monde? On the Origins of European Geopolitics, 1890–1920,” 
in Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought, ed. Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson (London: Routledge, 
2000), 27–51; For an overview of this kind of Social Darwinism, see, Christian Geulen, “The Common Grounds 
of Conflict: Racial Visions of World Order 1880–1940,” in Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and 
Movements, 1880s–1930s, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007), 69–96. 
21 This paragraph and the next are based on Osterhammel, Transformation, 87, 494, 912. 
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other forms of cultural exchange, defined by their increasing density and interdependence. Yet 
this dynamic of global interdependency meant something more than a growing integration of 
economies and cultures. Occidentalism, its historical geography centered on the dominant 
centers of military power and industrial capitalism, spoke directly to the intersocietal hierarchies 
and imperial conflicts which defined the emergent global condition. The international 
intensification of great power competition after c. 1880 demonstrated, for many advocates of 
Social Darwinism, a growing struggle among racial groups organized into national states.  This 
was the strategic rationale for the emergent geo-cultural division around which notions of 
Western civilization ultimately revolved. Under these conditions, the industrially-preponderant 
Anglo-Saxon powers occupied a position of world leadership tied to the vocation and 
responsibility of the white race to defend civilized values against the forces of potential 
barbarism. There was thus was typically a hard, geopolitical edge to such ideological visions. 
Anxieties about the “yellow peril” and the expansive “Slavic race” established a range of 
simultaneously cultural and geopolitical concerns that mapped on the basic hierarchies of 
industrial growth and imperial power in a meaningful symbolic form. 
 
At the same time, the pattern of intersocietal connections engendered by imperialism 
established an asymmetrical world culture in which the West figured as both the universal 
standard and archetypal subject of modernity.22 By the end of the nineteenth century, this 
meant that the discursive articulation of the West provided a universal equivalent against which 
other societies and cultures were to be measured. In a way that mirrors the historical clustering 
of nationalist discourse in the final decades of the nineteenth century, imperial elites throughout 
the British and American Empires thus converged on a conception of Occidentalist superiority 
that linked states, societies, and cultures within a single totalizing schema. In this context, the 
identification of the West with the civilized world, and vice versa, reflected the apparent 
opposition between the rival forms of “race patriotism” associated with the conflict between 
the Anglo-Saxon world and its “Slavic,” “Asiatic,” and sometimes “Teutonic,” geopolitical 
rivals.23 Rather than being the product of an isolated academic high culture, such ideologies of 
Western civilization were centrally shaped by the forms of imperial rivalry and geopolitical 
alliance that marked the late-nineteenth transition to a global scope international order. 
 
These forms of competitive coexistence assumed symbolic features which reflected the kinds of 
cultural schema through which many fin-de-siècle elites approached the emergent global 
condition. Among the most central dimensions of these schema were the perceptions of space-
time compression which accompanied the late-nineteenth century revolution in transport and 
                                                
22 See, also, Robbie Shilliam, “Civilization and the Poetics of Slavery,” Thesis Eleven 108, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 
101. 
23 The terminology of “race-types” and “race patriotism”  can be found in Mahan, The Problem of Asia, xix, 67. 
Throughout this work, Mahan employs the concept of race to denote putatively essential ethnic characteristics 
linked to “European” and “Asiatic” civilizations, the latter seen as an largely inferior order of civilization.  For 
Mahan’s advocacy of US-British military and diplomatic alliance on the basis of Anglo-Saxonism, see Alfred 
Thayer Mahan and Charles Beresford, “Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion,” The North American Review 
159, no. 456 (1894): 551–73. On racialized understandings of Anglo-Saxonism within US foreign relations at this 
time see, Paul A. Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and 
United States Empires, 1880-1910,” The Journal of American History 88, no. 4 (2002): 1315–53.  
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communications technology. This brought once-distant social formations into seemingly ever 
increasing contact. Geopolitical analysts like Mahan and Mackinder, who established the first 
formal theories of “world politics,” thus also wrote extensively on the putative characteristics of 
foreign racial and cultural formations.24 Their work exemplified the kind of essentialism which 
linked ideologies of state power to categories of ethnic and racial differentiation. The growing 
dominance of Social Darwinism in the academic field provided these conceptions of world-
political development with a scientific authority that helps explain their widespread social 
appeal.25 These schema were united in stressing the ties between cultural difference, often 
essentialized as a racial or biological determinism, national power, and geopolitical rivalries. 
This was how Theodore Roosevelt, himself a keen advocate of Lamarckian conception of racial 
theory, characterized US relations with Imperial Japan:    
 
The lines of development of these two civilizations, of the Orient and the Occident, have been separate 
and divergent since thousands of years before the Christian era…An effort to mix together, out of hand, 
the peoples representing the culminating points of two such lines of divergent cultural development 
would be fraught with peril; and this, I repeat, because the two are different, and not because either is 
inferior to the other.26 
 
The form of Occidentalism generated by such forms of cross-cultural analysis was thus 
intrinsically power-political and intersocietal. It naturalized a relationship between foreign 
civilizations and international rivalries that transformed the security dilemmas of world politics 
into a meaningful cultural reality.  
 
As the next section of the chapter illustrates, several features of American expansionism gave 
such conceptions of the West an especial significance and appeal. For the political and military 
elites of the rising American Empire, articulations of Western civilization revolved discursively 
around the notion of US expansionism as the fulfilment of “manifest destiny;” the self-
consciously scientific, rationalizing orientation of American state-building; and widely-held 
conceptions of masculine honor, which in turn reflected the progressive ideological linkages 
between an imagined white race and the construction of a national people primed for 
international conflict. These elements of American political culture fueled an especially 
exclusivist conception of Western civilization as a progressive historical mission. They helped 
to define and integrate the US political-military elite as a national ruling group with legitimate 
claims to world power. To establish the generative conditions and historical specificity of this 
ideological formation, it is first necessary to address a pair of more basic theoretical issues. 
These concern (1) the relations between the strategic and symbolic dimensions of power politics, 
and (2) the conjunctural processes which shaped the openness of a historical actors to such an 
exclusivist and imperialist form of Occidentalism. 
                                                
24 The role of perceptions of space-time compression in these construction of “world politics” was discussed in 
Chapter 1. This link between the “closing of the world” and the growth of “racist imperialism” is also given 
prominence by John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 125. 
25 Hung, “Orientalist Knowledge and Social Theories,” 269ff. 
26 Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1914), 306. 
On Roosevelt’s Lamarckian notion of “race science” see especially Thomas G. Dyer, Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea 
of Race (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 37–44. 
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THE INTERFACE OF STRATEGIC AND SYMBOLIC POWER  
 
Despite Max Weber’s insistence on the centrality of legitimate rule/domination (legitime 
Herrschaft) to the exercise of power in modern bureaucratic political hierarchies, conventional 
analyses of power politics tend to elide the construction of political authority relations as a 
relevant moment in the analysis of strategic power-projection.27 Defining state power an 
essentially unmediated expression of force, standard realist approaches presuppose a Weberian 
ideal-type of the modern state whilst bracketing the forms of political domination that Weber 
saw as a defining feature of the modern state order.28 Therefore, an approach that placed the 
interface between the strategic and symbolic components of modern statecraft — the exercise 
and authorization of political force — at its heart would go substantially beyond the theoretical 
framing of structural-realist approaches.29 For it would encompass the construction of political 
authority relations as a central analytic and historical feature of the organization of societies for 
power-political competition.30   
 
This has direct relevance for an analysis of the forms of Occidentalism embraced by American 
political and military elites. For such actors’ descriptions of the civilized West often involved 
fantasies of honor, prestige, and masculinity — positive terms of self-identification and self-
reinforcement. Famously, this paradigm of imperial culture was given expression by Kipling’s 
1899 poem, the “White Man’s Burden.”31 A personal confidant of Theodore Roosevelt, himself 
arguably the United States’ leading advocate of extra-continental expansionism, Kipling’s 
poetic discourse of masculine heroics and the ventures of great powers overseas offered an 
appealing image of imperial statesmanship.32 This was the cultural universe of the American 
Machtstaat: an expansive national-imperial state would project globally the idea of the United 
States as a guardian of “civilization,” the sign and symbol of “the freedom of the West.”33 
                                                
27 For Weber’s definition of legitimate domination, or domination by authority, see Max Weber, Economy and 
Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, vol. 1–2 (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1978), 946, 952–54. This argument about the absence of authority-formation from realist 
definitions of power politics and the state is discussed in more detail in Chapter One, above.  
28  For a related argument about the importance of rule and domination in Weber see, Stefano Guzzini, “Max 
Weber’s Power,” in Max Weber and International Relations, ed. Richard Ned Lebow (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 97–118; also, Guzzini, “Structural Power,” 477. 
29 On some readings, Morgenthau’s classical realism contains a conception of political legitimacy. See, Michael 
C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral 
Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 58, no. 4 (2004): here, 637, 645. However, it would be an 
exaggeration to say that Morgenthau’s brute conception of power politics as the expression of a struggle for survival 
rooted in human nature provided a strong basis for something approach a sociology of legitimation strategies. 
30 An argument along these lines is implicit in Goddard and Nexon’s account of power politics as a process of 
social mobilization. Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel Nexon, “The Dynamics of Global Power Politics: A Framework 
for Analysis,” Journal of Global Security Studies 1, no. 1 (2016): 4–18. 
31 For the masculinist characteristics of Kipling’s Occidentalism, see, Said, Culture and Imperialism, 165. 
32 Using the Digital Library of the Theodore Roosevelt centre, I have identified 21 letters in which Roosevelt 
refers to his positive interactions with Kipling, either in direct correspondence with Kipling himself or in his wider 
milieu. https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library.  
33 Elihu Root, “‘Address at a Dinner of the Lotos Club in Honour of the Secretary of War’, New York, May 9, 
1903,” in Miscellaneous Addresses, ed. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (1903; repr., Port Washington, NY: 
Kennikat Press Inc, 1966), 103.  The image of the United States as a guardian of freedom and civilization was 
also central to Root’s legal defence American expansion in the Caribbean, see Elihu Root, “The Ethics of the 
Panama Question: An Address before the Union League Club of Chicago, February 22, 1904.” (1904), 3–7, British 
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Despite a large literature on the cultural and historical sources of Western identity, much of it 
focused on the impact of colonialism, the specific ties between such conceptions of Western 
civilization and the  sociopolitical formation and strategic practices of imperial states has not 
been subject to much sustained theorization.34 Within IR theory, more particularly, the West 
has tended to figure as a set of identity relations and cultural discourses rather than as a 
sociohistorical product of the specific imperial field of late-nineteenth century power politics.35 
These accounts are characterized by a focus on the representational dynamics, discursive 
strategies, and rhetorical pragmatics associated with the political uses of the West rather than 
the actual geopolitical and intersocietal context which constructed and enabled it.36 Although 
such approaches make the important contribution of linking the production of the West to 
historical practices of cross-cultural comparison — European/Ottoman, Christian/Islamic, 
and so on — they tend to bypass questions relating to the kinds of social power transformations 
and historical conjunctures in which such articulations of identity unfold.37 As a consequence, 
they tend to bracket rather than confront the conditions which make particular symbolic 
systems effective, not just as representational devices, but as internal features of the formation 
and projection of state power itself.  
 
Whatever its validity as a general procedure, this method of analysis lacks purchase on specific 
features of the late-nineteenth century production of Western-civilizational ideologies of 
imperialism. Closely linked to a broader effort to legitimize the strategic exercise of external 
force, the existence of such schema is difficult to understand outside the context of the power 
hierarchies and geopolitical conflicts which confronted the agents of imperial rivalry and 
expansionism. Moreover, the distinctive metageography of Anglophone Occidentalism — 
revolving around an imperial hierarchy comprising a dominant economic and geopolitical core 
(the Anglosphere), a civilizing yet inferior semi-periphery (Russia, Japan, sometimes German) 
and a putatively barbaric mass of colonial subjects — bears an integral relationship the regional 
                                                
Library, Microfilm Collection. For a detailed account of this “legalist-imperialist” discourse pioneered by Root 
see Benjamin Allen Coates, Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 91–106.  
34 Works of cultural history that examine the history of Occidentalism but stop short of analysing its the origins in 
relation to the practices of the imperial state itself include: James G. Carrier, Occidentalism: Images of the West (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); GoGwilt, The Invention of the West; Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: 
The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (London: Penguin Books, 2005); Saree Makdisi, Making England Western: 
Occidentalism, Race, and Imperial Culture (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
35 For an overview of this research agenda see, Gunther Hellmann and Benjamin Herborth, Uses of “the West”: 
Security and the Politics of Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); cf. David Campbell, Writing Security: 
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Iver B. 
Neumann, “Identity and Security,” ed. William Bloom et al., Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 2 (1992): 221–26; Iver 
B. Neumann, “Russia as a Great Power, 1815–2007,” Journal of International Relations and Development 11, no. 2 (June 
1, 2008): 128–51; Johanna Vuorelma, “The Ironic Western Self: Radical and Conservative Irony in the ‘Losing 
Turkey’ Narrative,” Millennium 47, no. 2 (January 1, 2019): 190–209. 
36 For example, Jackson’s account of the use of “rhetorical commonplace” of “Western civilization” by the 
architects of US Cold War national security policy focuses primarily on the (German) intellectual origins of the 
concept, rather than the longer history of imperial power politics and expansionism out of which US discourses of 
Occidentalism emerged. See, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of 
the West (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 76–11. 
37 The seminal work in this regard is Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).  
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pattern of the industrial revolution, and the coercive power hierarchies it forged on a world 
scale. As such, a sociohistorical conception of the production of the West should embed late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century processes of symbolic restructuring within a wider 
conception of the forms of imperial conflict and hierarchy attached to the making of the 
modern international order and world economy. It should ask, as Stuart Hall has posed the 
question of the sources of modern racisms in general, “what are the specific conditions which 
make this form of distinction historically active” — which processes and institutions “give this 
abstract human potentiality its effectivity, as a concrete material force.”38 In this respect, the 
form of power analysis required for an adequate theorization of modern Occidentalism might 
be described as a kind of pivot between two paradigms of international theory  normally held 
at some distance from each other: on the one hand, a “strategic” perspective epitomized by 
Marxian and realist conceptions of power as a hard material and goal-oriented political or 
economic entity; on the other, a “symbolic” conception of power as a discursively or culturally 
grounded relationship of constitutive meanings.  
 
In a general theoretical sense, therefore, it is necessary to reimagine the social substance of 
power politics to encompass the forms of symbolic and cultural domination by which elites seek 
to sustain a position of political rule in socially legitimate terms. This conception of 
international power analysis follows a hypothesis about the nature of political domination 
which both Antonio Gramsci and Pierre Bourdieu placed at the center of sociocultural 
analysis.39 In these terms, the struggle to impose meaning and legitimacy is conceived as a 
constitutive feature of the formation of a dominant group. In Bourdieu’s programmatic terms:   
“no power can be satisfied with existing just as power, that is, as brute force, entirely devoid of 
justification — in a word, arbitrary — and must thus justify its existence, as well as the form it 
takes, or at least ensure that the arbitrary nature of its foundation will be misrecognized and 
thus that it will be recognized as legitimate.”40 Given the self-reinforcing nature of appeals to 
Western civilization, Bourdieu’s emphasis on the reproductive function of symbolic power 
structures —what he has called “sociodicies of privilege” — has an obvious force.41 More 
particularly, to grasp the effective power of such symbolic systems, the discursive expressions 
and ideological textures of strategic action need to be figured in relation to the social processes 
which underpin their collective force. This recalls Gramsci’s argument, elaborated at the end 
of Chapter 2, that our basic categories of social experience are best conceived as historically 
constituted products of embedded human practices with inseparably “subjective” and 
“objective” dimensions.42 The symbolic and material underpinnings of Occidentalism should, 
in these terms, be treated as internally related features of a historical process rather than 
                                                
38 Stuart Hall, “Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance,” in Black British Cultural Studies: A 
Reader, ed. Houston A. Baker, Manthia Diawara, and Ruth H. Lindeborg, Black Literature and Culture (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 52. 
39 Loïc J.D. Wacquant and Pierre Bourdieu, “From Ruling Class to Field of Power: An Interview with Pierre 
Bourdieu on La Noblesse d’État,” Theory, Culture & Society 10, no. 3 (1993): 19. 
40 Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, trans. Lauretta C. Clough (Oxford: Polity, 
1996), 265.  
41 Bourdieu, 265–66.  
42 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 447. 
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ontologically separate kinds of social reality. This requires that the “practices” and 
“expressions” of dominant actors be treated, as Bourdieu describes, as “two translations of the 
same sentence.”43   
 
Towards this end, the generative conditions of Occidentalism can be usefully situated in 
relation to the formation of the national-imperial state as the dominant locus of coercive and 
ideological power of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century industrial era. This 
theorization is intended to: (1) focus attention on the articulation of the West as a simultaneously 
symbolic and strategic power resource; (2) specify historical features of the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century inter-imperial field which shaped the constitution of Occidentalism; (3) 
identify how the formation of the West as a dominant identity category was implicated in the 
wider power politics of the New Imperialism.  
 
CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE NATIONAL-IMPERIAL STATE   
 
While the existence of some notion of civilizational difference can be dated back to the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment,44 to understand the essentialized and hierarchical 
conception of the West that emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century we need to focus 
on the specific conditions of intersocietal conflict and political rule which emerged with the 
formation of the national-imperial state. Like other forms of state, the highly competitive and 
externally expansionist states that proliferated during the modern imperial era had a strong 
symbolic dimension that was linked to the legitimation of coercive practices.  Without access to 
meaningful forms of cultural legitimacy, imperial competition would have appeared arbitrary 
both to its architects in the political, military, and business elite, and to the domestic populations 
who had to shoulder much of its material and financial cost. Given the violent and costly nature 
of the national-imperial state’s typical forms of external power-projection — naval build up 
and extensive maritime force, world-market penetration in the form of gun boat diplomacy and 
informal imperialism, territorial expansion and colonial rule — it is not surprising that political 
legitimacy often took the form of an essentialist logic of cultural difference. For racialized and 
ethno-nationalist depictions of “foreign” entities promised to justify highly coercive strategies 
of global penetration.45 Numerous historical studies illustrate the importance of such 
legitimization strategies to the depiction of war enemies as racial or civilizational “others,” to 
the ideology of the “civilizing mission,” and to the internal lifeworlds of many imperial elites.46 
 
The conditions which shaped the openness of historical actors to such forms of cultural 
essentialism were inseparable from the character of the wider global condition. During the late-
                                                
43 Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), 105. 
44 Bowden, The Empire of Civilization, chapter 2. 
45 This is similar to how Steinmetz’s characterizes the function of the “rule of difference” in the colonial state: 
George Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest 
Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 37; George Steinmetz, “The Octopus and the Hekatonkheire: 
On Many Armed States and Tentacular Empires,” in The Many Hands of the State: Theorizing Political Authority and 
Social Control, ed. Kimberly J. Morgan and Ann Shola Orloff (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 379–80. 
46 USE CITES FROM FN.26  
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nineteenth century, the emergence of an empire-centered world economy and international 
order drove the integration of separate social formations into a global economic and 
geopolitical hierarchy that was characterized by the intensification of uneven and combined 
development on a global scale. This laid the foundation for a universal condition of global 
space-time in which perceptions of differential development became a main feature of cultural 
production.47 The intensification (through capitalist industrialization) and coercive imposition 
(through colonial expansion) of socioeconomic unevenness on a world-scale created a novel 
global hierarchy of social formations that became the medium of power politics. Within an 
integrated yet profoundly unequal international system, there was an increasing pressure to 
impose meaning and legitimacy on hierarchies of wealth and power that were inherently open 
to contestation — from the kinds of competitive late-industrialization programmes pursued by 
states such as Japan, Russia and Germany, as well the struggles for political and social rights 
that emanated, “from below,” in form of anticolonial movements of self-determination.  
 
The consolidation of a global political-economic hierarchy and a colonial international order 
thus provided a new international framework for cultural expression and ideological change. 
Within the conditions of an increasingly “singular modernity,”48 categories of race and 
civilization were essential to the uneven yet universalizing potentialities of the world market 
constituted by industrial capitalism and colonial expansion.49 Anchored in putatively salient 
classifications of cultural difference (phenotypical, biological, craniological etc.), concepts of 
race and civilization manifested the comparative light cast by the instantiation of differential 
development on a world scale. The universalism of modernity and the extreme particularism 
of racism were in this two-sides of the same of historical dynamic. As an organizing conception 
of world-development, ethnocentric standards of civilization offered an attractive philosophy 
of history, which promised to reveal the hidden causes of the wealth of nations by projecting 
socio-historical differences into the domain of an imaginary nature.50  
 
The cultural mediation of unevenness by self-reinforcing ideologies of race and civilization was 
not simply a distorted reflection of structural change, but also had distinct conditions of 
possibility in the sociopolitical character of the national-imperial state. The racial theories of 
the nineteenth century presupposed a cultural universe in which social hierarchies were no 
longer understood in divine terms; where political authority had been formally separated from 
the spheres of religion and aristocratic privilege.51 In this context, the representation of political 
elites as racial superiors or guardians of a privileged civilizational order resonated with a 
broader rationalization of social authority relations. The kind of political hierarchy brought 
                                                
47 For a related argument about the role of unevenness and combination in cultural development, see, Sharae 
Deckard et al., Combined and Uneven Development: Towards a New Theory of World-Literature, Warwick Research 
Collective (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2015), 21–22. 
48  Deckard et al., 8. 
49  Vasant Kaiwar and Sucheta Mazumdar, “Race, Orient, Nation in the Time-Space of Modernity,” in Antinomies 
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Press, 2003), 264. 
50 Étienne Balibar, “Racism and Nationalism,” in Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, ed. Étienne Balibar and 
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51 Osterhammel, Transformation, 858. 
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into being by the idea of an exclusive form of Western identity depended fundamentally on a 
network of discursive opposition — dichotomies of “tradition” and “modernity”, “civilized” 
and “savage”, “effete” and “masculine” races — whose symbolic force was built on rationalistic 
standards of social distinction, even as scientific forms of racism constructed deeply ideological 
fantasies of ethnic and civilizational development. The growing ethnocentrism of imperialism 
thus corresponded to social and institutional changes in the foundations of political rule itself. 
Drawing on the self-consciously rationalist, modernizing cultural schema generated by the 
emergent biological and social sciences, ideologies of the West offered the kind of “sociodicy of 
privilege” demanded by an increasingly secularized system of political hierarchy.  
 
This process of Western identity formation reflected the dynamics of competitive coexistence 
engendered by the wider global condition. Against the pressures of rival imperial systems, 
Anglophone forms of Occidentalism served to locate the power imbalances of the prevailing 
imperial order within a self-reinforcing conception of historical development. In particular, 
they frequently took the form of developmental narratives revolving around the progress of 
“manifest destiny” or the “rise and fall” of rival civilizational systems; they cast the 
preponderance of the British and American Empires as the fulfilment of an inner law of 
historical progress (see below, Section III). In this respect, perceptions of differential 
development played a key role in the international conditions of Occidentalism. They were 
especially manifest in the obsessive focus on degeneration, miscegenation, and ethnic fitness 
which marked racially-inflected ideologies of civilizational imperialism. These discourses spoke 
directly to the problems of national competitiveness created by the intensification of imperial 
rivalry. In this context, ethnically essentialist definitions of East and West provided a way of 
defining the nature of the threat posed by rival civilizational systems, especially when the kind 
of catch-up development practiced by Meiji Japan resulted in such visible forms of geopolitical 
rivalry. By the same logic, the increasingly visible ethnocentrism of American political culture 
was directly articulated into the competitive international relations from which rival projects of 
external expansionism flourished. As Tokutomi Sohō, a prominent advocate of Japanese 
expansionism during the early-twentieth century, commented: “Admiral Mahan says that the 
Japanese must be excluded because they cannot assimilate. It all boils down to this: The only 
sin the Japanese have ever committed is that of being Japanese. If this is the case, we must 
break down the white domination [of the world].”52 In such highly-racialized terms, imperial- 
Japanese assaults on Chinese and Korean peoples as culturally inferior echoed the logic of 
cultural differentiation engendered over the course of the imperial era. Indeed, these Japanese 
attacks on their seemingly backward neighbors were partly motivated by the perception that 
Korea and China, militarily incapable of withstanding the incursions of Western imperialists, 
would weaken the relative standing of Imperial Japan by ceding territorial advantage to the 
European powers.53  
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The development of the West as a modern form of political subjectivity and symbolic power 
was thus inseparable from the broader cultural logic of the national-imperial state. Its 
intersocietal preconditions lay, fundamentally, in the dynamics of intersocietal unevenness and 
competitive coexistence which define the global condition as whole: how the competitive logic, 
coercive enactment, and cultural mediation of differential development fostered an increasingly 
ethnocentric definition of legitimate domination. In the next section of the chapter, I address 
the specific political and intellectual contexts which shaped the gradual Westernization of 
American political culture during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  
 
 
III. Cultures of the Machtstaat    
 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the linked processes of military expansion and 
colonial empire building served to generate a series of new challenges at the interface of grand 
strategy and political culture. By the time of the United States’ entry into WWI in 1917, the 
territorial possessions acquired during westward expansion were joined by a large colonial 
empire: Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the 
Panama Canal Zone, and a set of other temporarily occupied lands in Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, and Haiti.54 This break with the continental isolationism proscribed by the Monroe 
Doctrine (1823), effectively confirmed with the defeat of the Spanish Empire in the Pacific in 
1898, set in motion a new struggle to rationalize new forms of political domination. Though 
similar in part to the original experiences of settler colonialism and westward expansion, the 
process of extra-continental expansion brought the American Empire into a confrontation with 
rival global empires and unfamiliar cultural formations.  
 
Like other colonial states, government officials, imperial strategists, military commanders, and 
members of the wider intelligentsia had the task of legitimizing costly and violent policy 
decisions, as well as rationalizing the hierarchical division between colony and metropole.55 
Echoing the demands of many naval reformers,56 in his first message to Congress as president 
in 1901, Roosevelt announced that “the American people must either build and maintain an 
adequate Navy or else make up their minds definitely to accept a secondary position in 
international affairs, not merely in political but commercial matters.”57 This pursuit of world 
power in the form of extensive overseas influence required the costly forms of naval build-up 
and military expansion analyzed in the previous chapter. By examining the ideological and 
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strategic contexts in which American elites sought to rationalize and justify this project, it will 
be possible to better explain how the symbol of the West came to enter the categories of 
authority which held US expansionists together as a governing class.     
 
RACE WARS AND IMPERIAL RIVALRIES 
 
From the 1890s onward, prominent military and political elites conceived the “westward” 
expansion of the American Empire in extra-continental terms, a vision of external power-
projection that linked geopolitical goals to the cause of civilizational regeneration and the 
“Anglo-Saxon race.” As an “imperial republic of limitless resource” the US would seek “to 
occupy a high place among nations.”58  This expansive project linked the US political order to 
future world power rivalries of the “Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico” in conjunction 
with the wider scramble for colonial possions now emerging in East Asia. Writing in 1896, 
Admiral Henry C. Taylor Taylor set out a paradigmatic vision of westward expansion that 
defined warfare as a kind of civilizing and masculinizing force: the antithesis of “race 
decadence.”59  
 
Not only do nations that practice too long the arts of peace in forgetfulness of war become enfeebled 
and the natural prey of neighbors grown strong through combat, but they grow corrupt internally as 
well. Although peaceful trade may thrive, the arts and industries flourish, and every precaution against 
corruption, national and municipal, be observed, decay begins, the fervor of religion cools, skepticism 
advances, immoralities appear unreproved, and race decadence hastens its steps, even though it may be 
that no strong neighbor is at hand to quicken the downfall. We may recognize that war is cruel and 
brutal, disposing men to a state of savagery, but let us confess that the corrupt ease, the luxurious 
immorality of life, toward which a total absence of war always leads nations, has in it something more 
degrading for the human race than simple savagery.60 
 
This was a prediction of imperial grandeur and model of civilized militarism that many of 
Taylor’s contemporaries found appealing. For Admiral Stephen B. Luce, war was itself the 
great civilizer of human history which had enabled the spread of “Hellenism” and 
“Christianity.” The “star of empire” lay in the West, “for westward set the side of conquest” 
and civilizational progress. “The imposing wave of barbaric triumph swept from Asia across 
the Aegean Sea, only to be turned back by united Greece armed in the sacred cause of liberty. 
The battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea were only so many stepping-stones towards an 
ascendency of Hellenic civilization, the influence of which on human affairs can never die. 
Without war Greece would have lived on aestheticism and wasted its life in idle dreams.”61 
These imagined linkages between empire, war, and civilization were inspired, in part, by the 
writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who more than any other reformist intellectual of the 
Progressive Era sought to place the figure of enemy “Slavic” and “Asiatic” civilizations at the 
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heart of American grand strategy.62 Defense against such rival civilizational orders demanded 
a navy strong both in material and in the morale, “which comes from thorough mental and 
physical training, to make sure that no one shall venture to molest or make us afraid; so long as 
we follow the way we believe to be right.”63 These militaristic conceptions of civilizational 
expansion and defense were key elements in the processes of symbolic restructuring that bound 
the process of national-imperial state to the ideological discourse of Occidentalism. 
 
As a self-reinforcing discourse of imperial legitimacy, the doctrine of “manifest destiny” 
provided one source of the moral certitudes demanded by military elites. Indeed, there was a 
kind of symbolic fit between destinarian ideology and the cultural requirements of naval and 
other military commanders, whose frequent references to the civilizational cause served to 
confer meaning and prestige on the worldly activities of military conflict. The language of 
“duty” and “manhood” so frequently attached to idea of Western civilization invested military 
force with a higher spiritual meaningfulness.64 Given this, it is not surprising to find that the 
late-nineteenth century ideologues of Western civilization found a natural audience in the class 
of military reformers and empire-builders who presided over the first era of extra-continental 
expansionism.65 Josiah Strong, a protestant clergyman and influential theorist of Anglo-Saxon 
predominance, noted Mahan’s assistance in preparing his work on American expansion. This 
text set out a vision of imperial destiny which hoped to set the United States on a similar course 
to that of the British Empire, “‘the Titan of the West.’”66  
 
Likewise Brooks Adams, an influential theorist of US economic supremacy and civilizational 
development, joined Mahan in the White House of Theodore Roosevelt. As a lecturer at the 
US Naval War College, Adams helped generate the culture of civilizational imperialism 
embraced by military elites like Taylor, Luce and Chadwick. The world-hierarchy of 
civilizations outlined in Adams’ social evolutionary conception of world history offered an 
appealing explanation for the colonial empire now being amassed by US military commanders. 
In one striking formulation, Taylor, a devotee of Adams’ work, described the American capture 
of the Philippines as the outgrowth of providential necessity. “It is not a question whether we 
like the Philippines, or need Porto Rico. They were given into our hands without consulting 
our wishes or our judgment. The guarding and governing of these distant territories; their 
improvement and the happiness of their people, is our work whether we like it or not.”67 The 
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United States and its navy had established a “new empire in the West,” as Adams conceived it, 
the guardian of an Occidental civilization expanding across the Pacific.68  
 
At the center of this culture of imperial prestige were ideas of race. For Roosevelt, who presided 
over an unprecedented expansion of the US navy, military power was closely related to 
“fitness” of a “race.”69 In particular, the distinction between “the conquering race in America” 
— “the European whites” — and the variety of “coolies”, “black”, “Indians”, or other 
“degenerate” and “mixed races” identified during the process of territorial expansion provided 
a quasi-scientific language of imperial policy revolving around the distinction between 
“civilization” and “barbarism”70 Defined in these terms, the project of extra-continental 
expansion was a kind of white nativism. Imperialism offered the opportunity for imaginary 
status exaltations in the form of a “struggle for race supremacy.” In the United States, these 
vision of race struggle were catalyzed by the war of 1898 against Spain: “Unity of language is 
coming by education, unity of race by assimilation, or as regards the Spanish blood at least, by 
extermination, a process which, by the way, nature has not yet discarded.” 71 Underlying this 
peculiar vision of geopolitical rivalry were the sentiments of Social Darwinism, Spenserian 
evolutionary theory, and Lamarckism.72 While the tenets of Social Darwinism did not generate 
a uniform embrace of the homo Pugnax,73 the expansion of scientific racism offered confirmation 
of the experience of ethnic genocide and slavery which preceded the era of extra-continental 
expansion.74  
 
The discourse of “race war” and civilizational imperialism embraced by US military and 
geopolitical strategists was commonplace among the political class and intelligentsia of 
contemporary European empires.75 In Germany, for example, Kaiser Wilhelm encouraged an 
alliance with Russia to defend European Christianity and the “White Race” against “Asian 
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barbarism”, presenting the Japanese Empire as a “Yellow Peril” in the lineage of Genghis Khan 
and Tamerlane.76 In the context of the New Imperialism, the rationalization of political 
authority relations opened a novel space of secular racial fantasy. Influenced by new scientific 
forms of racial ideology, elites throughout the imperial field converged on racialized 
understandings of civilizational development and hierarchy.77 US geopolitical strategists 
moved within the same categorial universe as British theorists of Anglo-Saxonism, the German 
völkisch thinkers who advocated the unification of “blood and soil” within Eastern Europe, or 
the French colonialists pursuing la mission civilisatrice across an emergent Greater France.  
 
Ideologies of racial struggle offered seemingly compelling explanations for the conflict 
dynamics of a hierarchical and regionally differentiated global political-economic space, in 
which colonial wars were imagined as wars to spread “civilization” to enemies who lacked 
“civilized” rules of engagement, and the emergence of new industrial powers in Russia and 
Japan threatened to undermine Western dominance.78 In the eyes of many geopolitical and 
military strategists, these power struggles manifested a logic of cultural or biological destiny 
described in the emerging natural sciences: an historic clash between “Slavic” and “Germanic” 
races in Central Europe; the war against the rising “yellow peril” of Japanese imperialism and 
associated waves of “Asiatic” immigration; the struggle for “white” nations to maintain their 
“place in the sun.”79 In 1897, the centrality of racial characteristics to the project of westward 
expansion was given particularly striking formulation by Lieutenant James Harbord, two years 
before he served in the Spanish-American war: 
 
Our traditional policy of non-interference and our position with the ocean between us and any 
European foe, may easily lull our nation into a neglect of war like preparation, and the decadence of 
our military spirit. Material prosperity; devotion to the arts and industries of a long peace; conquests in 
the world of commerce and invention have perhaps blinded our eyes to our duty and destiny on the 
Western Continent. Surely the United States is fated to some day overshadow and dominate all other 
states on this hemisphere. The instinct of conquest is in the Anglo-Saxon blood and long before our 
population is as dense and the ownership of arable land, as difficult of attainment as in the best part of 
Europe today, our people will clamor for the extension of our borders, and the Latin-American with his 
indolence and improvidence will give way before the energetic and resourceful Anglo-Saxon American. 
The Monroe Doctrine has become a tenet of the National Creed, and at no distant day the possession 
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of Cuba and the adjacent isles will be essential to the protection of our interests in the canal across the 
Isthmus. 80 
 
Subsequently, the Philippine-American War (1899-1902) that began with the defeat of the 
Spanish Empire became an important crucible for the emerging cultural formation of the 
American Machtstaat. Against the perceived uncivilized guerrilla tactics of Emilio Aguinaldo’s 
nationalist forces — a military tactic likely inspired by the example of the Boer’s struggle against 
the British Empire —  US commentators and military officials castigated the Philippines as a 
barbaric alien culture.81 Newspaper editors and politicians called for policies of violent 
suppression and assimilation, while doubting the latter could ever be realized in practice.82 For 
Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, the war in Manilla was a time spent among “savages” defined by 
their hatred of Christianity and mysterious racial animosities.83  
 
Major General Frederick Funston, a key promoter of the policy of territorial conquest after the 
Spanish-American War, described the Filipino forces as “an illiterate, semi-savage people, who 
are waging war, not against tyranny, but against Anglo-Saxon order and decency.”84  Thus the 
US government’s decision to annex the Philippines came to depend on the claim that, rather 
than a national people capable of self-government, the Philippine Republic comprised a 
“multiplicity of tribes” exhibiting “multifarious phases of civilization — ranging all the way 
from the highest to the lowest”, some more “highly civilized”, some “little better than 
barbarians.”85 As US Secretary of War Elihu Root summarized: the anti-imperialist insurgency 
in the Philippines as a disorder of “rival chieftains,” and the Aguinaldo government a “pure 
and simple military domination of the Tagalogs” whose suppression was welcomed with “open 
arms” by “the tribes of northern Luzon.”86 
 
In a letter to Fuston, Roosevelt praised the General’s campaign as the greatest in American 
history since Lieutenant William B. Cushing sank the Confederate Albemarle in 1864.87 
Defined as a war against racially and culturally alien savages, the Philippine-American War 
became a generative source of cultural development, where the self-exaltation of a white, 
masculine military elite found a series of imaginary reference points. Through their relations 
with the press military commanders fostered this process in self-reinforcing ways. Admiral 
George Dewey, in particular, encouraged a gratifying cult of personal admiration after leading 
                                                
80 Lieutenant J. G. Harbord, “The Necessity of a Well Organized and Trained Infantry at the Outbreak of War, 
and the Best Means to Be Adopted by the United States for Obtaining Such a Force,” Journal of the Military Service 
Institution of the United States XXI, no. LXXXVIII (1897): 2. 
81 Kramer, “Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire.” 
82 Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 78. 
83 Bradley A. Fiske, War Time in Manila (Boston, MA: Richard G. Badger, 1913), 64–66, 255. 
84 Cited in: Andrew John Byers, “The Sexual Economy of War: Regulation of Sexuality and the U.S. Army, 1898-
1940” (Duke University, 2012), 126. 
85 These quotations taken from the US government’s “The Native Peoples of the Philippines” and “Preliminary 
Report: Capacity for Self-Government” Philippine Commission (1900).  For a related argument about the formation 
of the category of the tribe in the British Empire, see Nivi Manchanda, “The Imperial Sociology of the ‘Tribe’ in 
Afghanistan,” Millennium 46, no. 2 (January 1, 2018): 165–89. 
86 Root, “The United States and the Philippines in 1900,” 46.  
87 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Fuston, March 30, 1901 in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt, vol. 3 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 35–36. 
 167 
the Asiatic Squadron to victory over the Spanish Navy in May of 1898.88 In a series of poems 
dedicated to the Admiral in the national press, the nationalist subtext and cultural efficacy of 
military expansionism were translated into a broad populist vision.  
 
Dewey! Dewey! Dewey! 
Is the hero of the Day 
And the Maine has been remembered in the good old-fashioned way— 
The way of Hull and Perry, 
Decatur and the rest 
When old Europe felt the clutches of 
Of the Eagle of the West; 
That’s how Dewey smashed the Spaniard 
In Manila’s crooked bay, 
And the Maine has been remembered 
In the good old-fashioned way.89 
 
 
CATEGORIES OF DOMINATION 
 
It would be misleading to view the cultural formation of American imperialism as a kind of 
opium of the masses: a convenient ideological mystification of more “real” social and 
geopolitical interests. More fundamentally, the symbols of Western civilization and the Anglo-
Saxon race penetrated the categories of authority and prestige that bound US military and 
political elites together as a governing class. For many military commanders, the symbolic ties 
between the “civilized man” and the “instincts of the Anglo-Saxon race” offered appealing 
rationalizations of leadership and imperial power-projection, casting the US navy and armed 
forces as an embodiment of “manhood and self-respect” unmatched by rival powers.90 The 
figure of ethnic civilizational enemies — often the Russian “Slav,” the “Asiatic” Japanese or 
the Qing Empire — offered an integrating symbolic resource which helped unify US military 
and political actors as a civilized white elite.91 Theodore Roosevelt was a particularly keen 
advocate of this self-image, forming the “Rough Riders” regiment in 1898, the first volunteer 
force to enter the Spanish-American War.92  
 
The archetypally Orientalist theme of Western masculinity versus Eastern effeminacy provided 
an appealing status exaltation which went hand in hand with the military’s commitment to 
fostering a disciplined culture of martial masculinity. In a 1903 address at a Banquet in Ohio 
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in Honor of the late President McKinley, for example, Elihu Root praised the “character of 
the American Army” by drawing a contrast between it and China:  
 
Poor China today stands helpless, seeing, piece by piece, parts of her territory peopled by her citizens 
cut out from her living body and subjected to the domination of foreign power — China, which has 
carried the arts of civilization to a high, if not the highest point, — China whose peoples are industrious, 
and frugal and enterprising, among the best workmen, the most honest merchants, the most successful 
business men of the earth — China, whose people cultivate the domestic virtues, the affections, a high 
type of morality, and fear not death at all — is helpless today because centuries ago she forgot that the 
part of manhood required that men shall be able to defend their rights.93  
 
The sense of masculine superiority that Root articulated in a high rhetorical style, could also 
be couched in a cruder language of violence. As one US soldier deployed to the Philippines 
concluded, “the people of the United States want us to kill all the men, fuck all the women, and 
raise up a new race in these Islands.”94 
 
By now, we can begin to see the problems emerging at the interface of strategy and culture that 
gave the idea of the West its widely-felt symbolic appeal. Two points in particular require 
emphasis. First, the symbol of the West had a widely-felt salience among state-builders 
concerned with rationalizing American statecraft and the military along scientific lines. As the 
architects of a military culture based on self-consciously rational administrative and technical 
procedures, the application of the “principles of science” to strategy had an exalted status.95 
For this reason, ethnographic and biological depictions of foreign cultures were high-status 
intellectual activities, especially because the characterizing traits of “savage” or “Oriental” 
races were deemed pertinent explanations for success and failure in armed conflict.96 This 
meant the pseudoscientific definitions of white racial characteristics and Western or Anglo-
Saxon civilizational traits could provide a legitimate intellectual context in which to define the 
Occident. This dynamic can be in the persistently close relationship between invocations of the 
West and arguments about racial degeneration, miscegenation, and evolution — scientific ideas 
that were pervasive by the 1890s. Fantasies of a civilized Occident possessed a semblance of 
rationality that corresponded to the forms of scientific cultural capital valorized by American 
imperialists. Such fantasies provide a reminder that the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
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centuries were saturated with forms of “colonial knowledge.”97 While it looked back to a mythic 
past of Greco-Roman antiquity, the idealization of the West was constructively related to a 
scientific conception of cultural modernity.  
 
Second, the idea of the West as an exalted, racially defined political community appealed to 
the virtues of masculinity and martial honor to which military and political elites aspired. The 
distinction between Oriental effeminacy and European masculinity described by Said have an 
obvious relevance here. But codes of civilized masculinity were also actively constructed by 
American military training policies, which placed a high priority on the ability to “handle men” 
in a correct fashion.98 By offering exalted sentiments of honour, prestige, and rationality the 
discourse of the West appealed to some of the most basic forms of sociality practiced by 
American military commanders and statesmen. Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden” was in this 
sense paradigmatic of the emergent ideal of the West. In this context, the bizarre scene of 
Theodore Roosevelt’s weekly wrestling matches against a pair of Japanese wrestlers had an 
effective social logic, performing the codes of masculinity and race out of which the ideal 
Western civilization would grow.99  
 
Before considering this geopolitical component of Occidentalism in more detail, the social and 
historical specificities of the West’s American formation need to be underlined. The evolving 
Westernization of political and cultural forms was a specifically modern historical process of 
sociocultural transformation determined, in part, by the authority of the evolving natural and 
social sciences. At a deeper sociological level, this transition points to changes in the underlying 
bases of political rule itself. Influenced by ideologies of scientific racism and prevailing forms of 
colonial anthropology, the idea of Western civilization embraced by US empire-builders and 
military elites was a quasi-rational conceptualization of authority and legitimate domination.  
While the first ideologies of American manifest destiny took Christianity as their primary 
reference, by the 1880s and 1890s these notions of providence had been partly overtaken by 
the kind of evolutionary theory and economic determinism propagated by thinkers like Adams, 
Mahan and Strong.100 Though Christianity remained an archaic presence in these accounts of 
American expansion, it was not the primary rationalization for empire.  
 
Seen in this historical context, the emergence of the West at the centre of elite political cultures 
points to a wider shift in social foundations of political hierarchy — away from the systems of 
religious and aristocratic authority which sustained earlier state-forms, and toward a quasi-
                                                
97 See, Martin J. Bayly, Taming the Imperial Imagination: Colonial Knowledge, International Relations, and the Anglo-Afghan 
Encounter, 1808-1878 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), here, 49. 
98 According to one article on naval organization, “the Department of Organization and Discipline should include: 
(I) efficiency; (2) general physical fitness as determined by the Medical Board each yea; (3) fencing; (4) boxing; (5) 
shooting; (6) swimming; (7) general gymnastics. These marks to be combined in proportion to their importance to 
the physical officer and to his effectiveness, to have appreciable value in his multiple, as they will have in his 
ultimate value to the service.” Lieutenant J.S. McKean, “How Best to Meet ‘The Navy’s Greatest Need,’” 
Proceedings of the US Naval Institute 28, no. 4 (1902): 859. 
99 Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, March 5, 1904, in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt, vol. 4 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 744. 
100 For this argument see, Anders, Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, 67ff. 
 170 
rational order of legitimate domination grounded in the prestige of secular cultural symbols like 
race or Western civilization. Unlike, for example, the transcontinental aristocracy of earlier 
Europe, the ruling elites of the American and other late-nineteenth century empires were 
rooted in increasingly depersonalized political spheres where political legitimacy was structured 
in terms of rational-bureaucratic, democratic, and (especially in the colonies) racial  and 
civilizational authority relations. “The nobility” was converted into a secular class of state 
officialdom. The conflicts dynamics of political modernity could thus appear in a new worldly 
form: empire versus empire, nation-state versus nation-state, the elite versus the people. Under 
these socio-historical conditions, the mythology of the West provided a series of social and 
symbolic resources which promised to rationalize and justify prevailing forms of political 
hierarchy and domination in quasi-rational terms. As Pierre Bourdieu encapsulates this 
historical trajectory: “Culture succeeds religion, with quite similar functions. It gives the 
dominant the sense of being justified in their domination, not only on the level of a national 
society but also on that of global society, so that the dominant or colonizers, for example, can 
see themselves in all good conscience as bearers of the universal.”101  
 
 
 
IV. The Production of the West in the Anglosphere  
 
The competitive coexistence of rival imperial systems was the major feature of the international 
context in which ideologies of Western superiority flourished. What accounts for the sudden 
breakthrough to essentialist forms of Occidentalism in this period, then, is in part the rapid 
escalation of imperial competition that appeared after c.1880.102 The historical conjuncture of 
the New Imperialism spawned a novel reflexivity about the contested unevenness of the 
prevailing international order, which led both British and American elites to seek more 
sustained forms of imperial identity. By examining some of ideological patterns which emerged 
at the intersection between the Anglosphere and its geopolitical exterior, this section of the 
chapter locates the key intersocietal transformations which made identification with the West 
a core principle of visions within both British and American imperial cultures.  With the advent 
of intense military-industrial rivalry, an imperial order exposed to power struggles from its 
constitutive outside was forced to confront the possibility of its own degeneration or decline. It 
was this cultural mediation between the concerns of Anglophone imperialists and the 
increasingly global space of international power politics that defined the evolving paradigm of 
the West. 
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OCCIDENTALISM IN AN IMPERIAL FIELD 
 
Acting as a key ideologue of civilizational imperialism, Mahan advocated strengthening the 
bond between the US and Great Britain on the basis of the common racial and cultural bonds 
of white “Anglo-Saxons.”103 The common anti-type of this policy was the Russian and 
Japanese, Slavic and Asiatic, empires that threatened British and American global interests. 
For Mahan, the expansionary “outlook” of the rising US and European empires was 
inaugurating a “new era of colonization”104 which would generate conflicts between “the East 
and the West” as the latter drew the former out of its enduring inertia.105 In a time when a 
“new and significant restlessness” was emerging “among the Oriental peoples, aroused at 
length, by intimate contact with Europeans, from the torpor and changelessness of ages,” 
Anglo-Saxon solidarity was required to defend American and British interests against new 
centers of civilizational expansion.106 Indeed, the spreading of European technologies and 
military techniques to formerly “savage” and “barbarian” lands threatened to create rival 
civilizational bloc in East Asia, where the potential for racial solidarity among Chinese and 
Japanese societies figured as a worrying sign of global disorder.107  
 
For Roosevelt, the rise of Imperial Japan as a potential great power represented a seismic 
geopolitical shift with worrying consequences for the future of Western civilization. 108 As a 
result, the specter of Japanese power that emerged after 1905 activated anxieties about the 
American Empire’s national efficiency, linking these to concerns about domestic consequences 
of East Asian immigration.109 While geopolitical assessments of this kind appear irrational, they 
resonated with the intersocietal character of the world economy, where the rapid transfer of 
economic and technical infrastructures was enabling formerly “backward” societies to engage 
in modern forms of global power-projection. Categorized through preexisting cultural schemas 
of racial differentiation, the sight of catch-up development in societies like China and Japan 
exposed US political culture to an internationally-generated dynamic of combined 
development.  
 
The anxious reactions to the Russo-Japanese War in Europe and North America, discussed in 
the previous chapter, are testament to this structured dynamic between uneven and combined 
development and symbolic competition. The volatile pattern of inter-imperial rivalries 
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generated by such efforts at national self-strengthening, became a key factor in the emergent 
political geography of American world power calculations. In this context, it is revealing to see 
that Mahan became the first author to coin the notion of the “Middle East” as a distinct object 
of Western strategic policy. In an influential 1902 article for the London National Review, he 
outlined the evolving economic and geopolitical power struggles of the Persian Gulf — “one 
terminus of a prospective interoceanic railroad” and hence an increasingly vital center of global 
commerce — to advocate the cause of British naval expansion. 110 Essentially an argument for 
the preparation of British naval forces against Russian expansion into the Gulf of Aden, 
Mahan’s strategic analysis revolved around the seminal Occidentalist theme of Oriental 
backwardness, which showed that neither an uncivilized “Middle East” nor a largely 
undeveloped Russian Empire could be trusted to safeguard the needs of commerce in the 
region. The kind of protectionist economic policy practiced in the Russian Empire threatened 
to establish a system of closed tariff walls that would prevent the rational expansion of markets 
across North Africa and Western Asia.  “Applied to what is now Persia, this would be a direct 
injury to India, which, even under the present backward conditions of the inhabitants and of 
communications, carries on a large part of the Persian trade, as might naturally be expected 
from the nearness of the two countries.”111 As a result, “the rules of intercourse with Oriental 
nations” demanded that a European power, Germany in this instance, would be allowed to 
“have her voice heard in many local matters, affecting the interests of her subjects who are thus 
engaged in developing the country.”112  
 
What is striking here is the close rhetorical and conceptual relation between the idea of a 
racially defined Western alliance and the actual conflict dynamics of imperial geopolitics. The 
central problematic of Mahan’s argument about the strategic importance of a Western alliance 
in the Middle East is the emerging threat of international competition between Japan, 
Germany, Russia and the Anglo-Saxon powers.113 The ideological frame for this analysis was 
provided, in part, by the notions of racial development and social evolution which inspired late-
nineteenth visions of manifest destiny.114 According to this body of ideas “the English race in 
America” was the guardian of historical progress against barbarism.115 The Anglo-Saxon West 
and its colonial extension was the bearer of modernity in lands peopled by “irredeemable 
savages hardly above the level of brutes.”116 As Theodore Roosevelt opined in his 1898 work, 
The Winning of the West, the process of westward expansion had been an instance of “white 
conquest:” a “white flood” of Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, and other European “races” eventually 
overcoming the lesser-civilization of the Native-American “red men.”117 When the project of 
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territorial expansion turned outward to the world overseas, racialized understandings of 
Western civilization thus provided a framework of rationalization and legitimacy. Despite its 
atrocities, now the object of much public criticism in the United States, Roosevelt argued that 
victory in the Philippine-American War (1899-1902) had been “the triumph of civilization over 
the forces which stand for the black chaos of barbarism.”118 A central driver of the expansion 
of the West in the modern epoch, “the warfare that has extended the boundaries of civilization 
at the expense of barbarism and savagery has been for centuries one of the most potent factors 
in the progress of humanity.”119 This idealization of a civilized yet expansionary white race lent 
shape and meaning to the dynamics of imperial power politics,  providing a quasi-rational basis 
for the Western dominance in international affairs.  
 
 
WESTERNIZING THE ANGLOSPHERE  
 
The ideological production of the West in these arenas of empire and colonialism was by no 
means an internal process of American cultural development. In fact, as the preoccupation 
with whiteness and Anglo-Saxonism suggests, the combination between US and British 
imperial formations was an integral part of the late-nineteenth century development of 
Occidentalism. Indeed, the proposals for British imperial expansion and Anglo-American 
union outlined by Mahan were immediately taken up by the English theorist of empire and 
expert on “Eastern” affairs, Valentine Ignatius Chirol.120 In The Times — a publication which 
praised Mahan as a modern Copernicus — Chirol produced some twenty articles between 
1902 and 1903, expanding on the evolving idea of the West in relation to the demands of British 
Middle-Eastern policy.  
 
For Chirol, the core regional issue was Russian expansion. With the influence of Japan and 
Germany rising, the British Empire would have to strengthen its control of key frontier 
positions to defend India. This would be dangerous. In Persia, an “Oriental government” was 
being undermined by exposure to new forms of “luxury” produced by the “Western world.”121 
On the “Khaibar Pass” tribal peoples clung “fiercely to their own savage ideals of freedom.”122 
Throughout Asia, “great European powers” were becoming “great Asiatic powers,” as Oriental 
empires fell into decline, and British interests underwent an unprecedented challenge. “There 
lie in these events and in this renewed contact or collision, as the case may be, between the East 
and the West, omens of the greatest significance to this country.”123 
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Against this background of cultural and strategic challenges, Chirol’s interpretation of the 
Russian Empire crystallized around the conventional distinction between Oriental despotism 
and Western rationalism. Drawing on the Orientalist conception of Russia as a Slavic 
despotism, Chirol produced a characterization of the Russian-Western divide which 
epitomized the changing coordinates of imperial ideology. Though it be might on the rise, 
Imperial Russia was a backward historical entity — its progressive elements originated in the 
spirit of the West. Though the expanding power of the Tsarist state in Asia might appear to be 
a challenge to British claims to supremacy, this perception masked a deeper truth — the West 
would naturally triumph over the retrograde empires of the East. This self-reinforcing 
conclusion epitomized the advent of an exclusive and essentialized understanding of the West 
within the Anglophone world. Such depictions of foreign geo-cultures brought the realities of 
intersocietal unevenness engendered by the emergent global condition into the internal 
symbolic order of imperial cultures. One such depiction is worth reproducing at length: 
 
The most superficial observer who passes into Russia from Germany or Austria can hardly help feeling 
that, whatever the geographical text-books may say, when he has crossed the Russian frontier he is no 
longer quite in Europe, though he is not yet actually in Asia…The comparison may seem paradoxical, 
but to anyone who has visited Northern China, Moscow itself, with its semi-sacred Kremlin, in which 
the barbaric splendour of palaces and churches, stiff with gold and precious stones, has been 
accumulated for centuries to glorify the mystical association of spiritual and temporal sovereignty in the 
person of the Tsar, carries more than a suggestion of Peking and its Forbidden City, sacred to the Son 
of Heaven. Even to the outward eye the view from the tower of Ivan Veliky over the thousands of 
cupolas and domes, gleaming with gold plates or painted in vivid taints of green and blue, and the green 
or brown roofs of the Russian houses, intermingled with trees and gardens, which mark the panorama 
of Moscow, has no little in common with the spectacle which the yellow-tiled places and temples of 
Imperial Peking and the green or grey roofs of the Manchu and Chinese cities in a similar setting of 
foliage present from the walls of the Celestial capital...In the history of nations there has been perhaps 
no more curious phenomenon than the experiment upon which the rulers of modern Russia have 
embarked in their endeavour to blend with the fatalism and mysticism and passivity of the East the spirit 
of enterprise and individualism peculiar to the West. Whatever may be the case in other parts of Russia, 
in Baku, at any rate, the West has triumphed. Though long strings of camels may still be seen journeying 
towards its markets laden with the produce of Asia, though the Tartar city is still girdled with its ancient 
walls, though Persians and Turkomans in their quant Oriental dresses still crowd its bazaars, Baku is 
essentially a European city in which the spirit of the West prevails.124 
 
This Occidentalist conception of imperial supremacy was widely held among the generation of 
empire-builders who presided over the decades of colonial expansion before WWI.125 For Lord 
Balfour, Conservative Party prime minister between 1902 and 1905 and later an advocate of 
imperial federation for the white dominions, the British Empire stood firm as the exemplar of 
a Western civilization rooted in “Graeco-Roman culture.”126 “Progress is with the West,” 
Balfour claimed, “with communities of the European type.” Like Chirol’s visions of a 
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retrograde Russian Despotism, Balfour’s analysis was couched in a combination of racial and 
cultural determinism that helped solidify the paradigm of the West as quasi-rational designation 
of international hierarchies. “I at least,” Balfour stressed in a Cambridge lecture of 1908, “find 
it quite impossible to believe that any attempt to provide widely different races with an identical 
environment, political, religious, educational, what you will can ever make them alike. They 
have been different and unequal since history began; different and unequal they are destined 
to remain through future periods of comparable duration.”127 As such, the Anglo-Saxon 
powers were obligated to expand and maintain a civilizational order rooted in the imagined 
longue durée of Western development: 
 
Where are the untried races competent to construct out of the ruined fragments of our civilisation a 
new and better habitation for the spirit of man? They do not exist: and if the world is again to be buried 
under a barbaric flood, it will not be like that which fertilised, though it first destroyed, the western 
provinces of Rome, but like that which in Asia submerged for ever the last traces of Hellenic culture.128  
 
For other advocates of a closer Anglo-American union, this vision of racial and civilizational 
superiority provided a common rationale for strategic policy decision. Lord Milner, governor 
of South Africa between 1897 and 1901, thus placed the superiority of Western “civilization” 
and the “white race” at the center of his argument for stronger form of “imperial federation” 
linking the British Empire to its self-governing colonies.129 As these examples illustrate, the 
articulation of the West as a form of political subjectivity was inseparable from strategic and 
political questions provoked by the late-nineteenth transferal of power politics to a new global 
plane. Western civilization, as a logic of imperial prestige and societal differentiation, provided 
a range of symbolic resources through which the prevailing conflict dynamics of the period 
could be rendered into a meaningful social reality.  
 
In this connection, the convergence of British and American elites on a shared conception of 
Western civilization points to the mediating influence of trans-imperial interactions on the 
development of Occidentalism within the broader Anglosphere. The social contexts in which 
Western identity-formation flourished were characterized by an intersocietal setting in which 
political elites were not just oriented to a domestic social order, but also the ruing groups of 
other major empires. Theodore Roosevelt, in particular, was a personal intimate of the social 
class and cultural milieu which spawned British Westernizers like Balfour and Chirol. In May 
1910, he travelled to London following a period on safari in Sudan and a brief tour of 
Khartoum and Cairo. Recent events in Egypt, where the pro-British Prime Minister Boutros 
Ghali had been assassinated by nationalists in February, demonstrated that “fanatical” 
Egyptians were unready for self-government. Conceiving the British Empire as the guardian of 
civilization, Roosevelt impressed upon the British their duty to rule. “You are in Egypt for 
several purposes, and among them one of the greatest is the benefit of the Egyptian people. 
You saved them from ruin by coming in, and at the present moment, if they are not governed 
from outside, they will sink into a welter of chaos. Some nation must govern Egypt. I hope and 
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believe that you will decide that it is your duty to be that nation.”130 In June, Balfour endorsed 
Roosevelt’s demand for the maintenance of British rule by saying “we have gone on in Egypt 
doing more and more good work, year after year” and “that good work depends on our staying 
there.” The British “cannot abandon Egypt without disgrace to ourselves.”131  
 
Such intra-imperial interactions point to the constitutively global character of the West as a 
geo-cultural formation. By 1900, a discourse of whiteness and Occidentalism formed a global 
culture of Anglo-American solidarity which promised to stabilize culturally the systematic and 
contested unevenness of a global-imperial field — what Roosevelt stylized as the “seething 
modern turmoil” confronting “all our Western civilization.”132 Conscious of their location 
within a rivalrous and rapidly transforming hierarchy of empires, British and American elites 
projected a vision of Western civilization which resonated with the intersocietal character of 
global power politics, its underlying imperial hierarchies, and historical patterns of capitalist 
unevenness. Despite its outer self-confidence, such ideologies of civilizational imperialism were 
thus inherently prone to the destabilizing impact of rising powers from outside the imagined 
Western core. Reflecting the anxieties of many Anglo-Saxonists at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the British diplomat and close friend of Theodore Roosevelt, Arthur Cecil Spring Rice 
worried that the “future of the world” may now be “in the hands of Slavs.” Predicting that the 
Russian Empire would soon impose a new order of civilization upon Asia, Spring Rice feared 
the advent of an imperial power on par with that of Rome. These were “the powers of 
darkness” that might engender a future decline of the West.133 In the final section of the 
chapter, I conclude the argument by considering how the fin-de-siècle ideology of Western 
civilization evolved in the context of the early-twentieth rise of American world power. 
 
V. Occidentalism as a Power-Political Form   
 
The self-image of the West as the guardian and epicenter of modern civilization was 
intrinsically prone to deployments in power politics. In the build-up to WWI, the notions of 
civilized freedom associated with a trans-Atlantic Western world entered directly into the 
growing antagonism between the American and German empires. As Elihu Root described in 
1909, “German absolutism” had emerged as a major threat to the existence of democratic 
society as such.134 Now the autocratic character of the Wilhelmine state became a central 
marker of the differences between the Western core and its geopolitical adversaries. 
Prussianized Germany, in contrast to the Anglosphere, was depicted as inherently prone to 
militarism and thus a more natural ally of Russia and Japan, the major autocratic powers of 
the era. Often invoking racialized conceptions of an essential German character, the opposition 
between Western democracy and Prussian autocracy developed a key theme of American 
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political culture in the lead-up to 1917.135 According to Robert Lansing, US Secretary of State 
under Wilson, the successful alliance of these states “would mean the overthrow of democracy 
in the world, the suppression of individual liberty” and “the setting up of evil ambitions” based 
on the power of brute force.”136 Forged in the age of empire, the fin-de-siècle paradigm of the 
West, thus entered directly into the conceptions of international order and geopolitical rivalry 
that developed with ascendancy of American power in the twentieth century. An instructive 
instance of these continuities is to be found in the life of George Frost Kennan, whose portrayals 
of the Soviet Union became a central influence on American Cold War grand strategy. His 
example serves as an opt coda for the argument developed in the pages above.  
 
In 1929, Kennan travelled to the University of Berlin to attend the Seminar für Orientalische 
Sprachen, a centre of colonial studies founded by Bismarck in 1887 to educate “diplomats 
destined for service in the Orient.”137 The two-year training programme was a lasting influence 
on Kennan and shaped his understanding of the Soviet Union as a degenerate state rooted in 
pre-Enlightenment “Eastern” cultural tradition.138 From his tutors, mainly “highly cultured 
Russian émigrés” who had supported the counterrevolutionary White Movement,139 he 
learned a romanticized history of Romanov Tsarism, which confirmed his interpretation of the 
Bolsheviks — “spiteful Jewish parasites in Moscow” — as the negation of “Western European 
civilization.”140 In this perspective, the end-result of the revolution was a return to the non-
Western path of Oriental Despotism: “Again we have the capital back in Moscow, and 
Petersburg is sinking back into the swamps out of which it was erected ... We have again an 
oriental holding court in the barbaric splendor of the Moscow Kremlin. Again we have the 
same Byzantine qualities in Russian politics, the same intolerance, the same dark cruelty, the 
same religious dogmatism in word and form, the same servility, the same lack of official dignity, 
the same all-out quality of all of official life. Finally we have the same fear and distrust of the 
outside world.”141 Kennan’s romantic fascination with the East and his aversion to the Russian 
Revolution were acutely-felt commitments, shaped by professional training and social milieu. 
In the late-nineteenth century his father’s cousin had earned national distinction as a travel 
writer and explorer in Siberia, where he documented the daily lives of “the savage” in Northern 
Asia.142 A staunch opponent of the revolution, Kennan’s ancestor advised Wilson to pursue the 
Allied offensive against the Red Army in 1918. Decades later, Kennan wrote that he was “in 
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some strange way destined to carry forward as best I could the work of my distinguished and 
respected namesake.”143   
 
With the onset of the Cold War, the characterization of American power-projection as the 
defender and embodiment of the West became entrenched within US national security 
discourse. As the details of Kennan’s life and education suggest, this development was not an 
isolated reaction to the advent of Bolshevik Communism. Declaring themselves the guardians 
of Western Civilization, the highest authorities of US government have drawn directly upon 
cultural archetypes generated in the context of European imperial expansion, where the 
idealization of the West as an exclusive political entity was first established as a rationalization 
for domination.144 For Kissinger, the divisions between East and West perceived by Kennan 
meant that only within Euro-American societies could a “Newtonian” commitment to 
“empirical reality” be regarded as the foundation of political action, a cultural privilege which 
the USSR had only partially attained, the rest of the world not at all.145  
 
What the mythology of Western civilization presents as an organic cultural exceptionalism —
putatively rooted in the Graeco-Roman inheritance of Christian Europe — arose in reality 
within the concrete historical setting of the modern colonial era. By the turn from the 
nineteenth to the twentieth century, this process of cultural production had crystallized into an 
increasingly rationalistic discourse of civilizational hierarchy and international geopolitical 
division, often conceptualized in terms of race. Now, an “official racism in Western culture” 
promised to rationalize and justify the prevailing lines of global conflict in terms that 
contemporaries found scientifically and politically compelling.146 Thus in the aftermath of 
WWI, as Britain and the United States blocked Japan’s proposal to include racial equality in 
the articles of the League of Nations, the Supreme Council of the League constituted by Wilson 
announced that the Western powers would remain the guardians of the civilized world. The 
former “Ottoman Middle East” would be governed by the “advanced nations” as a “sacred 
trust of Civilization” until “backward” societies unready for self-government were “able to 
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”147 Against this 
background, the expansion of the mandate system, originally proposed by Britain and its “white 
dominions,” strengthened the system of colonial rule.148 This convergence between a 
geopolitical structure of power and a culture of racial supremacy is typical of the paradigm of 
the West which emerged from the late-nineteenth century. 
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The strange pattern of cultural rationalization and ideological fantasy that lies behind modern 
conceptions of the West draws attention to the deeper social sources of global power politics. 
Shaped by the forms of cross-cultural comparison and intersocietal interaction brought into 
being by the global condition of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century modernity, 
Anglophone Occidentalism reflected the conflictual constitution of a deeply contested 
international hierarchy, where the proliferation of quasi-rational authority norms was 
emerging in tandem with the destabilizing dynamic of catch-up development and imperial 
competition. Symbolic competition for the recognition of civilized status developed in tandem 
with the geopolitical and economic power struggles triggered by the tensions between the 
Anglo-American core and the catch-up empires outside it.   
 
By examining some of the key intersocietal, geopolitical, and sociocultural transformations 
which made the West into a core principle of imperial vision and division, the present chapter 
has illustrated the centrality of symbolic conflict and legitimization strategies to the 
development of interstate power politics. In so doing, it has also described the interplay between 
the struggle for political order and the pursuit of external influence as a key dimension of the 
New Imperialism. Rather than conceiving power politics and political authority as two separate 
features of the modern international order, the argument presented in this chapter has tried to 
integrate the logics of domination and logics of competition that have accompanied the 
development of the modern states-system historically. This interrelationship, between political 
order and international competition, is one of the key dynamics which a historical sociology of 
power politics makes visible.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
  THE NEW WORLD AND ITS TRAJECTORIES  
 
 
 
 
I. Summary of the Argument  
 
The new imperialism marked a profound transformation in the nature of international 
relations. The overarching argument of this thesis has been that the global scale geopolitical 
rivalries which defined the 1870-1914 imperial era emerged from a unique conjuncture of 
international change: the formation of a distinct global condition defined by the uneven 
historical geography of industrial capitalism, its imbrication with the power hierarchies of an 
empire-centered international order, and the proliferation of consciously modernist ideologies 
of imperial prestige. In this context, the forging of an expansionary national-imperial state came 
to be viewed as a necessary strategic mediation between the universalizing dynamic of a 
capitalist world economy and the unevenness of its local formations. Linking societies together 
within a contested yet interdependent global condition, the uneven and combined development 
of this imperially organized world economy forged the intersocietal conflicts from which the 
New Imperialism flourished. The attempt to secure world power in the form of an expansive 
imperial domain, in the United States as elsewhere, was thus a historically specific response to 
the international-historical unevenness of capitalist and colonial expansion. This was the 
emergence of global power politics.  
 
In the five preceding chapters, this argument was elaborated in the following way. First, Chapter 
1 established the historical specificity and central importance of the age of empire to the 
modern origins of global power politics. Chapter 2 then examined the analytical problems and 
substantive oversights that prevent prominent IR theories from grasping the transformations in 
international power relations wrought by the global condition of nineteenth-century modernity. 
Against this background, an alternative approach, global historical sociology, was employed to 
reformulate IR-theoretic conceptions of power politics in sociohistorical terms. Chapter 3 
extended this theoretical perspective to conceptualize the novel pathways of international 
power-projection associated with the development of the New Imperialism. The constitutive 
elements of inter-imperial power politics — the uneven and combined development of global 
capitalism; the competitive modernization drives of industrial societies; the symbolic 
restructuring of imperial states as organic national entities with progressive, civilization-
building goals — were thus conceptualized as an intrinsically modern constellation of 
intersocietal structures. Chapter 4 showed how this conjuncture of international change shaped 
the world power ambitions of the American Empire through its competitive interactions with 
Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan. Finally, Chapter 5 continued this investigation of 
American expansion by examining how the ideology of Western civilization emerged within 
Anglophone imperial culture and conditioned the international rivalries of the fin-de-siècle.  
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This conclusion moves the argument of the thesis forward by considering how a historical 
sociology of global power politics can inform the analysis of the emergence of US hegemony in 
the early-twentieth century (Section I), the putative “return of geopolitics” in the twenty-first 
century (Section II), and the research interests of contemporary international theory today 
(Section III).  
 
 
II. Lineages of the American Century  
 
World power, for the US political and military elites who presided over the global rise of the 
American Empire, signified the capacity of the American state to control the external spaces of 
a regionally differentiated global economy from its national-imperial core. With the United 
States’ entry into World War One in 1917, these ambitions became increasingly centered on 
the core zones of European states-system, where the German decision for unrestricted 
submarine warfare and the deep financial ties between New York and London led the 
American state to ally with the Entente. This alliance of the dominant industrial states of the 
era ensured the defeat of the Axis and prepared the ground for American hegemony after it. 
This was a war, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed, in which America enjoyed “the infinite privilege 
of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.”1 If the world power advocacy of previous decades 
had prepared the US political-military establishment for an extensive conflict with rival 
empires, the program of naval expansion and military activism launched by the Wilson 
administration, which troops sent to Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and 
Nicaragua before 1917, made the prospective globalism of Luce, Mahan, and Roosevelt’s 
generation the dominant mode of American statecraft.  
 
World War One thus provided the opportunity for the most central of American world power 
ambitions to be expressed on a global scale. The descent of the European states-system into a 
catastrophic era of total warfare made the imposition of economic discipline over rival empires 
— the long-term strategic rationale of the Open Door policy — into a realizable objective. In 
the characteristically zealous style of earlier conceptions of “manifest destiny”, Wilson 
announced this project as a war of democratic society against the principle of autocracy itself: 
“Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the 
freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of 
autocratic governments backed by organized force, which is controlled wholly by their will, not 
by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances.”2 Given 
the increasingly hostile conception of German expansionism promoted by American world 
power advocates in the 1910s — when “Prussianism” came to represent the antithesis of 
“Anglo-Saxon” liberties — such exalted descriptions of US war aims are not surprising, echoing 
                                                
1 From a speech of 1919, cited in Perry Anderson, “Imperium,” New Left Review, II, no. 83 (October 2013): 10. 
2 Woodrow Wilson, “At War with Germany: Address to Congress, April 2, 1917,” in War Addresses of Woodrow 
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as they do a preexisting tendency to identify American power with the cause of “Western 
civilization” as such.3  
 
Much as war against Spain in 1898 served to confirm the providential vision of “manifest 
destiny,” victory over Germany figured as a symbol of American exceptionalism, confirming 
the virtues of democratic society against the pitfalls of authoritarianism. The deeply racialized 
character of an earlier civilizational imperialism did not thereby disappear — civilization for 
Wilson was largely the preserve of the white world. But the twentieth-century reality of warfare 
against autocratic states gave the democratic identity of American statehood a particular 
strategic fitness. In the long-run, this ideological variation on the existing theme of world power 
shaped the ideological framing of the subsequent Cold War, a struggle which Dean Acheson, 
architect of US anti-Soviet policy, defined as a contest between the “free world” of “Graeco-
Judaic-Christian” civilization and the USSR’s despotic “police state.”4 The civilizational self-
conception of American power thus outlived the United States’ preference for colonialism 
proper. Anticipating this messianic conception of American hegemony, Wilson cast US entry 
into World War One as a necessary response to the “sufferings and indignities inflicted by the 
military masters of Germany against the peace and security of mankind.”5 As the controlling 
power of the postwar order, the United States would play the “leading part in the maintenance 
of civilization.”6 
 
A closer inspection of the geopolitical rationales which informed American grand strategy 
reveals some of the deeper continuities of American world power ambitions. In his 1921 work, 
The New World, Isaiah Bowman, Wilson’s chief advisor on geopolitical affairs at the Paris 
Conference, described the overarching logic of US grand strategy post-1917.7 In marked 
contrast to the received opposition between power politics and liberal internationalism, 
Bowman described the “new order” of postwar international relations as a “competitive world” 
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riven with interminable “national and racial ambitions.”8 While the United States was 
fundamentally a “democracy” inclined to commercial forms of international organization, its 
external outlooks had to be formulated in a world made up of “other powers”, where 
“Bolshevism” threatened a “backward step toward the barbarism of earlier times,” and the 
reality of national rivalries demanded an assertive global policy.9 Yet it was also true that “the 
world has now been parceled out nearly to the limit of vacant ‘political space,’” making further 
attempts at colonial expansion “not worth the price” of military and diplomatic conflict.10 As a 
result, the task of the Paris Conference was to curb the ability of rival empires to use the Old 
World strategy of territorial imperialism to raise barriers to American economic expansion. In 
the updated, 1928 edition of The New World, Bowman clarified the underlying presuppositions 
of this project. In a world where there was “no reality to a policy of isolation” for any significant 
state, the Unites States should seek to establish a world economy open to American economic 
expansion by converting the European powers to a US-led system of “commercial equality.”11 
This was a global policy based on the principle that “territorial expansion” had been 
“succeeded by economic expansion.”12 The fusion of economic and geopolitical priorities 
under the sign of the Open Door thus carried American grand strategy from the era of the New 
Imperialism to the new world order of postwar reconstruction. In order to align the European 
states-system with the economic and security priorities of the United States, American 
strategists sought to enforce a free-trade order backed by the demilitarization of rival powers 
under the authority of the League of Nations. The result was not a depoliticized form of global 
governance, but an attempt to realize long-standing world power ambitions in a more sustained 
form. 
  
The underlying logic of much US world power strategizing since c.1890, this thesis has argued, 
was to stress the control of global markets as a route to wider forms of international control. 
This overarching conception was in continuity with the so-called “New Diplomacy” of the 
Wilsonian administration that led the United States into World War One. Where German 
expansionism before 1914 had been predicated on a territorial model of imperialism as 
conquest, the model of American Empire carried over from the nineteenth century was the 
more informal-economic mode of global penetration associated with the Monroe Doctrine and 
Open Door.13 Expressing sympathy with the “German people,” the war aims Wilson declared 
in 1917 made the “partnership of democratic nations” against “autocracy” the bulwark of this 
grand strategy, which aimed at securing the freedom of European economies from the rising 
threat of autarchy.14 Outlined in the famous “Fourteen Points,” this liberal-democratic system 
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would entail the regulation rather than prohibition of European colonialism under the postwar 
Mandate system. Still, the “Wilsonian moment” of national self-determination which followed 
was decisive for the involution of the Axis empires of Imperial Germany, Austro-Hungary, and 
Ottoman Turkey after 1919.15 American liberal internationalism was in this sense inseparable 
from the United States’ longstanding interest in curbing the influence of its major imperial 
rivals.  
 
The long-term object of this strategy was the demilitarization of rival states. With the 
Washington Naval Conference of 1921, the Harding administration thus set out to define the 
world’s legitimate distribution of battleship power in a ratio of 10:10:6:3:3. At the apex of this 
hierarchy stood the British and American Empires, the dominant industrial powers of the 
international system since the late-nineteenth century. Immediately below them was Japan, 
granted third place as a major power in the Pacific. As if to confirm the subordination of 
continental Europe, France and Italy were allowed only a much smaller distribution of naval 
force, confining their spheres of operation to the coastlines of the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean. Germany and the USSR were not even counted in the new equilibrium.16 
While it set the stage for the long-term decline of territorial imperialism, the deeply power-
political nature of this agenda — framed as it was by the hegemonic objectives of American 
grand strategy — proved deeply contradictory over the course of the interwar period. Rather 
than depoliticizing the world economy, American efforts to combine postwar reconstruction 
with the subordination of rival empires perpetuated the dynamic of economic crises and 
geopolitical rivalry seen in the era of the New Imperialism.  
 
These long-running contradictions can be seen in the basic patterns of geopolitical and financial 
coercion that made up the post-World War One international order. Thus, for the victorious 
imperial powers, the mandate system provided a means of territorial settlement that maintained 
the prevailing colonial status quo. As Lloyd George noted, Britain “retuned home” from the 
Paris peace negotiations “with a pocket full of sovereigns in the shape of the German colonies, 
Mesopotamia, etc.” in return for the agreements on war debts desired by Wilson. For the 
United States in particular, the mandates promised to transform the Open Door into a 
mechanism for easing the commercial rivalries associated with great power antagonisms.17 Yet 
the basic parameters of imperial expansionism were left intact. By dispossessing Germany of its 
colonial possessions, the British Empire rose to its greatest territorial extent in the immediate 
aftermath of World War One, while the French and Japanese empires also expanded during 
the interwar conjuncture. Germany’s subordinate position within the hierarchy of world 
empires — a major cause of World War One — was thus entrenched and intensified. In a 
world where empire remained a standard mode of political organization and prestige, this 
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experience helped promote the resurgence of geopolitical expansionism under the Third 
Reich.18 Although the United States was increasingly reluctant to engage in formal imperialism 
after World War One, its pre-eminent position within a global economic hierarchy that dated 
back to late-nineteenth century made American capitalism perhaps a central target of this 
backlash.19 Rather than coming to an end with the outbreak of World War One, the imperial 
rivalries of the modern international order were thus perpetuated by the forms of intersocietal 
conflict and global economic hierarchy which emerged from an earlier conjuncture of 
unevenness.  
 
At the same time, the combination of geopolitical and financial goals that made up US grand 
strategy after 1919 worked to uphold the same Anglo-American-centric economic order which 
had propelled German expansionism since the late-nineteenth century. With its emergence as 
the world’s leading creditor power during World War One, the American state acquired a 
unique form of structural power linked to its ability to determine the rate and size of war-debt 
repayments. In the 1920s, American foreign policy-makers and financiers used these powers to 
reconfigure the military and economic policies of both France and Germany, with profoundly 
destabilizing consequences for the emerging European order. By using the Dawes Plan and the 
issue of war debts to promote French disarmament after 1924, US policy served to undermine 
the Treaty of Versailles as an effective diplomatic instrument. Although it temporarily halted 
the arms races of the pre-World War One era, this policy agenda effectively made the Versailles 
System unenforceable. As a result, the United States’ wider efforts to demilitarize great power 
relations after World War One created an unstable power vacuum rather than a coherent 
liberal international order. Together with their refusal to either significantly restructure 
European war debts or back the Versailles System as a League member, American 
commitments to a power-political foreign economic policy undermined the process of post-war 
stabilization. By utilizing its financial position as a creditor power to uphold an Anglo-centric 
hierarchy of global capitalism, American grand strategy fueled the creation of a deeply 
contested international order subject to rival strategies of great power expansion. In the 
aftermath of the 1929 Great Depression, the resurgence of radically revisionist, pro-nationalist 
foreign policy agendas in both Germany and Italy showed that the post-World War One 
international order remained subject to dynamics of imperial rivalry associated with the 
breakdown of the Pax Britannica in the 1880s. These historical parallels illustrate the continuities 
of global power politics beyond the fin-de-siècle age of empire.20    
 
For the United States, world power — military, economic, ideological — had been 
accomplished. Yet the resulting geopolitical system failed to stabilize the core states of Western 
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civilization in the ways imagined by the most zealous supporters of American expansionism. 
Nor did it establish the kind of liberal internationalism that is often associated with the postwar 
Wilsonianism. Rather, the protracted transition to American hegemony in the post-World War 
One era was structured by the deeply uneven political economy and inter-imperial world order 
that emerged from the nineteenth century.  Although there might be an understandable desire 
to deny him any theoretical insight, Carl Schmitt captured the fundamentals of this American-
centered world system with striking accuracy.21 Like the pessimistic forecasts of American 
preponderance that marked Imperial Germany before World War One, Schmitt’s postwar 
writings cast the United States as a global imperium based on the exercise of long-range forms 
of economic and financial control. This was an unprecedented system of global power-
projection, based on the disarticulation of territorial sovereignty from any effective form of 
political or economic independence, and legitimized by the identification of opponents as 
illiberal war criminals. Even as it sought to depoliticize prevailing economic and diplomatic 
norms, the extreme instability of this system — an American-dominated informal empire which 
defanged the European powers while seeking to confine the German state to a subordinated 
international status — was obvious.22 The fascist imperialism of Nazi Germany was an extreme 
example of the forms of backlash such a system could engender.23 
 
Trotsky too emphasized the transformative impact of American capitalism on the European 
states-system. “The staggering material preponderance of the United States,” he highlighted, 
“automatically excludes the possibility of economic upswing and regeneration for capitalist 
Europe. If in the past it was European capitalism that revolutionized the backward sections of 
the world, then today it is American capitalism that revolutionizes over-mature Europe.” This 
crisis of European hegemony foretold the coming struggle between the United States and the 
Soviet Union as the most general expression of the geopolitical rivalries fostered by the 
condition of historical backwardness.24 This account of the contested expansion of American 
hegemony in the early to mid-twentieth century support the wider claim about the power-
political dynamics of the modern global condition outlined in the thesis. While a full analysis of 
this process lies outside the scope of this work, the pattern of American economic expansion, 
inter-imperial rivalries, and aggressive nationalism seen during the 1930s and 1940s, is 
testament to the long-term historical continuities of global power politics. Indeed, it highlights 
three specific implications of the analysis presented in this thesis.  
 
The first of these concerns the character of the world power goals underlying American grand 
strategy. Bowman’s early-twentieth century articulation of a post-territorial world order, a 
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commercially oriented interstate system grounded in the political-economic integration of 
distinct societies and regions, translated the geostrategic concerns of earlier world power 
discourses into a seemingly liberalized conception of globalization. Yet the supremely power-
political character of this outlook captures, in a condensed form, the long-run echoes of 
nineteenth century imperialism: the close historical and ideological ties between a political 
economy of global capitalism, a Social Darwinian geopolitics, and the formation of a 
perceptibly compressed world-political arena. Wilsonian internationalism shared with earlier 
ideologies of world power a fixation on the competitive expansion of a global economic 
hierarchy centered on national-imperial states; it presupposed the deeply uneven social 
structure of an international order and world market dominated by the Anglo-American 
Empires. The attempt to secure an economically liberalized international system together with 
the demilitarization of rival empires in the context of this overarching international hierarchy 
brought into being a historically distinct form of global hegemony which departed from earlier 
forms of imperialism as conquest. What held together these distinct strategic and ideological 
concerns beyond their common intellectual lineages were their roots within the conjuncture of 
uneven development generated by the empire-centered political economy of nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century global capitalism.  
 
Second, the post-World War One realization of American world power ambitions draws 
attention to the centrality of intersocietal unevenness as a constitutive element of the modern 
international order. The phenomenon of unevenness, as Trotsky argued, is essential to the 
process of historical change as such.25 Yet as the preceding chapters have illustrated, the 
historical conjuncture of the New Imperialism was shaped by features that not only made the 
fact of uneven development especially intense, but also gave the ensuing experience of 
intersocietal difference a political and symbolic resonance that transcended the purely-material 
unevenness of industrial capitalism’s historical geography. During much of the pre-1914 era, 
the particular relationship between the national-imperial state and the development of 
standard-of-civilization world hierarchy made the regional unevenness of the industrial 
economy into an object of symbolic power struggles. Inter-imperial rivalries over the possession 
of colonies and the distribution of global markets  resonated with the widely-felt status norms 
of an imperially-organized international order that sanctioned external expansionism as 
legitimate method of civilization-building and national development. As a lived experience, 
uneven development was a doubly political and cultural condition. It shaped the proliferation 
of expansionist imperial projects as a strategic mediation of the concerns about historical 
backwardness fostered by the intensification of societal unevenness on a global scale. This 
distinctive patterning of socio-symbolic conflicts outlasted the high imperialism of late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Its afterlives were felt in the popular appeal of utopian 
visions of political-economic autonomy which animated many insurgent regimes of the post-
1929 Great Depression Era, when the perceived imperatives of catch-up development became 
a major theme of both fascist and socialist opposition to American capitalism. A sociohistorical 
conception of uneven and combined development as a medium of both strategic and symbolic 
                                                
25 Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, trans. Max Eastman (1932; repr., London: Penguin, 2017), 5. 
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power struggles therefore draws attention to the long-term intersocietal tensions that 
underpinned some of the major ideologies of twentieth century power politics.  
 
Finally, by foregrounding the deeper historical-intersocietal foundations of these geopolitical 
rivalries, the kind of global historical sociology advanced in this thesis helps to detach the idea 
of power politics from its conventional status as a realist theoretical concept. This reveals, 
fundamentally, the “thick” international social relations which underpin modern interstate 
politics, despite their concealment by realism’s “thin” understanding of power politics as an 
unmediated reflection of military-strategic drives. The struggle to mediate and control the 
geopolitical pressures generated by an American-centric world economy and international 
order cannot be grasped without locating modern states within the wider global condition of 
intersocietal unevenness surrounding them. Power politics, in this respect, should be seen as a 
deeply social process whose modalities of international conflict and competition — such as 
territorial conquest, informal empire, colonialism, hegemony, liberal internationalism and so 
on — have to be historicized in relation to the types of social formation which shape the 
interactive multiplicity of modern polities at a global level. This final observation can be 
expanded by revisiting the debates about the apparent resurgence of great power politics today.  
 
 
III. The Return of Geopolitics?  
 
The present historical conjuncture is marked by the complex entwinement between the 
unevenness of economic globalization and the proliferation of nation-centered strategies of 
great power competition and political mobilization. Contrary to a widespread belief, the 
removal of restraints on the expansion of capitalist democracy that followed the collapse of the 
USSR has failed to generate the pacific international environment envisioned by the most 
enthusiastic theorists of a post-political age.26 Quite the converse. Echoing older, late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century, conceptions of geopolitics and Realpolitik,27 
civilizational rivalry and ethnic nationalism,28 the contemporary world scene is imbued with 
visions of international rivalry associated with the historical condition of global power politics. 
In the current historical moment, such international fractures are centered on the legitimacy 
of the so-called liberal international order propagated by the American state after the Second 
                                                
26 For representative statements of the post-Cold War globalization zeitgeist, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of 
History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999); David Held and Anthony G. McGrew, Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global 
Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge: Polity, 
2001). For a critical overview of this discourse, see especially Justin Rosenberg, “Globalization Theory: A Post 
Mortem,” International Politics 42, no. 1 (2005): 2–74; Perry Anderson, “Arms and Rights,” New Left Review, II, no. 
31 (February 2005): 5–40; also, Timothy Brennan, “Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism,” New Left Review, no. 
7 (2001): 78. 
27 Stefano Guzzini, The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014) chapters 1-2. For a related discussion of the resurgence of far-right geopolitical 
ideology see Jean-François Drolet and Michael C. Williams, “Radical Conservatism and Global Order: 
International Theory and the New Right,” International Theory 10, no. 3 (2018): 285–313. 
28 Rogers Brubaker, “Why Populism?,” Theory and Society 46, no. 5 (2017): 357–85; Rogers Brubaker, “Between 
Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective,” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 40, no. 8 (June 21, 2017): 1191–1226. 
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World War. Subject to mounting pressure, the patterning of diplomatic, economic, and cultural 
norms underlying this international order has been distorted by a range of interlocking crises. 
Foremost among these is the escalating competition between Washington and Beijing, with its 
destructive global economic implications, and spotlighting of America’s own declining 
economic fortunes. The combination of this bilateral crisis in the US-China relationship with 
the apparent revanchism of Russian foreign policy and the ongoing resurgence of national 
populism in core capitalist states signals the crisis of liberal internationalism as a hegemonic 
mode of international governance.   
 
Yet in a striking reversal of its conventional strategic outlooks, the epicenter of this crisis of 
liberal internationalism is in many ways the United States itself. A combination of domestic 
populism and declining economic fortunes threatens to transform the American state into a 
revisionist power bent on upturning the forms of liberal internationalism that once 
underpinned its global hegemony. According to the Trump administration’s first National 
Security Strategy statement in 2017, the policy of expanding the “liberal economic trading 
system” overseas has been a failure, undermined by the competitive strategies of economic 
advancement pursued by rival powers, and converted into a barrier to American prosperity by 
the Chinese state’s ability to exploit Western liberalism in order to catalyze its own industrial 
take-off.29 As a consequence, “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of 
world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.”30 Heralding the end of the democratic 
peace era, American strategic planners now envisage a world of “simultaneous threats” where 
“contests over influence are timeless” and “geopolitics is the interplay of these contests over the 
globe.”31  
 
Viewed in a wider historical perspective, this apparent revitalization of great power 
competition, commonly heralded as a diminishing feature of late-twentieth century world 
politics, does more than undermine the depoliticized narratives of permanent liberalism that 
hailed the collapse of the Soviet Union. By illustrating the conflictual constitution of the modern 
international order, the present conjuncture also raises foundational questions about the 
structural and historical forces which make power politics an ongoing feature of the 
international order, even in the context of extensive global interdependence. Against the 
expectations of the cosmopolitan political discourse which adorned earlier conceptions of 
globalization,32 it now seems clear that any adequate conception of “the global” must reckon 
with its constituting forms of international conflict and domination. This insight is perhaps the 
central theoretical conclusion of a growing literature on the political construction of 
globalization as a distinctly power-laden project of twentieth-century capitalist states and elites. 
To this growing interest in the politics and ideologies of modern globalism, this thesis adds a 
broader historical sociology of the violent tensions implicated in the very origins of modernity’s 
                                                
29 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: US State Department, 2017), 17, 25. 
30 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 45. 
31 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 26. 
32 See, Brennan, “Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism” here 78.   
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encompassing global condition.33 
Of particular importance, in this connection, are the deep internal relations between the 
production of global economic space and the nationalization of modern societies.34 From this 
angle, the structured dynamic between the deeply uneven process of global economic 
integration and the pursuit of national autonomy suggests that conflicts such as that between 
China and the United States are basic to the intersocietal constitution of the modern 
international order. The recrudescence of a seemingly backward-looking ideology of 
civilizational geopolitics in a society like the United States attests to the fact that even 
“advanced” societies are embedded within global fields of intersocietal interaction, where the 
the dynamic of uneven and combined development  — powerfully illustrated by the temporal 
synchronicity between the process of industrial take-off in China and the transition to a 
financialized neoliberal accumulation model in the United States — tends to upturn established 
political orders.35 From a global-historical-sociological perspective, what is striking about the 
unfolding crisis of American authority is its intersocietal foundations in the external effects of a 
Chinese-led catch-up revolution, which promises to transform the structures of international 
hierarchy established during the nineteenth century age of empire.36 The appropriate lens for 
these transitions is not the hypostatized balance of power associated with many IR conceptions 
of international history, but a much deeper conception of the historical power struggles 
triggered by deeply uneven and coercively maintained pattern of capitalist modernity.   
 
This is not to suggest a deterministic conception of international change, where power politics 
is governed by repetitive cycles of hegemonic decline and their attendant great power wars.37 
For an international order made up of such closely interdependent, if politically differentiated 
and historically uneven, capitalist states is unlikely to produce the kind of zero-sum military 
competition which such formulations typically envisage. The dynamics of any US-China power 
shift will likely operate through multiple axes of competition. Quite unlike the highly-
militarized dynamics of European imperialism within and against which an American-led 
international order emerged, US hegemony itself has operated through a broad-spectrum 
                                                
33 For historical accounts of the ideological origins of globalization, see Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: 
Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2014); Or Rosenboim, The 
Emergence of Globalism Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939-1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2017); Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2018). Important IR contributions to the study of the contested politics of 
globalization include Rosenberg, “Globalization Theory”; Barry Buzan, “A World Order Without Superpowers: 
Decentred Globalism,” International Relations 25, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 3–25; Richard Saull, “Rethinking 
Hegemony: Uneven Development, Historical Blocs, and the World Economic Crisis,” International Studies Quarterly 
56, no. 2 (June 1, 2012): 323–38; Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Capitalism and the Emergent World Order,” 
International Affairs 90, no. 1 (2014): 71–91; Julian Germann, “German ‘Grand Strategy’ and the Rise of 
Neoliberalism,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014): 706–16; Julian Germann, “Beyond ‘Geo-Economics’: 
Advanced Unevenness and the Anatomy of German Austerity,” European Journal of International Relations 24, no. 3 
(2018): 590–613. 
34 This dynamic is a central analytic theme of Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National 
Space (London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), here 282. 
35 For analysis of  Justin Rosenberg and Chris Boyle, “Understanding 2016: China, Brexit and Trump in the 
History of Uneven and Combined Development,” Journal of Historical Sociology, 2019. 
36 Cf. Buzan and Lawson, “Capitalism and the Emergent World Order.” 
37 An approach recently exemplified by Graham T Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s 
Trap? (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 
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system of international dominance: the logic of American power in the global financial system 
is different to that of constructing a world trade order such as the “Belt and Road Initiative.” 
And the forms of political conflict associated with these dimensions of the global economic 
system are different again from the task of organizing a worldwide geopolitical alliance. This 
diplomatic arena is, in turn, distinct from the kind of ideological power an American hegemon 
predicated on democratic capitalism was able to call forth. Geopolitical-military competition 
might enter into all of these operations, but it is not their determinant. Nor are the ensuing 
conflicts the product of a single logic of state power. Pace realist accounts, understanding the 
power-political dynamics associated with this highly differentiated international order requires 
a sustained analysis of the multiple pathways of international power-projection generated by a 
historically specific conjunction of intersocietal processes, not a unitary logic of interstate 
competition. While the neorealist discourse of a “return of geopolitics” captures the surface 
reality of great power competition, the timeless image of the “rise and fall of great powers” 
which undergirds it lacks purchase on the historical specificities of contemporary global 
change.38 
 
This thesis has sought to overcome the limits of such theories, which have enshrined a fixed 
definition of internationality and security as immutable, and obscured the multilinear historical 
trajectories generated by particular formations of societal multiplicity. By adopting a 
sociohistorical perspective, it has elaborated the reciprocal relations between the production of 
an uneven global political economy, key strategies of international power-projection, and the 
mobilization of industrial societies into world-scale projects of economic and geopolitical 
expansion. The historicist understanding of global political-economic space which underpins 
this analysis underscores the internal relations between capitalist development and geopolitical 
change without postulating a universal “theory” of interstate competition. It is thus possible to 
highlight a number of themes which the present disorders of the global scene evoke for the 
study of power politics in general: first, that the continuing unevenness of global capitalism 
means that power-political strategies of external statecraft remain a basic feature of the national 
security repertoire, despite attempts to institutionalize cooperative interstate norms and 
institutions; second, that such exercises in strategic power-projection open out onto wider 
sociopolitical and ideological conflicts about the organization of social order on a variety of 
spatial scales, especially because efforts to manage unevenness are imbricated with the 
progressivist ideological expectations fostered by modernity; third, that the fundamental actors 
of global powers politics are historically developing societies, rather than isomorphic political 
units; and finally, that the means and logics of intersocietal conflict are shifting historical 
constellations rather than fixed geopolitical entities.   
 
                                                
38 For representative examples, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power 
in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381–396; Christopher Layne, “This Time It’s 
Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2012): 203–13; 
Christopher Layne, “Sleepwalking with Beijing,” National Interest 137 (2015): 37–45; Walter Russell Mead, “The 
Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014): 69–79. For a 
critique of neorealist and other IR theories of rising powers along these lines, see Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, 
“Rising Powers and State Transformation: The Case of China,” European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 1 
(March 1, 2016): 72–98. 
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This recalls the historical sociology of international change developed in the previous chapters 
of this thesis. An historicist conception of international power transformations suggests that 
studying ongoing episodes of interstate rivalry requires a more substantive conception of the 
distinct coercive, ideological, and socioeconomic foundations of contemporary intersocietal 
conflicts. A multilinear conception of historical development necessitates a sustained analysis 
of the specific “conjuncture of structures”39 within which particular societies engage in power-
projection at a global level. As the radically different developmental trajectories of Chinese and 
American capitalisms demonstrate — the former experiencing the first signs of a sustained 
slowed down after its original industrial transition, the latter a highly financialized neoliberal 
economy attempting to reassert the competitiveness of national manufactures   — the standard 
image of the states-system as a composite of homogenous units remains as inadequate for 
studying contemporary power politics as it is for understanding the era of the New Imperialism. 
Rather than the continual rehearsal of so many trans-historical drives, an internationally-
oriented historical sociology draws attention to such long-term patterns of societal 
transformation as a key analytic resource for understanding how the mobilization of societies 
for interstate competition takes place at particular historical conjunctures. Extending the 
analysis of contemporary geopolitical realities along these lines also means that scholars of 
international security would have to reckon with such transformations in the social bases of 
international politics as the well-documented decline in popular militarism, the fragmentation 
of class structures through the financialization and globalization of much contemporary 
capitalism, alongside the overall narrowing of ideological polarities brought by the spread of 
neoliberalism. Analogies between the contemporary period and the era of mass-mobilization 
warfare and imperial rivalry that marked the early to mid-twentieth century underestimate 
these long-term historical developments: they misstate the novelty of the context in which 
contemporary power politics operates.40  
 
In a wider sense, this suggests that the image of a cyclical historical process evoked by the 
contemporary realist discourse of a “return of geopolitics” represents a fundamentally 
misleading description of the present conjuncture. While the post-political, “end of history” 
narratives associated with the demise of the Soviet Union have been falsified by the actual 
trajectories of contemporary international change, viewing great power competition as an 
eternally returning dynamic of inexorable geopolitical forces elides the historically evolving 
character of international systems and occludes the social foundations of power politics as a 
mode of international engagement. In place of such over-generalized theoretic frameworks, 
what is needed is a conception which incorporates the antagonistic constitution of the modern 
global condition within a historical sociology of intersocietal conflict and interaction, the 
pathways for international power-projection constituted at particular historical conjunctures, 
and the specific logics of uneven and combined development underpinning them. In the final 
section of this chapter, I derive broader conclusions in this area by considering how 
                                                
39 William Sewell, Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
2005), 221. 
40 For an argument along these lines, criticizing attempts to compare the contemporary United States to the era 
of German Fascism, see,  Dylan Riley, “What Is Trump,” New Left Review, no. 114 (2018): 5–31. 
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contemporary IR theory might benefit from a deeper engagement with the idea of the global 
condition elaborated in this thesis. In this connection, I also address some of the oversights and 
omissions that have characterized the thesis as a whole.  
 
IV. International Theory and the Global Condition    
 
The historical sociology of global power politics outlined in this thesis was borne of a desire to 
better understand the relationships between two central features of modernity. In the 
nineteenth century, global capitalism acquired the status of an encompassing structural reality 
which subjected all peoples to the imperatives of a competitive economic system of 
unprecedented scale and intensity. As the socioeconomic relations of market dependency 
became ever wider in their reach, human society was enriched by an unprecedented material 
abundance even as the conduct of individual life was subsumed by conditions of capitalist 
production which exist, like a fate, outside of it.41 Relative to earlier social formations, the 
productive foundations of material existence now appeared to be separated from the political 
apparatus of formal coercion institutionalized within the modern state; but in actuality, the 
industrialization of the world economy ushered in new capacities for violence that were 
translated into highly coercive strategies of colonial expansion and great power rivalry. 
Although war and diplomacy ceased to be formal mechanisms of wealth-accumulation, the 
institutional separation of the economic from the political generated a seemingly volatile 
strategic field, for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, materialized in an 
external arena of imperial competition wherein industrial societies struggled to define the terms 
of global interdependence.  
 
If these features of global capitalism were the first research interest which animated this project, 
the second major concern was the strategic rationales and ideological motivations that 
characterize modern attempts to establish spheres of influence and autonomy within the 
integrated global condition of nineteenth century modernity. Imperial projects of territorial and 
economic expansionism, whether couched in terms of the civilizing missions or the Open Door, 
were just one of many such projects. Historically, these struggles for global influence and 
autonomy properly involved movements of anti-colonialism, national liberation, and class 
struggle not analyzed in the preceding work. At the same time, for a study focused on the global 
dimensions of modernity, this thesis has privileged the analysis of a single, if expansive, Western 
empire. I hope this narrowness of this focus has enhanced the specificity of the account 
developed above. It is to be hoped that future work on the development of the New Imperialism 
will encompass a range of empires beyond the American case, as well as a fuller reckoning with 
the history of resistance to great power politics and its inequities.  
 
                                                
41 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 
1993), 158. In this passage, Marx writes that, under capitalism, “individuals now produce only for society and in 
society” meaning that “production is not directly social, is not ‘the offspring of association’ which distributes labour 
internally.” As a result, “individuals are subsumed under social production; social production exists outside them 
as their fate; but social production is not subsumed under individuals, manageable by them as their common 
wealth.”  
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The conception of international transformation and power politics developed in this thesis was 
rooted in an understanding on the specific conjuncture of social structures associated with the 
New Imperialism. But its broader analytic categories — uneven and combined development, 
strategic mediation, symbolic competition, conjunctural analysis — entails a middle range, 
internationally-oriented historical sociology that can illuminate other areas of IR theory. On 
the one hand, this way of approaching power politics is applicable to a range of issues in 
contemporary security studies: to the study of modern transformations in the conduct of 
interstate politics, the construction of liberal international orders and the governance of the 
world economy, or to the analysis of changes in the mechanisms of global power-projection, 
such as dynamics of economic statecraft and the demilitarization of great power relations. A 
study of any of these developments would seek to draw out the ways in which the changing 
bases of state power — such as the conversion of former national-imperial states into 
democratic capitalist forms — is articulated with broader intersocietal transformations in the 
textures and organization of the world economy in order to better situate the evolving 
ideological and strategic calculus of contemporary grand strategies. On the other hand, the 
emphasis on the uneven and combined character of the modern international order developed 
in this work suggests that intersocietal approaches to international competition could be 
fruitfully applied to other cases of historical power politics. Such an approach to the unfolding 
dynamic of the Cold War, for example, raises questions about how a subordinate industrial 
society like the Soviet Union sought to fashion a kind of geopolitical and ideological autonomy 
within the prevailing structures of an American- dominated world economy. Given what we 
now know about the intensity of modern globalization, it is unlikely that the conventional image 
of superpower-bipolarity and Soviet autarky adequately captures the patterns of global-scale 
intersocietal connection which marked the post-nineteenth century international order — a 
global power structure forged in an age of deep imperial entanglements.42 
 
These openings point to some of the possible directions for a wider historical sociology of global 
power politics. Only by grasping the intrinsic historicity of international relations, the 
interactive multiplicity of historically evolving human societies, can we begin to reconstruct the 
constituting power dynamics of the modern global condition. This thesis, by historicizing some 
of the key sources and conditions of geopolitical rivalry forged during the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century imperial era, represents an initial step toward this larger effort.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
42 For a recent attempt to situate the USSR within an understanding of globalization, see Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, 
Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). This work is especially interesting for its attempt to deconstruct the narrative of self-
enclosed autarky associated with Soviet society.  
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